Environmental Footprints of Violent Conflict by Pathak, Swapna
University of South Carolina
Scholar Commons
Theses and Dissertations
1-1-2013
Environmental Footprints of Violent Conflict
Swapna Pathak
University of South Carolina - Columbia
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Pathak, S.(2013). Environmental Footprints of Violent Conflict. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/2451
Environmental Footprints of Violent Conflict
by
Swapna Pathak
Bachelor of Arts
University of Delhi, 2001
Master of Arts
Jawaharlal Nehru University, 2003
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosphy in
Political Science
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Carolina
2013
Accepted by:
Harvey Starr, Major Professor
Katherine Barbieri, Committee Member
David Darmofal, Committee Member
Edward Carr, Committee Member
Lacy Ford, Vice Provost and Dean of Graduate Studies
c© Copyright by Swapna Pathak, 2013
All Rights Reserved.
ii
Dedication
To Mumma...
iii
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my advisor Professor Harvey Starr for providing invaluable
and timely insights into this research. One could not ask for a better teacher and
mentor than Harvey. Besides providing intellectual expertise, Harvey was a constant
source of professional and emotional encouragement throughout this project. I am
extremely grateful to have him as my advisor and guide as I navigate through my
academic career. I would also like to thank the other members of my dissertation
committee, Professors Katherine Barbieri, David Darmofal, and Ed Carr, for their
valuable suggestions and inputs.
Special thanks to the administrative assistants at the Department of Political
Science at University of South Carolina–Tamara, Brenda, and Debby, for helping me
with the bureaucratic labyrinth of Graduate School.
Finally, this dissertation would not have been possible without the constant sup-
port of my partner Viplav, my brother, my sister, and most importantly, my mother.
It was her unconditional love and faith that motivated me to finish this project. This
dissertation is dedicated to her.
iv
Abstract
The effects of militarized conflict pervade countless aspects of society, yet scholars
have focussed very little attention on the consequences of conflict. My dissertation
assesses the cost of war by examining the relationship between violent conflict and
the environment. I argue that the effect of conflict on the environment is an im-
portant consequence of war that is often overlooked in favor of other repercussions
such as economy and health that are more politically expedient . I study this effect
in the light of components of national environmental capacity and hypothesize that
conflicts result in short-term and long-term impact on the quality of the environment.
Moreover, wars pose a significant threat to the socially critical components of the en-
vironment which could engender further conflict. I present a framework to evaluate
the complex linkages between war and environment, where environment is assumed
to be at the center and not an exogenous factor that affects conflict. My empirical
analyses explicate the mechanisms though which wars lead to degradation of the en-
vironment. In Chapter 1, I introduce the project and reflect on the importance of
studying the environmental consequences of conflict. I discuss the extant literature
on environment and conflict and underscore the importance of reformulating our un-
derstanding of environmental security in Chapter 2. Then, I lay out the conceptual
and theoretical framework for this study in Chapter 3, outlining the ways in which
conflict undermines our environment. In Chapter 4, I empirically analyze the effect
of conflict, along with relevant political and economic factors, on overall levels of
national environmental capacity over the past five decades. I extend this analysis to
disaggregated measures of environmental capacity in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, I go
v
on to assess the international regime and laws available to protect the environment
during and after wartime. Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“A small grove massacred to the last ash,
An oak with heart-rot, give away the show:
This great society is going to smash;
They cannot fool us with how fast they go,
How much they cost each other and the gods.
A culture is no better than its woods.”
–Wystan Hugh Auden
As I write this chapter, a brutal and devastating civil war in Syria continues.
The international community is ‘cautiously’ debating the possible courses of action,
including military intervention, to establish some political and economic stability in
the region. Other countries and international agencies are closely monitoring the
impact of the conflict on human lives and the economy of Syria to evaluate the costs
and benefits of any international intervention. While the humanitarian, economic,
and political consequences of such conflicts garner immediate international concern,
their environmental impact often ranks very low to factor into any decision making.
For example, very little attention is being paid to what the civil war is doing to an
already drought prone Syria. Large displacement of people away from their lands has
led to the suspension of any planting which will lead to soil erosion. Also, massive
violence has disrupted and destroyed most of the irrigational infrastructure in the
country which will make it extremely difficult to restore agriculture in the future and
further deteriorate the soil.
According to the UN Refugee Agency statistics, nearly a million people have fled
the country and more that 4.25 million people have been displaced. Several thousands
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of these IDPs have taken shelter in the olive orchards at the border of Turkey and
Syria. Many hundreds of year old olive trees in those orchards have been cut down
to create space for make-shift tents and for fire wood for the people living in camps
there. Similarly, the recent civil war in Libya destroyed oil fields and refineries in
Ras Lanuf, Brega, Zawiyah, and several other places, where Gaddafi’s forces bombed
the oil infrastructure in their own country before retreating. Moreover, unrest in
Libya and Egypt, during the last couple of years, have stymied the Strategic Action
Program initiated by the International Atomic Energy Agency to sustainably use the
Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System. This is the largest and one of the most crucial
sources of freshwater in this arid region shared by four countries–Egypt, Libya, Sudan,
and Chad–therefore, its management is critical from both environmental and social
perspectives. However, since the social unrest in Egypt began, all talks to discuss
any sustainable use of the aquifer have been suspended.
The above examples highlight only a few environmental catastrophes due to wars
in recent years. Environmental destruction from wars has a long history. From the
Romans in 146 BC salting fields around Carthage to impair food production to the
destruction of the Libyan oil fields in the recent civil war, wars have always left a trail
of environmental destruction. While the images of burning oil wells during the first
Gulf War and the spraying of Agent Orange to defoliate the jungles in Vietnam woke
up the international community to environmental warfare, other less-known, but no
less significant, acts of environmental destruction have also been perpetrated by the
warring factions during conflict. Such scorched earth tactics have historically included
poisoning freshwater sources, burning down forests that might provide shelter to
enemy combatants, killing livestock, and destroying agricultural fields. Scholars have
used the term “ecocide” to describe such planned destruction of the environment
carried out to harm the local population and achieve military objectives.
Although such ecological destruction during warfare has been carried out for thou-
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sands of years, modern day warfare has made its impact increasingly severe. With
the usage of advanced weaponry and aerial bombing, the scope and the impact of
wars on the environment has increase manifold. Also, the presence of critical infras-
tructure like dams and nuclear reactors in our time has increased the opportunity for
environmental destruction as part of warfare strategy.
Warfare induces a direct and immediate impact on the environment, such as mil-
lions of tons of pollutants being thrown in the air when nearly 800 oil wells were
set ablaze by the retreating Iraqi army in 1991. According to the United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP) reports, the fires took almost 9 months to be extin-
guished and their long term effects on soil quality and underground water are, as yet,
unknown. Similarly, during the aerial campaign over Iraq in 1991, the US utilized
approximately 340 tons of missiles containing depleted uranium. Chemical residue
from these weapons has contaminated the water and soil of the region. Perchlorate,
a toxic ingredient in rocket propellant, is just one of a number of contaminants that
have been widely detected in the groundwater in the area. Aerial bombing over Yu-
goslavia by the NATO forces in 1999 destroyed millions of square kilometers of forests
and also contaminated the soil with large amounts of depleted uranium. Such toxic
and radioactive pollution not only poses a health risk to the human population but
also alters the chemical composition of the soil and destroys its fertility, that can
take decades to recover. These examples only outline the damage that conventional
weapons can inflict. Obviously, the devastation caused by the use of nuclear weapons
will be far greater and could even cause long term changes in the Earth’s climatic
cycle.
Apart from direct and immediate impact on the environment, warfare often leads
to collateral (sometimes unintended) damage of the environment. This occurs when
a country’s hydrological facilities, nuclear reactors or chemical factories are targeted
as part of the military strategy. For example, during the early stage of the Second
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Sino-Japanese War in 1938 the Chinese government destroyed a series of dams on the
Yellow River to create massive flooding in an attempt to halt the rapid advance of the
Japanese forces. Similarly, during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict, the Israeli forces
bombed a power station in Jiyeh causing a massive oil spill that was environmentally
disastrous for the region.
Violent conflicts can also inflict environmental damage in the long run in several
indirect ways. For example, Sudan has experienced over two decades of civil war on
its territory. One result of that war has been over 5 million internally displaced per-
sons. This massive displacement of population has led to significant environmental
damage, particularly around larger camps. In addition, it is feared that following
the cessation of civil war, the large scale return of the displaced population to their
homeland would engender a further wave of environmental degradation in some of the
more fragile return areas. Exploitation of environmental resources to fund conflict
as in the case of Liberia is another indirect environmental consequence of conflict.
The fourteen year long civil war in Liberia was primarily funded by exporting “con-
flict diamonds” and “conflict timber” by Charles Taylor’s administration. A similar
illegal trade of diamonds and other precious metals helped in financing wars in An-
gola, Congo, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Zimbabwe. In addition to perpetuating
resource extraction based environmental damage, violent conflicts often destroy a
state’s political and economic infrastructure which might be directed to ensuring sus-
tainable use of environmental resources. Violent conflicts also make it difficult for any
international conservation task force or scientific groups to gather data and conduct
research to protect the environment in the region.
Given that wars inflict an immense amount of damage to the environment–in
several immediate and long-term ways–it becomes absolutely crucial to examine this
relationship more closely. Also, the global community has been actively trying to
assess the anthropogenic impact on the environment and since wars are one of the
4
biggest man-made catastrophes, it is important to look at how wars affect the envi-
ronment. To elaborate upon the importance of this research question seems almost
redundant and trivializes the significance of the environment and natural resources
for our existence. What is surprising though is how little attention is paid to the
impact of conflict on the environment in conflict literature. While the literature on
conflict is replete with analyses of its causes, its consequences in general have been
paid much less attention. There is some literature on the economic and trade related
consequences of conflicts, and more recently, there has been some emerging research
on the impact of conflict on health and education, however, there is a significant
lacuna in the field when it comes to focusing on the environmental degradation as a
consequence of conflict.
Studying the environmental consequences of war serves a threefold purpose–Firstly,
it illuminates yet another cost of violent conflicts that is borne not only by the the
present generation but by generations to come. Scholars of rational choice theories
who study conflict assume that going to war is a rational decision, predicated by
weighing the costs and benefits of the outcome. By highlighting the environmen-
tal cost of war, this study argues that environmental outcomes of conflicts should
not be ignored while deciding on initiating any military action. The motivation for
this study comes from a normative concern for the environment that often takes a
backseat when pitted against military or economic necessity by states and decision-
makers. Even during or after a conflict, fulfilling the immediate needs of the affected
population comes at the expense of long term environmental damage. Unlike public
health or economic development during and after wartime, which are the immediate
indicators of a population’s well being and hence easily become issues of domestic
and international concern, environmental degradation ranks very low as a political
priority. Gauging the environmental consequences of a conflict is often a more com-
plex process that takes a considerable temporal commitment with slow results. For
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example, the amount of depleted uranium released into the soil in Kosovo as a re-
sult of NATO bombing of the region is still under assessment. Moreover, saving a
particular kind of plant or animal species is not deemed critical by the international
community or the political leadership of a war ravaged country where people’s lives
are at stake.
Such a myopic attitude towards the environment, that forsakes the future well
being of the environment for the sake of immediate military gains, is not just criminal
but also leads to eventual social and economic backlash. Setting fire to oil wells,
destroying forests or poisoning bodies of water are clearly acts of “ecocide” that
compromise the environment and also affect the people dependent on these resources.
This research underscores the fact that the environmental impact of war needs to
be paid more attention to when decision-makers and researchers assess the cost of
conflicts.
Secondly, as mentioned earlier, most of the research on international and civil wars
focuses on their causes or termination. The body of work on consequences of war is
still limited, with most scholars concentrating on the economic and political conse-
quences of war. [Bayer and Rupert (2004), Blomberg and Hess (2002), Bodea and
Elbadawi (2008), Collier (1999; 2009), Collier and Davies (2008), Elbadawi (2008),
Flores and Nooruddin (2009), Koubi (2005), Pickering and Kisangani (2006)] Hence
given the state of the field, looking at environmental consequences of war fills a sig-
nificant gap.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, this study aims to put the environment at
the center of the theoretical frameworks analyzing the relationship between conflict
and environment. So far, most of the research that has looked at the relationship
between conflict and the environment has focussed on environmental factors, such as
climate change or natural resources, as causes of conflict. These studies have also
focussed on how often excess or lack of certain resources leads to violent conflicts.
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[Gleditsch and NordŇs (2007), Gleditsch (2001; 2007) Reuveny (2007), Goldstone
(2001), Barnett and Adger (2007), Deudney (1999), Homer-Dixon (1991), Volker
(1999), de Soysa (2002a; 2002b) Renner (1996), Ross (2004)] What is common among
all of these studies is that they treat the climate and natural resources as exogenous
variables affecting social well being. However, in this study I argue that climate and
environmental resources are not exogenous to but a function of our social and po-
litical realities. For example, droughts can often be man made, that occur because
of problems with irrigational facilities or soil degradation. The recent drought in
Maharashtra, a state in the western part of India, is one such contemporary case of
man-made drought. Being lamented as the worst drought in the region in the last
five decades, it is an outcome of inequitable and inefficient water management poli-
cies. Existence of the environment might be an exogenous factor, but what we deem
as “environmental resources” and who has access to these “resources” or who gets
affected by environmental calamities is a political and social issue. Moreover, given
the increasing scientific evidence for the anthropogenic impact on the environment,
where human beings are constantly transforming their natural environment, it is a
fallacy to even consider the existence of environment as exogenous.
Therefore, it becomes critical to bring the environment back to the center of any
analysis exploring the relationship between conflict and environment. This means
not only exploring how environmental factors instigate conflict but also looking at
how wars affect the environment. Such an altered way of looking at the relation-
ship between conflict and environment moves away from a unidirectional analysis,
where environment is treated as an exogenous variable, to a more comprehensive and
interdependent view of the relationship.
This research underscores the need to alter our understanding of ‘environmental
security’ in conflict and security studies. Traditionally, the notion of ‘environmen-
tal security’ is subsumed under the whole human security paradigm. The discourse
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on human security emerged towards the end of the Cold War as a challenge to the
dominant Neo-realist paradigm in international relations and security studies. As
part of the Cold War outlook, the Neo-realist paradigm argued that security of the
state is the paramount concern in international politics. However, as the Cold War
ended, scholars and policy makers began to look at a more comprehensive notion of
security that prioritized the security of human beings over the security of states. This
notion of human security involved economic security, food security, health security,
political security and all other social, political and economic contexts that can ensure
a rich and fulfilling life for all human beings. This call for human security was in
response to the changing milieu where the process of globalization was expanding and
the Washington Consensus had failed to improve the lives of people living the poor
countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. One important aspect of human secu-
rity was considered to be environmental security which aimed to protect people from
the threats of long-term and short-term environmental deterioration such as global
warming, availability of fresh water, natural disasters, and so on. However, in this
research I argue that by subsuming environmental security under human security, the
international community is endorsing weaker regimes and laws to protect the envi-
ronment. Utilizing insights from political ecology and critical geopolitics I claim that
the environment should be put at the center of the environmental security discourse.
Which means that we should focus on securing and conserving our environment for
its own sake and not necessarily for human consumption and development. Given
the clear evidence of anthropogenic impact on the environment, it is presumptuous
to focus of securing the environment for human use, rather, the environment needs
to be secured from the human beings.
The existing anthropocentric approach to environmental security has two signifi-
cant drawbacks–one, prioritizing human and other types of security over securing the
environment justifies the doctrines of proportionality or military necessity to dam-
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age the environment during conflict. These gaps weaken the international laws and
regimes to protect the environment during wartime and in turn, paradoxically, com-
promise human security. Second, by focussing on how environmental factors lead to
social unrest and affect human security, we only look at a part of the full picture. To
understand how conflict and environment relate to each other we also need to look
at how conflicts as a human construct, affect the environment.
One of the broad questions that I attempt to answer in this research is–how do
violent conflicts affect the environment? Moreover, how do different types of wars–
intrastate and interstate–affect different aspects of the environment? Wars clearly
have a negative impact on the environment due to bombings, chemical defoliation or
air pollution from military activities. But wars also result in indirect impact on the
environment through population displacement, destroying environmental institutions
and infrastructure, and resource extraction for financing conflicts. Additionally, the
nature of particular conflicts also influences the relationship between war and envi-
ronment. For example, international warfare, that includes aerial bombing, can be
more detrimental to soil productivity than civil wars which normally do not utilize
advanced weaponry. On the other hand, civil wars could be more detrimental to
forest cover if they are primarily financed by timber exports. Asymmetric warfare
also engenders different environmental consequences for the countries involved. For
example, the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, led by the United States, have
had a very serious impact on the environment of Iraq and Afghanistan, whereas the
environment of the Unites States has been unaffected. Additionally, magnitude of
the conflict should also be taken into account when assessing its impact on the envi-
ronment. More severe conflicts, defined in terms of their duration and casualties, are
likely to have a more profound impact on the environment. This study is designed
to be a “first cut” in understanding these direct and indirect linkages utilizing large
panel data which will help us in identifying some general trends and patterns, and
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provide us pathways for future projects in this area.
The second part of the thesis discusses the various legal provisions and institutions
available to protect the environment during war-time. How effective is the interna-
tional regime to protect the environment during conflicts? Where are the gaps?
What needs to be done to make this regime more effective? As history has shown us,
wars are detrimental to the environment, but effective international safeguards and
penalties could prove to be a deterrent for “ecocide.” Also, adequate monetary com-
pensation for environmental destruction by the guilty party during war-time could
help in restoration and conservation efforts.
I attempt to answer the questions outlined above using an aggregate measure for
the environmental well being of a country–national biocapacity data. This biocapac-
ity data is widely used by ecologists, environmentalists, and national governments
to estimate the environmental productivity and ecological consumption footprint in
countries. To deepen my analysis on the impact of violent conflicts on a country’s
environment, I also look at four disaggregated measures of a country’s biocapacity–
forest land, agricultural land, grazing land and fishing grounds. These aspects of a
country’s aggregate biocapacity shed light on the productivity and quality of a coun-
try’s land, forest cover and water resources. Additionally, forests, land, and water
are critical resources for population sustenance and therefore degradation of theses
resources due to various reasons, including conflict, can forebode social unrest in the
future. In order to understand the relationship between conflict and environment, I
assess the impact of different types of wars–international, civil, and ethnic–and their
magnitude on the aggregate and disaggregate measures of national biocapacity.
Conflict adversely affects the environment and a social scientific study of this rela-
tionship would make theoretical, conceptual and methodological contributions to the
disciplines of political science and environmental studies. Establishing the linkages
between violent conflict and the environment would contribute to the international
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conflict literature by assessing an important consequence of war. Drawing on conflict
data from international relations sources and combining it with biocapacity data used
in environmental sciences would make the study valuable for both disciplines. It also
opens up the opportunity to draw on methodological expertise from the disciplines
of international relations, environmental studies, and economics.
This study analyzes data on conflict, environmental biocapacity, and other vari-
ables of interest for 186 countries across a span of forty years. Such large-N analysis
helps us in exploring broad patterns and developing baselines for the study of conflict-
environment relationships. Since most literature in political science on this subject (as
will be discussed in later chapters) focuses on area specific studies of environmental
damage caused due to conflict, a large-N analysis of this relationship is a significant
contribution to highlight the environmental cost of war in general. This broad spec-
trum study also shows how wars affect different aspects of environmental productivity,
regardless of the specificity of processes within individual countries. Such information
can be very useful for policy-making around war initiation and providing financial aid
towards environmental protection in conflict zones. A large-N analysis also enables
us to compare environmental impact of wars on different countries. In particular, this
study highlights the issue of environmental injustice because some results point out
that poorer countries suffer much more in terms of their environmental biocapacity
as a result of wars than advanced industrialized democracies.
The implications of this project have broad relevance due to the interconnected-
ness of the issues involved in the relationship between conflict and environment. En-
vironmental conservation and protection from anthropogenic activities has certainly
become important in international policy making and domestic policy decisions for
many countries. An understanding of the effect of war on the environment would
inform the security policy of states as the costs of war become clearer. Just as the
financial cost of waging war is taken into consideration before embarking on military
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action, the environmental cost, if understood, could also be a factor in the decision to
go to war. Further, an emphasis on strengthening the international regime for pro-
tecting the environment during wartime could contribute in shifting the norm towards
environmental conservation as a priority. The study would also help inform various
international agencies and international law experts to create more effective laws and
international infrastructure to protect the environment during and after conflicts.
The academic audience for this study is also wide and diverse. The examination
of the effect of conflict on the environment draws upon, and contributes to, the fields
of conflict processes, development, and environmental studies. The number of socio-
political, and economic factors involved in assessing the costs and consequences of war
reflects the interconnectedness of various disciplines in social scientific work. Conflict
and security scholars maintain a profound interest in causes and consequences of war,
this study examines an important impact of conflict within a transformed notion of
environmental security. Studying the security of the environment rather than security
of human beings or security of states needs a fundamental shift in our our perceptions
about ourselves and the traditional notion of security. This study also informs scholars
who study resource based conflict or climate change induced conflict to broaden their
analysis and move away from a unidirectional framework that treats environment and
natural resources as exogenous variables. In stead, the study argues to create a more
comprehensive framework, rooted in feedback loops, to understand the relationship
between conflict and environment where wars and other types of social conflicts can
destroy our environment or limit our access to natural resources, engendering further
conflict.
The following chapter discusses the state of the discipline in analyzing the rela-
tionship between conflict and environment. I locate this analysis within the context of
a much larger international debate on the idea of “environmental security.” Taking a
cue from the literature on Political Ecology and Critical Geopolitics, I argue that the
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concept of “environmental security” needs to move away from the state centered or
even anthropocentric notion of security where the environment needs to be “secured”
by the states and for the states (and its population). Instead, the environment needs
to be at the heart of “environmental security” where it is conserved and preserved
for its own sake. Based on this transformed notion of “environmental security,” I
present a framework to analyze the relationship between environment and conflict
in Chapter 3. Here I outline the existing research in the field that has focused on
how environmental factors lead to violent conflicts, treating the environment as an
exogenous variable. In addition to this framework, I suggest reversing the causal
arrow and looking at how violent conflicts affect the environment. This approach to
analyzing the relationship between environment and conflict brings the environment
at the center of analysis and also highlights yet another cost of war. Chapters 4
and 5 comprise the empirical analysis and test the hypotheses related to the main
questions posed in this study. In Chapter 4, I assess the effect of conflict on the
overall quality of the environment (measured in terms of biocapacity) and provide a
general understanding of this relationship. In Chapter 5, I evaluate the influence of
wars on different aspects on the environment, such as forest cover, crop land, grazing
land, and fisheries, whose deterioration can signal the occurrence of future conflicts.
In Chapter 6, I analyze the international regime to protect the environment during
wartime. Here I evaluate the strengths and weakness of various international laws
and treaties designed to safeguard the environment during conflicts. Based on those
evaluations, I argue that the international regime pertaining to environmental protec-
tion during wartime needs to undergo a norm-shift from that of “military necessity”
to “environmental security” or “environmental preservation.” Chapter 7 discusses the
implications of this project and directions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Environment, Conflict and Security
2.1 Introduction
Analyzing the impact of conflict on the environment within the traditional scope of
international politics is a tough order. Studying the environment or natural resources
forces us to think beyond the conventional analytical categories of system, state and
individual. This is because the boundaries of our political existence circumscribing
countries, governments, various groups and individuals do not overlap with the global
environment. Water resources, atmosphere or even the utility of the existence of
the rain-forests do not observe national boundaries. Yet, the global environment is
managed by institutions that are constrained by political boundaries. This poses
a challenge for policy and decision-makers who are trying to “manage” the global
environment without compromising national interests and also for the researchers in
choosing an appropriate framework of analysis to study.
Research on the environment within the field of International Relations can be
broadly classified into two categories–one that analyzes the relationship between en-
vironmental/climate change and conflict and the other that looks at the impact of
natural resources on political regimes and conflicts. The first category involves re-
search that looks at the impact of climate change, desertification or natural disasters
on conflicts. [Buhaug [2010], Homer-Dixon and Blitt [1998], Smith and Vivekananda
[2012], Detraz and Betsill [2009], Hendrix and Glaser [2007], Podesta and Ogden
[2008], Buhaug et al. [2010], Brown et al. [2007], Raleigh and Urdal [2007], Salehyan
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[2008], Nordås and Gleditsch [2007], Reuveny [2007], Barnett [2003], Barnett and
Adger [2007]] A substantial amount of work in the field has also been done to look
at environmental agreements and negotiations as an analytical focus for research into
the dynamics of environmental regime. [Helm and Sprinz [2000], Wapner [1996], Vic-
tor et al. [1998], Sprinz and Vaahtoranta [1994], Betsill and Corell [2001], Roberts and
Parks [2006], Kütting [2000], Mitchell [2003], Luterbacher and Sprinz [2001], Falkner
[2003], Young [1999]] The latter category was influenced by the concerns of political
economy and looked at the impact of natural resources like oil and natural gas on
economic development and political regimes in resource rich countries. [Soysa [2002],
De Soysa [2000, 2002], Kahl [2002, 2006], Luong and Weinthal [2006], Dunning [2005,
2008], Sachs and Warner [1995, 2001], Levy [1995], Ross [1999, 2001a,b, 2004a,b, 2003,
2006], Midlarsky [1995]] Several theories of “resource curse” and “honey-pot effect”
were put forward to explain how natural resources affect the political institutions and
economic growth with in a country. [Sachs and Warner [2001], De Soysa [2000], Soysa
[2002], Luong and Weinthal [2006]] This went on to spawn a large body of growing
literature on how resources like diamonds, precious minerals, timber, oil and so on,
affect conflict between and within countries. [De Luca et al. [2012], Sorens [2011],
Rustad et al. [2008], Call [2010], Brunnschweiler and Bulte [2009], Le Billon [2008],
Le Billon and Levin [2009], Lujala [2010], Colgan [2010], Hamilton [2012], Basedau
and Lay [2009]]
In the decades of 1950 through 1990, as colonialism retreated and cold war came
to an end, the world was looking at the newly independent countries in Asia, Middle
East and Africa. Many countries in these regions were extremely rich in mineral
wealth and natural resources like oil, natural gas, timber, diamonds and so on. The
naive hope of development scholars and the international community was that given
the wealth of their natural resources, these countries would develop and thrive quickly.
Yet, to this date, many of these countries remain economically and politically unsta-
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ble, some of them are now termed as “failed states.” These developments perplexed
international communities and by the 1990s many economists like Auty [1993] and
Sachs and Warner [1995] tried to explain this “paradox of plenty.” The four major
economic explanations provided to explain the “resource curse” were–(1) a decline in
the terms of trade for primary commodities, (2) the instability of the international
commodity market, (3) poor economic linkages between the resource and the non-
resource sectors, and (4) “Dutch Disease”–which describes the combined influence of
two effects that commonly follow resource booms, the first is the appreciation of a
state’s real exchange rate caused by the sharp rise in exports (of the resource); the
second is the tendency of a booming resource sector to draw away capital and labor
from a country’s agricultural and manufacturing sector, raising their production cost.
By the late 1990s political scientists began to look at other factors like regimes
and conflicts associated with natural resource abundance, that explained lack of de-
velopment in these countries. Some of the mechanisms that were put forward were
those of a “Rentier State” where the state’s biggest source of revenue is the income
from the natural resource. This leads to low taxation, lack of development of polit-
ical institutions, bloated and corrupt bureaucracy, resulting in a stagnant economy
and weak political regime. Scholars who look at the relationship between natural
resource abundance and conflict propose two mechanisms–(1)theories of “honey-pot’
effect or “resource war” arguments where groups engage in conflict in order to control
the abundant natural resource and (2)“Conflict resources” arguments where natural
resources are extracted from conflict zones to fund or prolong the war.
In most of these analyses environment is in the background–an independent vari-
able to analyze more conventional concerns of military and economic security. A
small but growing literature on critical geopolitics and political ecology suggests that
environmental degradation is very substantially driven by the processes implicit in
the normal operations of international politics, hence most analyses on environment
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and conflict take for granted precisely what they ought to investigate. [Dalby [2010],
Lee Peluso [2012], Peluso and Watts [2001]] This difficulty is especially evident in
the literature on climate change and natural resources in conflict studies. Most of
the research on environment and conflict discusses the necessity of rethinking secu-
rity, whether in terms of common, comprehensive or human security which includes
environmental security. [Levy [1995], Dabelko and Dabelko [1995], Westing [1989],
Barnett [2001], Myers et al. [1993]] The field of conflict studies is predicated on a cer-
tain kind of environment and human security framework where humans need to be
“secured” from the changing climate or the abundance or lack of resources. The ap-
peals of conservation and preservation in this research are also made for the sake of the
human survival. However, this framework simply extends the dilemmas rather than
shifting the analytical gaze to investigate the simultaneous causes of both insecurity
and environmental degradation. Once this connection is directly addressed, ecology
then opens up the possibility of more drastically rethinking the scope and purposes
of international relations and conflict studies and the centrality of the assumption
that security is the overarching rationale for the endeavor in the first place.
This chapter will first outline the main-stream environment and security paradigm,
then it will go on to discuss the primary criticisms of this framework from the devel-
oping world and also from the foreign policy hawks in the developed world. The last
part of the chapter will present a third line of criticism rooted in political ecology
and critical geopolitics literature which argues against considering environment as an
exogenous variable to human or national security and urges the academic and policy
making community to look at both security of human beings and environment as a
part of a singular system continuously interacting with each other.
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2.2 The Environment and Security Framework
The relationship between environment and human security has perhaps been recog-
nized since the beginning of mankind. It manifested in religious and spiritual beliefs
of people where the elements of nature were worshipped for the protection and pros-
perity of human civilization. The very structure of human existence was aligned with
that of the natural environment. Nature was feared and revered and all existence
depended on it.
Even far back in the 4th century BC a noted Indian scholar, Kautilya, explic-
itly wrote about the utility of protecting and conserving the environment as part
of statecraft. In many sutras in his work Arthashastra, Kautilya wrote about envi-
ronmental consciousness along four dimensions–natural resources like land, forests,
minerals, rivers, and so on, biological environment like animals and aquatic life, nat-
ural calamities like droughts and floods, and civic responsibilities such as hygiene
and disposal of waste. He highlighted the need to protect natural flora and fauna
and emphasized upon appropriate civic behavior for the long-term prosperity of the
kingdom. [Rangarajan [1992], Modelski [1964]] The notion that environmental stress
can induce human insecurity is also evident in other countless examples that exist
throughout history like warfare in ancient China [Zhang et al. [2007, 2005]] or the
collapse of Native American population centers in the United States. [Booth and
Jacobs [1990], Gedicks [1994]]
As the awareness about the relationship between environmental stress and human
security has increased, coupled with issues of population, development and globaliza-
tion, the international community is waking up to more and more instances of envi-
ronmental degradation. For example–Philippines is experiencing massive depletion of
natural resources through deforestation, watershed abuse, overfishing and coral reef
destruction. Such environmental degradation threatens the livelihood of the people,
where more than 73 percent of the population is in the agriculture, forestry and fishery
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sectors. The anti-government rebel groups in the country, like the New People’s Army,
take advantage of these declining conditions and governmental campaigns against the
rebels often do not get any support from the rural communities who are disenchanted
with the degradation of the environmental basis of their livelihood. The resulting lack
of security has resulted in open conflicts in the country. [Castro and Nielsen [2003],
Hirsch [1998], Homer-Dixon [1994]] Similarly in the last 60 years Haiti’s forest cover
has reduced from 60 percent to merely a 2 percent of its total land area. This has
resulted in firewood shortages and cultivation of marginal soil, which is a recipe for
social disruption and instability in such a low-income country.[Dolisca et al. [2007],
Kreimer and Munasinghe [1990], Homer-Dixon [1994]] In another such case, during
the 1960s, as a result of deforestation and improper agriculture practices, there was
widespread soil erosion in Ethiopia’s Highlands. The result was decline of farmland,
inefficiency of agriculture, food shortages and exponential rise in food prices leading
to urban riots. [Myers [1989]]
Literature on water-based conflicts is also replete with instances of social distur-
bances in many areas caused due to the lack of availability and improper distribu-
tion of water.[Conca [2005], Waterbury [2002], Khagram [2004], Stetter et al. [2011],
Bernauer et al. [2012a], Weinthal and Vengosh [2011]] For example, two of Somalia’s
biggest rivers–Jubba and Shebelle originate in Ethiopia, and sharing these rivers has
been an integral part of the longstanding conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia.
Scholars argue that even after the end of the Ogaden war between the two countries
in 1979, water distribution related issues between the Ethiopian refugees and local
Somalis further complicated the conflict, which manifested in more intensified wars
later on. [Gleick [1993], Reuveny [2007]]
The militarization of water conflicts is not a recent phenomenon. On numerous
occasions, Israel and its neighboring Arab states have feuded over access to Jordan
River waters. In the 1950s, a comprehensive Johnston plan was designed to facilitate
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co-operative use of the Jordan River waters in the region. This plan eventually failed
because of the mistrust among the four bordering states (Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and
Syria). Since then each state has tended to follow its own water policies. In November
1990, former Israeli Minister for Agriculture Rafael Eitan stated that Israel must
never relinquish the West Bank because a loss of its water supplies would threaten
the very existence of Jewish State. Many military moves in that region like the 1967
occupation of the West Bank, the Golan Heights and Gaza Strip, at some level, were
also said to be motivated by water supply issues in the region. [Nijim [1990], Wolf
[1995], Selby [2004]]
Traditionally, such analyses of environmental security examine the threats posed
by environmental events and changes to human population. The relationship between
environment and security has been under consideration since the 1980s mainly by two
groups–(1) the environmental policy community, addressing the security implications
of environmental change and security, and (2) the security community and political
scientists, looking at new definitions of national security, particularly in the post Cold
War era. It was acknowledged by all groups concerned that the global impact of, for
example, environmental change, the depletion of the ozone layer and transboundary
pollution, have clear security implications. This in turn led the military authorities to
re-evaluate the security dimension of environmental issues. Security was traditionally
seen as a synonym for national security with two main objectives: (1) to preserve the
territorial integrity of the State and (2) to maintain the preferred form of government,
by political and military means. [Baldwin [1997], Walt [1991], Haftendorn [1991]]
However, this traditional notion of security has been extensively debated over the
last three decades given how the perceived threats to our security have changed from
a nuclear war in a bipolar world to international terrorism, climate change, civil wars,
cyber terrorism and so on.
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Security Redefined
After the end of the Cold War in 1989, the security community’s focus shifted from
the global clash of superpowers to fragmented groups of stateless actors fomenting
civil war and terrorism. This move towards expanding the notion of security picked
up momentum in the early 1980s when the Independent Commission on Security
and Disarmament Issues (ICSDI) developed and introduced the concept of “common
security”. Hence, the idea of national security began to assume a broader perspective
beyond traditional security concerns. A range of diverse threats to both, individuals
and the world, such as economic decline, social and political instability, ethnic rivalries
and territorial dispute, international terrorism, money laundering, drug trafficking
and environmental stress came into focus within this expanded definition of security.
Today “environmental security” has become a catch-all phrase which includes
everything from climate change to oil exploration to agricultural subsidies or any other
issue that connects the environment to human existence. Environmental security is
now closely linked to national security and has become an integral part of the Human
Security paradigm. Our understanding of the links between environment and security
has evolved in the last twenty years to reflect the changing threat scenarios from
chemical and nuclear warfare to resource-based warfare to terrorism to vulnerability
towards climate change.
Our Common Future
In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) clearly
linked security with environment in its report namedOur Common Future–“Humankind
faces two great threats. The first is that of a nuclear exchange. Let us hope that it
remains a diminishing prospect for the future. The second is that of environmental
ruin world-wide and far from being a prospect for the future, it is a fact right now.”
[Brundtland et al. [1987, p. 99]] Following this inter-linkage, the UN General Assem-
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bly officially introduced the concept of security and environment at its 42nd Session.1
Our Common Future, was also one of the initial documents that defined sustain-
able development. Population, poverty, conflict, high levels of military spending, and
the ultimate threat of nuclear exchange were highlighted as direct and indirect im-
pediments to achieving sustainable development. Yet, the Brundtland Commission,
named after its chair, former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, also
called for a broader conception of security that included instability caused in part by
environmental factors–as was to become the habit of many subsequent environmental
security advocates.
The Brundtland report, in an under-appreciated chapter entitled “Peace, Secu-
rity, Development, and the Environment,” set the agenda for understanding multiple
links between environment and security. [Brundtland et al. [1987]] In this chapter,
the Brundtland report flagged both the environment’s implications for security and
security’s impact on the environment. It highlighted the contributions of natural re-
sources to violent conflict and their link to the well-being of humans and ecosystems.
It also noted that the arms culture of superpower military confrontation and the
subsequent war on terror had presented tremendous impediments to achieving sus-
tainable development. The report even previewed some of the efforts to capture the
power of environmental issues to build peace instead of conflict. “Some of the most
challenging problems require cooperation among nations enjoying different systems
of government, or even subject to antagonistic relations,” wrote the commissioners.
[Brundtland et al. [1987, p. 302]] In the introductory chapter, the commissioners
stated, “The whole notion of security as traditionally understood in terms of polit-
ical and military threats to national sovereignty, must be expanded to include the
growing impacts of environmental stress–locally, nationally, regionally, and globally.”
1UN Doc. A/40/553 (1986) ‘Concepts of Security’; UN GA Res. 42/93 (7 December 1987),
‘Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security’; UN GA Res. 42/186 (11 December
1987)
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[Brundtland et al. [1987, p. 19]] While acknowledging these linkages were “poorly
understood,” the commission held that “a comprehensive approach to international
and national security must transcend the traditional emphasis on military power and
armed competition.” [Brundtland et al. [1987, p. 290]]
While by no means the first advocate for this expanded notion of security,2 the
Brundtland Commission was a key legitimizing voice. Its influence was felt in the
United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) “human security” frame, which
gained traction in UN forums and was championed by select national leaders such
as Canada’s Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy.3 The commissioners identified cli-
mate change, loss of arable land, fisheries, and water as factors likely to contribute
to conflict and spur other security-related problems, such as migration and economic
dislocation. The report flagged “environmental stress as both a cause and an effect of
political tension and military conflict” and recognized that “environmental stress is
seldom the only cause of major conflicts within or among nations” but could be “an
important part of the web of causality associated with any conflict and can in some
cases be catalytic.” [Brundtland et al. [1987, p. 290-291]] It also highlighted poverty,
inequality, and lost development opportunities as key factors in creating insecurity.
Even as it called for altering the security paradigm, the Brundtland Commission
made arguments firmly ensconced in a traditional statist security perspective. How-
ever, many of these arguments were later critiqued for being very Euro or Developed
world centric in their orientation and prescription and faced tough resistance in the
policy circles of developing countries like India, China and Brazil. [Lele et al. [2010],
Lohmann [2009], Najam et al. [2003]]
2See L. Brown, Redefining Security, Worldwatch paper no. 14, Washington, DC: Worldwatch
Institute, 1977.
3 See UN Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 1994, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1994; R. Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” International
Security 26, No. 2 (2001): 87-102, and L. Axworthy, “Introduction”, in R. McRae and D. Hubert,
eds., Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace, Montreal:
McGill, Queen’s University Press, 2001, Pp: 3-13.
23
The Brundtland Commission also identified political capacity as an important
element in environment-conflict links. Ten years later it was recognized as a crucial
variable by the field’s researchers.4 The commissioners stated that environmental
stress could contribute to interstate or subnational conflict “when political processes
are unable to handle the effects of environmental stress resulting, for example, from
erosion and desertification.” [Brundtland et al. [1987, p. 291]] Our Common Future’s
focus on environment and conflict provided a legitimizing foundation for what, just
a few years later, became an explosion of analytical work within and outside of gov-
ernments.5 Apart from highlighting the environment’s contribution to conflict and
insecurity, the Brundtland Commission’s report also highlighted the negative im-
pact of conflict and the military on the environment. It reminded governments that
the costs of conflict and militaries present direct and indirect tradeoffs to investing
in sustainable development: “Arms competition and armed conflict may stimulate
an ethos that is antagonistic towards cooperation among nations whose ecological
and economic interdependence requires them to overcome national or ideological an-
tipathies.” Even “a state of ‘peace’ might well entail the diversion into armament pro-
duction of vast resources that could, at least in part, be used to promote sustainable
4See T. F. Homer-Dixon, The Ingenuity Gap, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000); G. D. Dabelko
and R. Matthew, “Environment, Population, and Conflict: Suggesting a Few Steps Forward,” En-
vironmental Change and Security Project Report, (2000): 99-103; and S. D. VanDeveer and G.
D. Dabelko, “Its Capacity, Stupid: International Assistance and National Implementation,” Global
Environmental Politics, 1, No. 2 (2001): Pp:18-29.
5See T. F. Homer Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute
Conflict,” International Security, 16, no. 2 (1991): 76-116; T. F. Homer-Dixon, “Environmental
Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,” International Security, 19, no. 1 (1994):
5-40; T. F. Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1999); G. Baechler, Violence through Environmental Discrimination: Causes, Rwanda
Arena, and Conflict Model, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989; N. P.
Gleditsch, ed., Conflict and the Environment, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Publications,
1989; P. F. Diehl and N.P. Gleditsch, eds., Environmental Conflict , Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
2001; D. H. Deudney and R. Matthew, eds., Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New
Environmental Politics, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999; UN Environment
Program (UNEP), Understanding Environment, Conflict, and Cooperation, Nairobi: UNEP, 2003,
and C. Kahl, States, Scarcity and Civil Strife in the Developing World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2006.
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forms of development.” [Brundtland et al. [1987, p. 290-294]] This resource-diversion
or opportunity-cost argument has been used repeatedly in both expert and public
discourses on environmental security.6 The commissioners went so far as to identify
tropical forest, water, desertification, and population priorities that could be funded
with one month’s share of the global military spending budget. During the 20 years
that followed the release of Our Common Future, scholarly and policy interest in the
linkages it highlighted has risen, fallen, and risen again.7
Since the UN General Assembly introduced environmental security in the 1980s,
many international institutions like the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP),
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Security and Cooper-
ation in Europe (OSCE) or the International Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) have
been actively engaged with the issue of environment and security. These organiza-
tions recognized the urgency of looking at the environment and security nexus and
worked to design a more comprehensive response in terms of capacity building and
monitoring compliance.
The UNEP first dealt with environmental security in the joint PRIO/UNEP Pro-
gram on Military Activities and the Human Environment in the 1980s. In 1988 an ad
hoc experts’ meeting on expanded concept of international security was organized by
UNEP, followed by the international symposium “Towards a Comprehensive System
of International Security” which was co-sponsored by UNEP. The main emphasis of
this framework was to explore the interrelationship between environmental security
6See UN Secretary-General, Potential Uses of Military-Related Resources for Protection of the
Environment, Report A/46/364 (New York: UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1993). This same
argument against the “arms culture” was voiced in the Rio+10 forum of the 2002 Johannesburg
World Summit on Sustainable Development where public interventions at IUCN’s 3 September en-
vironmental security forum repeatedly focused on diverting U.S. military largesse to more productive
and sustainable ends (Environmental Resources and Social Conflict Dialogue, Sandton, South Africa,
3 September 2002).
7See R. Matthew, B. McDonald, and M. Brklacich, “Analyzing Environment, Conflict, and Co-
operation,” in UNEP, Pp. 5-15; and G. D. Dabelko, “The Environmental Factor,” Wilson Quarterly
23, no. 4 (1999): 14-19.
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and comprehensive international security. As a follow-up, the PRIO/UNEP Pro-
gram published a booklet on Environmental Security - A Report Contributing to the
Concept of Comprehensive International Security.8
The General Assembly Resolution 42/186 mandated UNEP to deal with the issue;
Paragraph 86 of the Resolution reads:
“One of the roles of the United Nations Environment Program is to pro-
mote environmentally sound development in harmony with peace and se-
curity, and towards this end, issues of disarmament and security, in so far
as they relate to the environment, should continue to receive appropriate
attention.”
The United Nations Task Force on Environment and Human Settlement addressed
the issue in its 1998 Report:
“[...] Monitoring and assessment are closely linked to early warning of
possible environmental emergencies through the prediction of extreme
events or unusual environmental conditions. This kind of warning is ex-
tremely valuable for environmental and economic decision-makers; for ex-
ample, advance warning of drought conditions can enable farmers to plant
drought-resistant crops. It may be possible to identify, on a long-term ba-
sis, potential ‘hot spots’ or areas that are likely to be subject to rates of
change that exceed the limits of sustainability and thus pose threats to
regional or global security. The Task Force also recommends that UNEP
and Habitat Design maintain the system of information, monitoring and
assessment so as to maximize its ability to provide early warning of possi-
ble environmental and human settlement emergencies. It further recom-
mends that UNEP consider establishing a capability to identify potential
environmental and environment-related conflicts and provide information
and analysis to guide the development of preventive measures, for example
by the negotiation of joint actions. [...]” 9
8See PRIO/UNEP, Environmental Security - A Report Contributing to the Concept of Compre-
hensive International Security, December 1988
9UN Doc. A/53/463 (6 October 1998) “Report of the Secretary-General on Environment and
Human Settlements”, Annex “Report of the United Nations Task Force on Environment and Human
Settlements”, Para. 41.
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2.3 Critiques of Environment and Security Framework
The notion of environmental security, after it took root in the 1990s has been crit-
icized along several dimensions. The developing countries criticized it as another
form of western ideological dominance to undermine their sovereignty. Foreign policy
hardliners within countries panned the idea of considering environment as a threat to
national security because it would dilute the urgency and the seriousness of national
security considerations. Even environmentalists and scholars from the developed
countries opposed the idea of equating environmental security with national security
on the grounds of normative motivations.10 While recognizing the existing critiques of
environmental security, this research uses the framework of political ecology and crit-
ical environmentalism to reformulate our understanding of environment and security
for the purpose of this project.
Sovereign Overreach
Many developing countries vehemently opposed the ideas on environment, peace, and
security put forth in the Brundtland Commission’s report at the 1992 UN Conference
on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. The developing world did
not endorse a global dialogue on environmental issues within the context of conflict
and security, reacting negatively to formal environmental security proposals in UN
forums. [Lohmann [1990, 2009], Najam et al. [2003], Lele et al. [2010]] The coalition of
developing nations, the Group of 77, perceived the security frame as a Pandora’s box
that, once opened, could dilute their claims of absolute sovereign control over their
resources. The United States was equally wary, fearing environmental issues might
10See Deudney [1990] where he primarily offers three arguments against linking environmental
security with national security–(1) Environmental problems are unlikely to cause interstate wars,
(2) secuity threats from wars are very different from security threats from environmental factors,
lastly and perhaps more importantly, Deudney argues that (3) the emotive power of nationalism
to promote environmental concern can prove counterproductive to developing a global approach to
tackle environmental problems.
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dilute and undermine military-focused security definitions in the midst of the Cold
War. More practically, the environment, conflict, and security issues raised in the UN
did not easily lend themselves to resolution in a multilateral environmental treaty,
the preferred mechanism at Rio and of the international environmental community
in general.11
The Soviet Union attempted–and failed–to institutionalize environment and se-
curity links at the United Nations prior to the Rio conference. In October 1987, in
the wake of the Chernobyl accident, Mikhail Gorbachev launched his “Murmansk
Initiative” in a speech in that northern city on the Kola Peninsula.12 Calling for
glasnost and greater cooperation (particularly among the Arctic states) in trade, en-
vironment, culture, and arms control, he proposed ekologicheskaia bezopastnost or
“ecological security” as a top global priority for both bilateral relationships and in-
ternational institutions. While aimed at environmental challenges, the Murmansk
Initiatives were a de facto forum for moving beyond environmental goals to broader
confidence-building efforts across the Cold War divide.
Gorbachev and then–Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, in speeches
to the United Nations in 1988 and 1989, proposed creating ecological security insti-
tutions because, in Shevardnadze’s words,“Overcoming the global threat to the envi-
ronment and ensuring universal environmental security through prompt and effective
action is an imperative of our times.”13 In early May 1989, Shevardnadze called for
the creation of a “UN Center for Emergency Environmental Assistance” commonly
11The 1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques (ENMOD) and subsequent international law aimed at reducing the inten-
tional use of the environment as a tool of war are exceptions to the global level agreement in this
area. See J. E. Austin and C. E. Bruch, The Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic,
and Scientific Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
12See D. Scrivener, Gorbachev’s Murmansk Speech: The Soviet Initiative and Western Response,
Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1989 for a discussion of Gorbachev’s 1987 Murmansk
Initiatives and the Western response.
13“Soviet Union Proposes Center for Emergency Environmental Aid,” Reuters, 5 May 1989.
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referred to as the “Green Helmets,” to be headed by a UN undersecretary-general.
The foreign minister asked all member states to discuss this idea, in which a group of
environmental experts would comprise a rapid-response force, “at a time when coun-
tries are starting preparation for a UN-sponsored conference on environment and
development planned for 1992.”14 He also called on the UN General Assembly to cre-
ate a UN Environmental Security Council. These specific proposals were predicated
on the more fundamental premise that security had to be redefined.
The reaction to the Murmansk Initiatives and the subsequent UN proposals was
mixed. The U.S. government response was “reserved,” perceiving the Soviet ideas
as posturing and rhetoric designed to play to the developing country galleries at the
UN General Assembly.15 Environment was not yet widely linked with security in
U.S. diplomatic circles, with then–U.S. Senator Al Gore one of the few politicians
regularly promoting the connection. With the concurrent collapse of communism in
Central and Eastern Europe, the rest of the world glimpsed the massive toxic legacy
lurking behind the Iron Curtain, which damaged the credibility of Soviet environmen-
tal decision-making. Shevardnadze’s 27 September 1988 call for the United States
and others to transfer funds from military programs to environmental efforts echoed
similar efforts in the 1970s and 1980s by the Soviets to slow or constrain NATO
weapons development by promoting international environment regimes. The Green
Helmets proposal was highly unpopular with developing countries and became a po-
litical nonstarter. Countries such as Brazil feared (and continue to fear) developed
country intervention seeking to stop exploitation of natural resources such as those
14“Shevardnadze Calls for Steps to Protect Environment,” Information Telegraph Agency of
Russia (ITAR-TASS), 3 May 1989.
15See B. Jancar-Webster and V. I. Sokolov, “Environmental Security: Challenges for the United
States and Russia,” in S. Cross, I. A. Zevelev, V. A. Kremenyuk, and V. Gevorgian, eds., Global
Security Beyond the Millennium: American and Russian Perspectives, New York: MacMillan Press,
1999, 131.
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in the Brazilian Amazon.16 The sovereign right of nonintervention was employed as
an argument against the Green Helmets proposal, cutting off UN General Assembly
discussion of further ecological security proposals. This dynamic repeated itself 10
years later in the UN context when then–UN Environment Program Executive Direc-
tor Klaus Toepfer reintroduced the Green Helmets idea, which was once again quickly
rejected by the Group of 77 countries due to sovereignty concerns.
In more recent years this divide between the developed and the developing coun-
tries like India, China, Brazil, Indonesia and so on, has once again come into the
forefront as part of the negotiations over the emissions of greenhouse gasses. The
rapidly developing economies are very suspicious of any attempts made by the devel-
oped countries to limit their carbon emissions and development trajectory. Several
mitigation mechanisms proposed in the Kyoto Protocol could potentially give devel-
oped countries the financial and political leverage to interfere with the developmental
projects in developing countries in the pretext of environmental security and mitigat-
ing climate change.
Environmental Security as National Security?
This failure to achieve high-profile traction on environmental security linkages at the
United Nations in the 1990s did not imply a commensurate lack of interest among
certain individual nations and regional organizations. The end of the Cold War
did not produce the expected peace dividends, as hostilities held in check by the
superpower competition were unleashed and the number of conflicts actually spiked
in the 1990s. Both policy analysts and academics studying conflicts such as those in
Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, indicated that governments should pay greater
attention to the underlying demographic, environmental, and distributional origins of
16T. G. da Costa, “Brazil’s SIVAM: Will It Fulfill Its Human Security Promise?” Environmental
Change and Security Project Report 7 (2001): 47-58.
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these conflicts. These concerns led to a raft of analytical and policy initiatives which
were prominent in, but by no means limited to, the United States.17
In his 1994 Atlantic Monthly article entitled “The Coming Anarchy,” Kaplan cap-
tured the attention of the policy-making community.18 Kaplan held up demographic
and natural resource pressures as primary explanations for West Africa’s failing states,
drawing heavily on Homer-Dixon’s work on resource-scarcity. Many critics thought
Kaplan oversold the environment as the national security issue of the twenty-first
century, and his claims that West Africa’s fundamental challenges were widely appli-
cable to other regions of the world provoked an analytical and policy backlash when
environmental scarcity did not prove to be the ultimate threat in the post-Cold War
era. Environmental security would not provide an all-encompassing alternative secu-
rity paradigm. [Deudney [1990, 1991], Levy [1995] Nevertheless, the contributions of
natural resource scarcity and abundance to conflict, as well as the larger environmen-
tal challenges to traditional definitions of security, became institutionalized concerns
for foreign, development, and security communities.
In 1994 the UNDP dedicated its annual Human Development Report to human
security, suggesting that environmental security was one of seven areas that should
constitute a new global security paradigm. The seven securities were economic, food,
health, environmental, personal, community, and political. Japan, Canada, and a
wide range of UN bodies now commonly use this framework, and small island states
commonly invoke it to underscore the threat to survival posed by climate change–
induced sea-level rise.
The environment and security framework faced an abrupt setback after the Septem-
17See G. D. Dabelko and P. J. Simmons, “Environment and Security: Core Ideas and U.S. Gov-
ernment Initiatives,” SAIS Review 17, no. 1 (1997): 127-46; R. Floyd, “Typologies of Securitization
and Desecuritization: The Case of US Environmental Security 1993-2006,” PhD diss., University of
Warwick, 2007; and D. C. Esty et al. State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings, McLean,
VA: Science Applications International Corporation, 31 July 1998).
18See R. D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” Atlantic Monthly 273, no. 2 (February 1994): 45-76.
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ber 11 attacks. Just as the superpower confrontation of the Cold War provided little
political space for a broader array of security concerns, the “war on terror” kicked
other threats off policymakersï£¡ priority lists. The environmental security issue suf-
fered another blow in 2003 when the UN-constituted Commission on Human Security,
a blue-ribbon panel co-chaired by Amartya Sen and Sadako Ogata and similar to
WCED, inexplicably dropped natural resources from its analysis. And the antipathy
of U.S. President George W. Bush’s administration to anything dubbed “environmen-
tal” set back efforts in international forums and pushed much of the official U.S. work
on environmental security behind the scenes, or forced it to be relabeled as disaster
relief. Yet interest in environment, peace, and security linkages continued to grow
within the UN system, the bilateral development and security communities, and in
countries experiencing conflict. As the “force-only” responses to the September 11
attacks have fallen short of achieving either military or human security objectives,
policymakers and practitioners have been returning to more inclusive notions of se-
curity.
The recent rise of concern over climate change has both spurred–and been spurred
by–climate-security connections. Prominent reports in the European Union, United
States, United Kingdom, and Germany aimed at garnering more policy attention to
climate change have emphasized its security linkages.19 With a push from the United
Kingdom, the UN Security Council devoted an April 2007 session to climate change,
peace, and security, the first Security Council session on an environmental topic.20
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon subsequently linked UN efforts to battle climate
19See Military Advisory Board, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, Washington,
DC: CNA Corporation, 2007; German Advisory Council on Global Change, World in Transition:
Climate Change as a Security Risk, London: Earthscan, 2007; J. W. Busby, Climate Change and
National Security: An Agenda for Action, Council Special Report no. 32, New York: Council on
Foreign Relations Press, 2007; and K. M. Campbell et al., The Age of Consequences: The Foreign
Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change, Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic and International Studies and Center for a New American Security, 2007).
20See “Security Council Holds First-Ever Debate on Impact of Climate Change on Peace, Security,
Hearing Over 50 Speakers,” UN Security Council press release SC/9000, 17 April 2007.
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change with its mission to address the underlying causes of conflict in Darfur, Sudan.21
In March 2008, European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy Javier Solana presented to the European Council a short climate
change and security paper responding to pressure (particularly from Germany) to
raise the profile of climate-security connections. Mirroring some of the language used
in prominent reports from German, British, and U.S. nongovernmental organizations,
the brief called climate change a “threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends,
tensions and instability” that could “overburden states and regions which are already
fragile and conflict prone,” posing “political and security risks that directly affect
European interests.”22
The heightened attention to climate change has certainly boosted the prospects
for constructively addressing environment, development, and security linkages. The
wide range of potential climate impacts is re-energizing broader debates over human
security that suggest redefining security beyond purely militaristic terms. Traditional
security community’s concern with climate change (and the social reactions it may
produce, such as migration) has helped garner wider attention. Climate change and
its implications for desertification, precipitation, and crops in vulnerable areas such as
the Sahel may also help illuminate the preexisting but neglected connections between
these environmental variables and social conflict. Even scholars like Levy [1995], who
had sharply criticized including environment in the national security discourse, admit
that climate change is a direct threat to a country’s national security. Ironically,
climate change mitigation efforts, such as increasing the use of biofuels, are arguably
creating new natural resource and conflict links, as more forests are cleared for palm
oil plantations and food prices are rising as we choose to grow our fuel supplies. These
“unintended consequences” of climate change mitigation efforts present a new research
21K. Ban, “A Climate Culprit in Darfur,” Washington Post, 16 June 2007.
22See EU Commission and the Secretary-General/High Representative, Climate Change and In-
ternational Security (Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, 3 March 2008), 2.
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agenda for environment, development, and conflict scholars and practitioners.
The research community continues to debate links between environmental scarcity,
resource abundance, and violent conflict. The study of the relationship between
climate change and conflict has advanced noticeably in the past five years. With
regard to how changes in precipitation may influence internal conflict, the one area
where we now have a fair number of studies, the dominant view seems to be that
rainfall abundance is associated with greater risks than drought and that in any
case other conflict-generating factors are more important. Studies of how climate
change may promote interstate conflict over water resources also seem to point in
the direction of a weak or a null relationship. In recent reviews of this literature,
Bernauer et al. [2012b], Gleditsch [2012] and Buhaug et al. [2010], conclude that
although environmental change may under certain circumstances increase the risk
of violent conflict, the existing evidence indicates that this is not generally the case.
The present study argues that the existing uncertainty in many research findings that
are trying to explore direct causal connections between climate change and human
security or natural resource and conflict stem from the fact environmental factors
are in fact endogenous to conflicts and share a circular, interdependent relationship
rather than a one-way linear causal relationship. Therefore the environmental factors
like climate change, resource scarcity or resource abundance are in fact a product of
human conflicts, and political and social institutions. The next section will outline
the a new approach–rooted in political ecology and critical geopolitics–that can used
to reformulate the environment and security framework.
Political Ecology and Critical Geopolitics
Most academic and policy work on the environment-security framework works within
the predominant state-centric paradigm in international politics. The literature out-
lined above focusing on scarcity and abundance of natural resources and conflict or
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looking at climate change and conflict, basis its discussions on states, their perfor-
mance, interactions and capabilities. Most of these analyses assume states as the
central actors and the environment to be an external entity that has to be controlled,
monitored and administered. Using language of “resource curse”, “honey-pot” or
“natural disasters” implies that environment is an external factor that affects po-
litical, economic and social circumstances of human beings without paying much
attention to the role of mankind in shaping its natural environment.
This study attempts to reverse the causal arrow of environment and human se-
curity framework by looking at how human actions like wars have an impact of the
environment. Drawing on the literature of political ecology and critical geopolitics,
this study also goes on to argue that it is not meaningful to look at the relationship
between environment and violent conflicts in terms of unidirectional causality, where
one is a dependent variable and the other an independent variable. It is imperative
that we consider human beings and the environment as part of a singular system
allowing for feedback loops and systemic interdependence.
Based heavily on the Marxian Tradition in political ecology and Foucaultian tra-
dition in cultural theory, political ecology concerns itself chiefly with the various ways
in which global and local political economies parcelize the natural world, assign val-
ues to these parcels, distribute them in particular ways, and thereby contribute to
patterns of exploitation and violence. Peluso and Watts [2001] notes that political
ecology emphasizes “the entitlements by which differentiated individuals, households,
and communities possess to gain access to resources within a structured political econ-
omy. It grants priority to how these entitlements are distributed, reproduced, and
fought over in the course of shaping, and being shaped by, patterns of accumula-
tion.”(p.5) Peluso and Watts in principle reject the neo-Malthusian way of looking at
environmental conflict. In the early 90s scholars such as Homer-Dixon and Kaplan ar-
gued that violence emerges due to scarcity of renewable resource such as forests, lands,
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water, and so on. The scarcity induces marginalization and heightens competition.
Peluso and Watts argue that this neo-Malthusian way of looking at environmental
problems and violence is flawed in many ways. They reject the simplistic view and
the automatic/linear relationship between scarcity and environmental conflict. They
argue that there is much more than scarcity that can explain environmental conflict.
For them conflict is a phenomenon that can be understood by looking at the interplay
between local and extra local factors. Conflict is embedded in the historical context
and wider processes that take place at higher level. Colonialism, the expansion of
capitalism, and the integration of markets via globalization have historically meant
that the value of natural resources has been largely constituted by the power, policies
and consumption habits of the wealthy industrial countries and their allies among the
elite in the developing countries. Moreover, the structure of both the contemporary
international trading system and most domestic economies is such that the distri-
bution of these resources is skewed in favor of these powerful actors. Consequently,
many poor, subsistence and indigenous communities in developing countries expe-
rience so-called scarcities of vital natural resources for distributional reasons, even
under objective conditions of global or local abundance. Environment is an arena
upon which stakeholders attach value, contest claims, struggle for legitimacy, etc.
Thus, environmental conflict cannot be reduced to scarcity alone, it must be under-
stood within the web of social, historical and political contexts and the interrelations
among them.
Even though a somewhat similar criticism of environmental determinism has been
made in the literature on critical geopolitics, the field of political ecology is especially
germane. It particularly locates itself against the scarcity-based arguments made by
Homer-Dixon’s approach to explain environmentally driven conflicts. In his writings
Dyer [2011, 2002, 2001a] has sought to completely reformulate the environment and
security framework by suggesting that the literature in international relations deal-
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ing with these issues needs to confront the question of which contains what. Global
environmental change is much more than international change and the suggestion is
that it drives international responses, whether in terms of security, economy or other
matters. “In some respects environmental change is the greatest challenge for interna-
tional relations theory since this appears as a material externality to the international
system rather than as an internal variable which can be addressed in terms of familiar
political structures and their supporting social values. Thus environmental change
may present security concerns which are qualitatively different from traditional secu-
rity threats, and in itself present a material basis for a broad shift in social values.”
[Dyer [2001b, p. 234]]
This directly raises the question of whether the environment is to be understood
as a matter of international politics, a matter of potential security concern and a
matter for regulation in various international regimes or is international politics to
be understood as a matter that happens within the environment, a matter of politics
within natural circumstances which get priority in how matters are conceived and
policy devised? This slightly reformulates the earlier questions in the environmental
security discussion as to whether what is implicitly getting secured is the interna-
tional order or the natural environment. What cannot be assumed is that there is
a necessary congruence between these two. Indeed the whole premise of the parallel
discussions of sustainable development in the last couple of decades is precisely that
the conventional modes of economic activity practiced in most parts of the world
were not sustainable. How can we then imagine a qualitatively different understand-
ing of security where environment is not an external variables against which human
beings and political institutions are being secured? What kind of contribution can
the field of international relations and conflict studies make to include environment
in its discourse? It is a an extremely challenging undertaking that requires thinking
in unconventional ways.
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As outlined in the above sections, since the late 1980s the discussion of environ-
mental security has continued apace with conceptual arguments intersecting regularly
with both empirical research and policy advice. While there is agreement in most
of the literature that environmental changes are unlikely to directly cause inter-state
warfare, there remains considerable discussion about the likely trajectories of environ-
mental change causing state “failures” and the likely disruptions–like civil wars–that
might result. [Gleditsch [2012], Young [1999], Raleigh and Urdal [2007], ?] Likewise
there is considerable discussion of the appropriate policies to anticipate such failures
and the possibilities of aid packages as preventative interventions. Not surprisingly
the main focus in many of these discussions is on states, their performance, interac-
tions and capabilities. In so far as the conclusion that states are unlikely to go to war
as a result of environmental scarcities or changes holds, the question then becomes
in what way is this a matter for detailed attention by international relations scholars
and especially those interested in security studies.
Environment is a catchall residual category which usually refers to the non-human
material context of human activities. Premised on the extraordinary modern assump-
tion that divisions between humanity and the rest of the biosphere are a useful onto-
logical starting point the term environment has come to encompass the definition of
the part of “nature” that provides the backdrop for human affairs. When it shows up
in discussions of security it is frequently the changes in specific environments in terms
of resource scarcity that are the focus of analytical attention. Other considerations
of the disruptions caused by climate change and related matters also appear in the
environmental security literature, although these are often speculative exercises in
constructing plausible future scenarios, or extrapolating from contemporary events.
But the assumption of a stable backdrop that is being changed in some places is
not now an adequate representation of what the scientific literature on global ecology
has been describing in increasing detail for the last few years or what environmental
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history has been investigating. In Hugh Dyer’s terms–the material context driving
international politics is changing 23 and that point has to be integrated into the con-
ceptual frameworks that link environment to security, and especially so in terms of
the discipline of international relations, where at least some of the change in polit-
ical arrangements needed to address this changing context will have to be studied
23What is now frequently simply called global change science has, in the last few decades, begun
the task of synthesizing knowledge from many disciplines while extending the monitoring of numerous
aspects of the planetary biosphere. It has also incorporated historical research into the planet’s past
and looked in detail at the crucial matters of atmospheric composition and climate change. A
number of noteworthy conclusions have already been reached which affect our understanding of
ecology in ways that matter in terms of what security might now mean. While the sheer scale of
change is important, the most worrisome matter is the unpredictability of forthcoming changes.
Three aspects of the contemporary literature on global change are especially salient.
First is the importance of understanding the scale of anthropogenic disruptions of the atmosphere,
and in particular the fact that humanity has altered the composition of the gases in the air to
such a degree that there is no parallel in the last 400,000 years for which science now has a fairly
comprehensive geologic record. That period has been recorded in the so called Vostok ice cores
extracted from Antarctica and analyzed in detail in the last few decades. The conclusions from
this analysis are quite clear in that climate is related to carbon dioxide concentrations through the
last four glacial periods. Climate and carbon dioxide oscillated within a fairly stable range during
that period, but we are now already outside that range of relative stability. In the words of the
International Geosphere Biosphere Program (IGBP) authors we are living in a “no-analogue state”,
a situation where we are already beyond the bounds of the system that produced ice ages and “inter-
glacials” in between. This alone ought to be reason for great concern, and it has been through the
1990s where scientists have repeatedly called for dramatic reductions in emissions of carbon dioxide
from human activities in the hope that CO2 levels can be reduced to within the historic ranges that
provided relative stability to the earth’s climate in the past and provided the conditions for the
emergence of human civilization.
Second, is the recognition that it is not only the atmosphere that we have changed but other
important natural systems too not least nitrogen and phosphorous cycles in the biosphere. The
cumulative impact of these parallel disruptions of other material and energy cycles and maritime
systems and terrestrial land uses suggests to the IGBP that the geological period known as the
Holocene, the last 10,000 years since the most recent ice age, is now effectively over. They have
coined the apt term the “Anthropocene” to denote the arrival of a new geological period where a
dramatic new series of forces have been unloosed in the planetary biosphere changing the atmosphere
as well as geomorphic processes and most natural cycles that involve a biomass of any substantial
size. Literally we have entered a new geologic period in which humanity has become an agent in
remaking some of the essential systems of the global biosphere.
Third, is the fact that these changes interact and cascade through the earth’s natural systems in
ways that are hard to predict precisely because so many things are changing at once and interacting
in ways that are impossible to comprehensively grasp and model. But they do so in ways that are
not likely to give either immediate or linear responses. Lagged effects due to inertia, and non-linear
responses due to the crossing of crucial thresholds of relative stability, are likely results in complex
interconnected systems. Given that science does not know where the critical thresholds of many
of these systems may be, or whether we have in fact already crossed some of them, thinking hard
about ways of reducing the overall impact of human disruptions has become a pressing necessity if
the long term survival of human civilization is taken seriously.
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and analyzed. Whether what will result will be international relations as currently
practiced is highly doubtful, but prior to discussing such matters the question of the
changing material context needs more detailed study.
The reality of the changing material context of our political framework suggests
that the assumption of the environment as the backdrop or context for human history
is no longer an appropriate way of thinking. There is no longer a stable “environ-
ment” that can be “secured”. Neither is there a predictable environment that might
be said to threaten humanity in precise ways. Humanity is actively, albeit inadver-
tently, changing the overall conditions of its existence. No longer can nature be seen
as something external to human designs. In the language of astronomy and space
exploration we are already “terraforming” the earth, changing the overall patterns
of basic life systems in the process of remaking our specific contexts, not least to
supposedly secure our modes of life. This terraforming changes the basic assumption
of human-nature relations.
2.4 Environment, Security and State: A New Framework
Studies on conflict and environment still operate within the assumptions of neo-
liberalism and neo-realism in international relations theory where states are the key
entities. A neo-liberal stance in these studies often broadens the concern of a state
from traditional military security to issues of economic development, health, environ-
ment and climate change. These studies also consider an wide array of actors such as
international organizations, non-governmental organizations, businesses and transna-
tional organizations. However, the main concern of such research remains focussed
on the state and its economic and political development, separated from its physical
environment. Shifting the focus to global environmental changes suggests that this
separation of state and environment is not useful in understanding what is gener-
ally understood as ‘security’ and the relationship between institutions like the state
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and the environment. Many environmentalists and environmental politics scholars
have been arguing for some time that the trans-boundary “flows” of environmental
politics have challenged the assumptions of sovereignty in many ways that require
international cooperation on many themes. They argue that states may well be es-
sential for administering agreements and enforcing laws, but innovation frequently
comes from outside the structures of state bureaucracies and in spite of government
planning. They assert that ecological processes are not constrained by state frontiers
and environmental security is not just about state policies and initiatives. Schol-
ars like Liftin, Wapner, Conca and Lipschutz point out that a sense of “greening”
of sovereignty 24is occurring making the importance of international cooperation ev-
ident. However, even these studies that tend to argue for diffusing boundaries of
political institutions like the state often fall short of diffusing the boundaries between
political and environmental.
One of the most critical points in thinking about states and international relations
in the face of global environmental issues is the simple but compelling argument that
states are precisely the agencies that, in the twentieth century, built the infrastructure
that requires huge inputs of carbon fuels and other materials that disrupt biospheric
systems. One of the most obvious facets of this is the active promotion by states of the
automobile culture. Building highways and roads was part and parcel of state func-
tions in most parts of the world in the twentieth century, a trend that shows few signs
of abating with developing countries like India and China making huge investments in
building road infrastructure. Just as states were active in facilitating the construction
24See Litfin [1998] for a comprehensive discussion on international environmental politics and the
issue of sovereignty. In this edited book, Litfin, Wapner and Lipschutz and others argue that the
concept of sovereignty has evolved over time from absolute control of the monarch to rule of the
people and that it needs to continue to evolve to address the issue of environmental degradation.
The scholars in this book argue that at one place sovereignty of states needs to dilute to to address
environmental issues on a global scale, at the same time, sovereign authority in many countries needs
to be strengthened to implement international environmental treaties at a domestic level. Therefore,
according to the authors of this volume, the notion of sovereignty is a “moving target”–constantly
changing and shifting–and it needs to do some more changing to deal with ecological issues.
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of railways in the nineteenth century they built road networks, ports and airports in
the twentieth producing an economic mode that is literally driving climate change.
Environmental disruptions are frequently caused by economic activities supported by
the state such as supplying resources to distant markets, insurgency in Bougainville
is caused by demands for metals far from the remote provinces of Papua New Guinea;
vegetable purchasing preferences on the part of supermarket company produce buy-
ers at Heathrow airport near London drive the practices of Kenyan farmers. The
enormous differences between states in terms of capabilities and development levels
also belies simple assumptions about them as the most effective agent of change in
many places. The fundamental inequities between North and South stand in the way
of progress on many things, although the recognition of this difficulty is finding its
way into both international negotiations and efforts to think intelligently about such
things as “sustainability science”.
Therefore understanding issues of environment and security suggests a more fun-
damental reorientation of thinking which no longer considers states–which operates
outside environment–as a focus of our concern. The conventional political assump-
tions in state thinking, that environment is an external entity to be controlled, pa-
trolled, surveyed, monitored, catalogued and administered is not new. Rather such
environmental practices, what Tim Luke might call “environmentality” is a long-
standing mode of rule that can be directly traced to colonial arrangements in many
places over the last few centuries. [Luke [1997]] Tracing matters to the long term
history of imperial ecological arrangements suggests once again the inadequacy of
contemporary institutional arrangements for grappling with the scale and scope of
contemporary environmental transformations. The modern state system is of recent
origin; in many parts of the world it post-dates the emergence of the technological
systems literally driving climate change. Assuming that this administrative frame-
work is necessarily adequate because of the contemporary attribution of sovereignty
42
to states is an obvious response to environmental difficulties, but not one that reas-
sures those who look to the long term political ecology of the planet. The processes
in motion predate states in many places and in many ways call into question the
basic functions of contemporary states that are so frequently better understood as
development agencies. The infrastructure they provide is in many ways the source of
contemporary ecological disruptions, hence the assumptions that these agencies are
necessarily the solution is not one that can be taken for granted.
Acknowledging the above argument, this research aims to refocus the existing
analysis of environment and conflict on the environment, instead of states and their
political and economic concerns. We argue that instead of looking at environment
and natural resources as external variable that affect the political stability, economy
and human security in states, we need to look at how states and their political and
economic actions affect the environment. Just as the industrial revolution, develop-
ment of transportation or commerce are state driven activities that have affected the
environment, for this study we focus on violent conflicts like international, ethnic and
civil wars and how they affect environment in the short-term and in the long run. By
reversing the causal arrow we concern ourselves with the security of the environment
for environment’s sake and not just the security of people removed from their envi-
ronment. This study is the first step towards integrating political institutions like
states with their material environment and to understand them as one interdependent
system where one affects the other in tight feed-back mechanisms.
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Chapter 3
The Theory and Concept of Conflict and
Environment
As elaborated upon in the previous chapter, this study is arguing for reversing the
causal arrow to study the relationship between violence perpetrated between and
with-in states and the environment. This approach is a move towards blurring the
line between the “political” and the environment. Political institutions like the state
and political activities like war, and the environment should be analyzed as a com-
plete system where all the entities are interdependent and affect each other. The
approach presented here contradicts most of the existing models of looking at conflict
and environmental issues where the environment is treated as an exogenous variable
affecting human lives. The first step towards such analysis is to understand how
conflict affects the environment, which is the focus of this project.
Figure 3.1: A Schematic Representation of How Environmental Conditions
lead to Conflict
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Figure 3.1 is a graphic representation of how most research on conflict and en-
vironment in the field of conflict studies or environmental politics has viewed the
relationship between environment and conflict. The previous chapter outlined how
studies have argued that both abundance of natural resources like oil, gemstones, min-
erals and scarcity of natural resources can lead to conflicts, by weakening the political
and economic structures in a state. Similarly, climate change and natural disasters
put pressure on political and economic apparatus of state which compromises human
security and lead to conflict.
Figure 3.2: A Schematic Representation of the Feedback-
Loop between Environment and Conflict
Figure 3.2 however, presents a different approach to looking at the relationship
between environment and conflict where environment and conflict are both connected
though complex feedback mechanisms mediated by social, political and economic
factors. Such a view forces us to reconsider our focus on resource abundance or
resource scarcity or natural disasters as causes of conflict and breach of security.
These environmental factors are not a given but are rather created by social, economic
and political factors. For example, who gets affected by natural disasters leading to
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social tension is an outcome of active social, political and economic choices. Also,
as mentioned in the previous chapter, many ‘natural’ disasters are a result of human
actions, so to consider climate change and natural disasters as exogenous entities is a
fallacy in such analyses. Similarly, our political and economic actions have determined
where minerals are located–by creating political boundaries–and who has access to
those resources. Our economic relations have also made certain “resources” more
valuable than others, thereby creating notions of “abundance” and “scarcity”.
In the conflict studies literature, most of the research on international and civil
wars focuses on their causes or termination. The body of work on consequences of
war is still very nascent, where most of the scholars are concentrating on economic
and political consequences of war (Bayer and Rupert 2004; Blomberg and Hess 2002;
Bodea and Elbadawi 2008; Collier 1999, 2009; Collier and Davies 2008; Elbadawi
2008; Flores and Nooruddin 2009; Koubi 2005; Pickering and Kisangani 2006). In
recent years there has been some research on consequences of war on health and
education. [See Lai and Thyne (2007), Iqbal (2006), Hoddie and Smith (2009)] Hence
given the state of the field, looking at environmental consequences of war fills up a
significant lacuna. Studying environmental consequences of war, within the field of
conflict studies, serves a three fold purpose–firstly, it embodies a normative concern
for the environment. This research hopes to illuminate yet another cost of violent
conflicts that are borne not only by the present generation but by generations to
come. Secondly, often during or after a conflict, fulfilling the immediate needs of
the affected population comes at the expense of long term environmental damage.
Also, unlike public health or economic development, which are immediate indicators
of a population’s well being and hence easily become issues of political concern,
environmental concerns take a backseat. Gauging environmental consequences of a
conflict is often a more complex process that takes considerable temporal commitment
with slow results. For example the amount of depleted uranium released into the soil
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in Kosovo as a result of NATO’s carpet bombing of the region is still under assessment.
Or saving a particular kind of plant species or a animal species usually features
very low on the priority of the international community or the political leadership
of a war ravaged country where people’s lives are at stake. Lastly, by focusing on
environmental degradation as a consequence of conflict, this study hopes to add to
a whole body of literature analyzing environmental variables such as climate change
and natural resources and their relationship to conflict (Gleditsch and Nordas 2007;
Gleditsch 2001, 2007; Reuveny; Goldstone 2001; Barnett and Adger 2007; Deudney
1999; Homer-Dixon 1991; Volker 1999; de Soysa 2002a, 2002b; Renner 1996; Ross
2004) and to become a significant building block for any future research exploring a
circular or spiraling relationship between conflict and environment. Several studies
(Alao and Funmi 2002; Collier 1999, 2000; Collier and Hoeﬄer 1998; Deihl and
Gleditsch 2002; Hauge, Wenche and Ellingson 1998, Renner; Homer-Dixon 19999,
2000) have begun to indicate towards a circular relationship between environmental
degradation and political conflict, where environmental degradation feeds into causes
of conflict through several political, socio-demographic and economic channels.
Most previous studies conducted on environmental damage caused due to violent
conflicts–by individual researchers, environmental groups and international organizations–
have focussed on specific regions or specific conflicts. This study presents an empir-
ical study exploring the said relationship in a fairly comprehensive manner. The
study analyses environment and conflict data on 186 countries from 1961 to 2005.
The dependent variable in my statistical model–overall quality of the environment–is
measured in terms of national biocapacity. I also estimate several other regression-
based statistical models with four disaggregated components of biocapacity–forest
land, grazing land, fishing ground and cropland. I measure the impact on environ-
ment based on the total number of conflicts a state is involved in and also the types
of conflict–international, civil and ethnic–a state is embroiled in. We control for
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population density, trade openness, refugee flow and economic growth in my model.
This chapter will outline how I conceptualize the relationship between conflict
and environment with particularly focusing on the impact of conflict on the envi-
ronment. I will also conceptualize and define a number of variables–Environment,
Conflict, Democracy, Economic Growth, Trade Openness, Refugee Flow and Popula-
tion Density–utilized for this study. Lastly I will talk about the data I have used to
measure these variables to understand the impact of conflict on the environment.
3.1 Our Model of Environment and Conflict Relationship
Figure 3.3: A Schematic Representation of How Conflict affects the Environment
Figure 3.3 represents my analysis of how conflict affects the environment. The
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first step to understand this relationship is to classify conflicts on the basis of their
intensity and type. Intuitively, more intense conflicts (as measured by their duration
and number of deaths involved) will have a greater impact on the environment. Also,
the type of conflict, whether it is international or confined within sovereign territorial
boundaries can have an impact on its environmental aftermath. Similarly, whether
the conflict is rooted in ethnic differences also affects its relationship with natural
resources in terms of motivation and impact. These conflicts can have a very direct
environmental impact during bombing, which can destroy the chemical composition
of the soil or destroy environment related infrastructure like dams, oil refineries and
so on. Chemical and biological weapons used during conflicts can also inflict immense
damage to the environment by poisoning water bodies, altering soil composition or
causing massive deforestation. The indirect impact of warfare on the environment
are often harder to gauge. But wars cause longterm damage to the environment by
destroying political and economic infrastructure to manage environmental resources
and by breaking down traditional conservation practices. Environmental resources
are also used to prolong conflicts and resources that could be used for environmental
protection are often channeled towards the state’s war machine. Another long-term
and indirect impact of conflicts on environment occurs through populations displace-
ment and refugee flows.
3.2 Modeling the Impact of Conflict on the Environment
As alluded to earlier, violent conflict may affect the environment and its capacity to
regenerate through a host of means. This includes a direct impact on the environ-
ment due to bombing, land mines and other chemical wastes generated by weapons
used in warfare. Violent conflicts can also lead to damage to the infrastructure of the
society which is instrumental in preserving the environment. Other indirect effects
of conflict on environment include refugee influx which puts pressure on the environ-
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mental resources of the host nation, diversion of economic resources to warfare and
environmental mutilation to fund the conflict. One important factor in analyzing the
relationship between conflict and environmental degradation is the nature of political
institutions that govern a state. According to Li and Reuveny (2006) democracy
substantively reduces environmental destruction. Active democracies due to their
institutional structures that allow free media and interest groups are better at raising
public awareness towards environmental issues and encouraging environmental legis-
lations. This section discusses my dependent variable and other control variables of
interest in my model.
Conceptualization and Definition of Variables
Measuring Environment
Measuring the environment has been a controversial endeavor. Assigning a value or
measure to all that our environment provides us is fraught with political, economic,
and above all, moral dilemmas. The United Nation’s Millennium Ecosystem Assess-
ment (MA) report released in 2005 made an attempt to measure the Earth’s natural
environment in terms of “ecosystem services.” This approach is certainly not devoid
of controversy or criticism, but it is considered to be one of the most established
ways to conceptualize and measure environment. The MA report defines ecosystem
services as “benefits people obtain from ecosystems” and distinguishes four categories
of ecosystem services. These four broad categories of ecosystem services include: pro-
visioning, such as the production of food and water; regulating, such as the carbon
sequestration and purification of air and water; supporting, such as nutrient cycles
and crop pollination; and cultural, such as spiritual and recreational benefits. This
study uses national biocapacity data to measure the overall quality of the environment
in a country. The national biocapacity data has been developed by the Global Foot-
print Network as part of their study on National Footprint Accounts. Ewing et. al.
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define biocapacity as the “measure of the amount of biologically productive land and
sea area available to provide the ecosystem services that humanity consumes” (p.1).
This implies that biocapacity data primarily captures the provisioning services of the
ecosystem. To some extent, the data also captures regulating services by including
carbon sequestration in its measurement of forestland biocapacity.
It is truly hard to put a value on cultural and supporting services of the ecosystem
and there is very little consensus in the field of environmental economics or ecological
sciences to put a price cultural and supportive significance of ecosystem. Therefore
whenever this research refers to the “environment” or “environmental” I am refering to
environmental productivity or or provisioning services of the ecosystem. Biocapacity
may not a comprehensive measure of the overall environment, but it is one of the best
available measure of what can be measured for now of the human interaction with the
ecosystem in terms of overall environmental productivity.
Most previous studies (Reuveny 2006, Jorgenson et al. 2010) that have looked at
the relationship between natural or environmental resources and violent conflicts, con-
sider raw data on natural resources such as forest cover, timber, oil, carbon emissions
and so on. These number also reflect the environment in terms of its provisioning
services but they do not control for different eco-system types. If one is concerned
about the impact of violent conflict on the overall environment (measured in terms
of environmental productivity or the ecological provisional services) of a country,
then it is useful to consider an aggregate and standardized measure of environment
the environment such as the biocapacity data for useful analysis across countries and
time-periods.
The calculations of biocapacity are based primarily on international data sets
published by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO
ResourceSTAT Statistical Database 2007), the International Energy Agency (IEA
2006), the UN Statistics Division (UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database – UN
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Comtrade 2007), and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2006).
Other data sources include studies in peer reviewed science journals and thematic
collections. Of the 200 countries analyzed in the National Footprint Accounts, 150
had populations over one million and were covered consistently by the UN statistical
system.
Calculation of biocapacity is based on the following fundamental assumptions:
• Environmental resources or Earth’s resource supply can be quantified and en-
vironment can be measured in terms of biologically productive area depending
on how much environmental resources it can generate.
• By weighing each area in proportion to its bioproductivity, different types of
areas such as crop land, forests or fishing grounds, can be converted into the
common unit of global hectares, hectares with world average productivity.
• Because a single global hectare represents a single use, and all global hectares
in any single year represent the same amount of bioproductivity, they can be
added up to obtain an aggregate indicator of a state’s or global biocapacity.
Biocapacity “measures the ability of available terrestrial and aquatic areas to
provide ecological services” (Ecological Footprint Atlas 2008, 7). Biocapacity is an
aggregate measure of amount of land available, weighted by the productivity of the
land. It represents the ability of the biosphere to produce crops, livestock (Pasture),
timber products (forest), marine life, as well as to sequester waste such as CO2. It
also includes how much regenerative capacity is occupied by built-up land. National
biocapacity is calculated by the following equation:
Biocapacity = Area X Yield Factor X Equivalence Factor
Where Biocapacity is the capacity of ecosystems to produce useful biological mate-
rials and to absorb waste materials generated by humans, using current management
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schemes and extraction technologies. Useful biological materials are defined as those
used by the people’s economic and social activities. Since wars and conflicts are hu-
man activities, their impact is factored into countries’ biocapacity through direct and
indirect means. Area refers to the total bioproductive land and water that supports
significant photosynthetic activity and and accumulation of biomass. Bioproductive
areas are differentiated as-Cropland, Grazing land, Forest Land, Fishing Ground and
Built-up Land.Yield Factor accounts for differences between countries in productiv-
ity of a given land type. Each country and each year has different yield factors for
different types of bioproductive areas. Equivalence Factor is a productivity-based
scaling factor that converts a specific land type (such as cropland or forest) into a
universal unit of biologically productive area, a Global Hectare. A Global Hectare
is a productivity-weighted area used to report both the biocapacity of the Earth,
and the demand on biocapacity (the Ecological Footprint). The global hectare is
normalized to the area-weighted average productivity of biologically productive land
and water in a given year. Because different land types have different productivity, a
Global Hectare of, for example, cropland, would occupy a smaller physical area than
the much less biologically productive pasture land, as more pasture would be needed
to provide the same biocapacity as one hectare of cropland. For land types (e.g.
cropland) with productivity higher than the average productivity of all biologically
productive land and water area on Earth, the equivalence factor is greater than one.
Thus, to convert an average hectare of cropland to global hectares, it is multiplied by
the cropland equivalence factor of 2.64. In a given year, equivalence factors are the
same for all countries.
A more detailed discussion on Environmental Footprint data and its merits as a
measure of environment quality are offered in the following chapter.
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Conflict
Perhaps the most brazen impact of an international conflict on the environment that
the world has experienced was the American nuclear attack on Japan during the Sec-
ondWorld War. The sheer amount of heat and radioactive emissions caused due to
a nuclear attack is enough to destroy the quality of land, air and water. Needless to
say that this kind of a nuclear attack affects not only humans but also plants and
wildlife. As a fallout of the attack, the effects could be spread even further, and
might make the city (and an area of countryside stretching tens of kilometers down-
wind) uninhabitable for many weeks or even years. Apart from nuclear attack, even
the production and testing of nuclear weapons leads to considerable environmental
damage; several substances like plutonium, PCBs, uranium, cesium, mercury, that
are released due to manufacturing and testing of nuclear weapons are carcinogenic
and hazardous and they remain in the environment for thousands of years. Con-
taminants from nuclear weapons production and testing have often traveled far down
wind and down stream. Many square miles in Russia, Belarus and the US have been
rendered unusable by contamination of the soil due to production and testing of nu-
clear weapons. Conventional international wars also impose heavy damage on the
environment by destroying forest cover as in the case of Vietnam War where nearly
20 per cent of the forest areas in South Vietnam were destroyed. Dense tropical
forests were also converted into arid grass lands as a result of the war. Herbicides
used during the course of war killed several species of wildlife and birds. (Dudley
et al. 2002) The Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s saw desertification of many wetlands in
the region.The UNEP reports that the extensive date palm forests along the Shatt
al-Arab estuary were completely destroyed as a result of this war. Aside from the
Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf War also saw destruction of numerous oil wells in the region
causing significant damage to the atmosphere and a precious natural resource like
oil. (UNEP Desk Study 2003) The Gulf War, even though short, also had a harsh
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effect on terrestrial, marine and coastal ecosystems (Price and Robinson 1993; Dudley
2002, 322). Jorgensen et al. (2010) argue that even in the absence of armed con-
flict, military institutions and their activities consume vast amounts of nonrenewable
and other resources for research and development, maintenance and development of
overall infrastructure. At the same time, they generate large amounts of toxic waste,
which contribute to the contamination of land and water.
Apart from the direct effects of international conflicts on environment there are
other intervening factors that exacerbate environmental degradation after a war. Po-
litical instability or lack of political institutions often experienced as a result of con-
flict acts as an intervening variable between conflict and environmental deterioration.
These factors perhaps hold more for politically fragile, developing countries where
political institutions are weak and civil societies; virtually non existent. Wars re-
sult in the disruption of government services and functions, destruction of physical
resources and infrastructure and depletion of human and economic capital (Gled-
itsch 1997). A break-down of political institutions leads to stagnation in natural
resource and environmental management and often deterioration of resources. Lack
of effective institutions to monitor environment also makes countries vulnerable to
external exploitation where foreign firms and multinational countries often partic-
ipate in “natural resource loot” by helping warring factions in return. Similar to
international wars, civil wars also induce direct and indirect harm to the environ-
ment and wildlife. Military, paramilitary and guerilla groups involved in civil wars,
unknowingly or knowingly exert a great deal of pressure on their own habitat. Such
environmental destruction could be due to warring groups’ greed or poverty. Civil
wars (that have recently occurred in mostly poor countries of the world) often lead
to resource extraction by the parties involved. Also, most countries enmeshed in civil
conflicts do not have the required political and economic capital to undo or monitor
the damage caused to the environment due to conflict.
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Most military and guerilla forces involved in civil wars in poor, resource abundant
countries tend to live off the land. They use the area’s natural resources for food,
housing and other material goods. Since these guerilla forces don’t have the advan-
tage of having a well organized supply line to furnish their daily needs, the fighters
or soldiers have to often subsist partially or completely on animals and plants, avail-
able in areas or forests they operate from. These military and guerilla fighter often
hunt large animals for food in war-zones and disputed territories and opportunistic,
accidental and random shooting of animals by combatants in free fire zones may be
a significant cause of mortality among wild life and stock populations (Dudley et al.
2002, 322; Martin and Szuter 1999, Plumpetre et al. 1997). Other kinds of direct
damage to the environment are caused by guerrilla activities such as movement of
vehicles for transportation across forested regions. This requires clearing up land
to construct pathways for vehicle movements. Deforestation for such reasons has
occurred in civil war ridden countries like Liberia, Angola, Mozambique and Sierra
Leone (Collier 2002; Alao and Olonisakin 2002; Auty 2003).
To assess the presence and intensity of violent conflict, this study uses data from
from “Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEVP) and Conflict Regions” created
by Monty G. Marshall at the Center for Systemic Peace. Major episodes of political
violence in this data set are defined by the systematic and sustained use of lethal
violence by organized groups that result in at least 500 directly-related deaths over the
course of the episode. Episodes are coded for time span and magnitude (on an 11 point
scale: 0-10) and assigned to one of seven categories of armed conflict: international
violence, international war, international independence war, civil violence, civil war,
ethnic violence, and ethnic war. The next chapter will cover this measure of conflict
in more details.
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Democracy
From what we know of democracies and their nature it would not be erroneous to hope
that democracies would do better at managing footprints of conflict. Democracies
are known to be more responsive to the needs of the society, they allow free flow of
information, they tend to be more law abiding. All of these structural and cultural
characteristics within democracies should make them better at restoring environment
after conflict.
According to Schultz and Crockett (1990) and Payne (1995), democracies ensure
political rights and freedom of information that promote the cause of environmental
interest groups in society. This not only raises public awareness but also encourages
and enforces environmental legislation. Environmental groups, therefore, are often
more successful at informing people and organizing them to act on environmental
problems in a democracy than in an autocracy. An autocratic regime censors infor-
mation flows, and its decision making is more autonomous than that of a democratic
government.Environmental degradation may not be reported by the media to the
people. In contrast,as democracy allows for free media, environmental problems are
more likely to be reported in the news. People in a democracy, therefore, are more
likely to be informed about the environment and have the ability to influence decision
making to check environmental degradation.
Closely tied to the above argument of information flow, Kotov and Nikitina (1995)
argue that Democracies are more responsive to the environmental needs of the public
than are autocracies. This argument works through electoral accountability and the
ability of groups to mobilize socially, achieve political representation, and influence
public policy making. Democracies hold regular and free elections, which can bring to
power new parties, including those friendly to the environment (e.g., the Green Party
in Germany). In an autocracy, the distribution of political power is concentrated,
reducing the likelihood that environmentalists will come to power. Thus, environ-
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mentalists stand a greater chance of affecting policy making in a democracy than
they do in an autocracy. Weiss and Jacobsen (1999) argue that democracies are also
more likely to comply with environmental agreements at domestic and international
levels because they respect the rule of law. Moreover the costs of environmental reg-
ulation and legislation are borne better by democracies than autocracies (Congleton
1992) because in autocracies, ruling elites hold a much larger share of national income
than most people in democracies. Since environmental regulations impose a cost on
production and consumption, a small group of ruling elite in an autocracy may be un-
willing to bear the burden of that cost. On the other hand, the cost of implementing
more environmental friendly technologies is better distributed in a democracy.
Having said that, on average democracies tend to have higher overall environmen-
tal footprint. This is because democracies are generally wealthier and enjoy a steady
economic growth. This leads to more utilization of natural resources, negatively
affecting a nation’s biocapacity. However, economists like Bhagwati (2002) have ar-
gued in favor of the environmental Kuznet’s Curve where greater economic growth
and environmental footprint share a curvilinear relationship because economic growth
initially leads to environmental exploitation but eventually that economic prosperity
also enables wealthy countries to develop environment friendly and sustainable tech-
nologies. This process eventually leads to economic growth that is environmentally
sustainable.
To measure the level of democracy or nature of the political regime in a country,
I use the POLITY IV scores. These scores range from -10 to 10, with higher scores
denoting higher levels of democracy.Thus, a state with a score of 10 is considered
completely democratic, and one with a score of -10 is an autocracy. Apart from using
POLITY scores as is, for this study, I have also categorized countries with a score
of -7 or lower as ‘Non-Democracies’, -6 to 6 as ‘Mixed Regimes’, and 7 or higher as
‘Democracies’. This is because it is difficult to differentiate between for example, a
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level 6 and a level 7 democracy so using a broad categories for measuring political
regime might help us establish a stronger connection between polity and environment.
Economic Growth and Trade
A large literature argues that economic growth has competing effects on environmen-
tal quality. A larger economy generates more output and, therefore, more pollution
and waste. Some types of technological progress, which are associated with growth,
also may damage the environment (e.g., greenhouse gases). The effect is typically
referred to as the scale effect. As income per capita rises above some threshold, the
importance of environmental quality for people is said to rise, and they begin to use
cleaner production techniques and fewer natural resources, thereby increasing invest-
ment in environmental regulation. This behavior is referred to as the income effect.
The combined operation of the scale and income effects is often said to generate
an inverted U figure when environmental degradation is plotted against income per
capita.
The inverted U shape is known in environmental economics and environmental
politics as the environmental Kuznet’s curve (EKC). Its empirical existence, as men-
tioned earlier, is hotly debated. Relevant to my analysis, one may also frame the
Kuznet’s curve debate in terms of whether this is an economic effect (environmental
quality as a luxury good that is affordable at higher per capita incomes) or a political
effect (the emerging middle class as a byproduct of industrialization asserting itself
politically on issues of air and water quality).
Even though the, existence of the Kuznet’s curve is debated, most studies allow
for it in statistical models by including income per capita and its squared term.
If the environmental Kuznets curve exists, the coefficient of income per capita will
be positive, the coefficient of income per capita squared will be negative, and the
coefficient of income per capita will be larger than the absolute value of the coefficient
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of income per capita squared. I measure economic growth in terms of Gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita. I use GDP data from the World Development Indicators
(2008) (purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted, constant 2000 international dollars).
The trade and environment literature argues that trade can affect the environ-
ment in two broadly defined ways. In one way, the pattern of domestic production
and consumption, and the methods of production, change under trade openness as
countries follow their comparative advantages and/or adopt certain more efficient,
cleaner or not, technologies to produce for other countries. For example, a country
that trades environmentally clean goods will see its environmental quality rise, and
vice versa. This channel also involves changes to environmental regulation, as some
international trade treaties countries sign may require regulatory changes at home.
In addition, trade may also affect the environment by promoting economic growth,
and hence, altering people’s behaviors over time. While the combined empirical effect
of trade on the environment is debated, it needs to be included in the model. My
research uses a popular measure of the importance of trade openness to a national
economy, which is the sum of national exports and imports divided by GDP, from
the Penn World Table 6.1.
Refugee Population
One of the important social outcomes of a civil conflict is displaced population and
cross-national refugees. Wars and civil strife in many parts of Africa have led to dis-
persion of refugees in various remote areas that lie along national boundaries. Prunier
(1995) discusses the Rwandan civil war where nearly 50 percent of the civilian pop-
ulation fled out of the country to escape the atrocities of the incumbent junta. A
massive number of these people (about 3.5 million)settled within the eastern regions
of the Republic of Congo. Of these, approximately 860,000 refugees were concen-
trated in the vicinity of Virunga National Park, with another 332,000 camped in the
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Democratic Republic of Congo near Kahuzi Biega National Park. Such large refugee
camps often lead to severe destruction of the nearby environment. In order to pre-
pare food, refugee populations have to resort to slash-and burn agriculture and over
harvesting of vegetation for fuel, forage, and construction materials that may result
in widespread deforestation and erosion. Such desperate times also prompt refugees
to fight with the local population for maintenance of livestock and crops. The refugee
populations under these circumstances often have to resort to eating bushmeat and
wild food plants for their survival (Plumptre et al. 1997) as breakdowns in food
production and looting of livestock by transients may result in the indiscriminate
slaughter of wildlife for food and marketable byproducts such as meat, horn, hides,
and ivory. (Dudley et al. 2002 p. 469) This hints at the environmental impact of
population displacement caused due to international and civil wars. To analyze the
environmental impact of population displacement I use refugee data by the country
of asylum from World Bank’s World Development Index. I would ideally also like
to use Internally displaced people (IDPs) for this study) but unfortunately due to
data limitations I have to restrict myself to only looking at international refugees by
“host” countries.
Population Density
The effect of population density on environmental degradation can have competing
effects. A rise in population density is normally expected to put more demand on
the biocapacity, as a larger population consumes and produces more. A greater
population implies more pressure to use agricultural land for food and industry and,
therefore, more land degradation. But on the other hand, many densely populated
nations tend to be more urbanized and depend less on the environment for livelihood
(e.g., consider West European countries such as the Netherlands or Belgium). As
such, they may clear fewer forests. Data on population density are from the World
61
Development Indicators (2008). World Bank defines population of a country as-
“mid-year population, based, in most cases, on a de facto definition, which counts all
residents regardless of legal status or citizenship.” (WDI, 2008). It is also important
to note that refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum are generally
considered to be part of the population of their country of origin. Population density,
is calculated by the World Bank as the midyear population divided by land area in
square kilometers.
3.3 Conclusion
It is crucial to study the environmental impact of conflicts. This analysis is important
because it forms the first step towards looking at a more complete picture of the
conflict environment relationship where environment is not removed from conflict
and both are related to each other through complex feedback mechanisms. Secondly,
the literature on consequences of conflict has not addressed the environmental impact
of wars sufficiently, therefore this study illuminates another cost of conflict not only
for the purposes of human well being but for the sake of the overall environment. The
study attempts to put forth a more accurate measure of environment–environmental
biocapacity–to measure the environmental impact of violent conflicts. The extent of
this impact is also related to the intensity and type of conflicts and several economic,
social and political factors like economic development, political regime, refugee flow
and population density. In the next chapter I examine the effect of conflict on a
country’s environmental biocapacity in the long run and short-term, considering the
relevant economic, social and political factors.
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Chapter 4
Conflict and Environmental Impact
In the previous chapter, I outlined some important elements of the relationship be-
tween conflict and environment and the ways in which wars-both international and
civil, can lead to exploitation and decline of environment. In this chapter, I examine
the effect of militarized conflict on the environment of the countries by evaluating the
relationship between war and environment, taking into account relevant economic
and political factors, including democracy and wealth.
I test the following hypothesis:
H1. The overall environment will decline if a state is involved in conflict and the
intensity and number of conflicts of conflict is positively related to the environ-
mental decline.
H2. The decline in overall environment is likely to be greater in the short term after
the war but continues in the long run.
H3. States with higher levels of wealth and economic openness experience a decline
in their environment but this effect could be reversed as levels of wealth go
higher.
H4. Higher levels of democracy in a state are associated with better environment.
H5. The impact of conflict on environment is higher in states with larger population
densities.
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I argue that interstate and intrastate conflicts influence the environment nega-
tively. I assess the magnitude of this relationship by analyzing data on composite
measure of environment for 200 states between 1961 to 2005 in the light of relevant
political factors, including wealth, trade and regime type. Involvement in violent con-
flict lowers the overall quality and capacity of the environment, especially in countries
without established democratic institutions and with lower levels of income; there is
a decline in the overall environment in the short-term and the long run. The findings
suggest that the negative effect of war on environment is closely linked to the levels
of income, trade and democracy.
4.1 Measuring Environmental Capacity
Biocapacity refers to the amount of biologically productive land and water areas avail-
able within the boundaries of a given country. Global Footprints Networks calculates
Biocapacity for five major land types: cropland, grazing land (which also includes
other wooded land), fishing grounds (marine and inland waters), forest, and built-up
land (infrastructure and hydro). The National Footprints Account (NFA) includes
built-up land biocapacity because though built-up land does not generate resources,
buildings and infrastructure do occupy the biocapacity of the land they cover. How-
ever, for the purposes of this study we will use data for overall biocapacity of countries
and disaggregated biocapacity data for cropland, grazing land, fishing grounds, and
forest.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, most studies on conflict and environment or
natural resources in past have used raw environment data, which can be problematic if
one is looking at various countries in different ecological zones with different ecological
capacity across time. There are at least three distinct advantages of using data on
biocapacity over using raw data on natural resources–first, biocapacity is a more
comprehensive measure of the interaction of anthropological activities and ecological
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environment than raw natural resource data. Second, biocapacity data, measured
in Global Hectares (using Yield Factors), normalizes the bioproductivity of different
countries across different years. This makes it possible to compare two or more
countries that lie in different ecological zones and experience different environmental
vulnerabilities, with each other and across time. Third, this data creates a common
standard for measuring different bioproductive areas by using Equivalence Factors.
Therefore it becomes becomes possible to compare how different bioproductive areas
such as cropland or fishing land get affected by conflict. The national biocapacity
data used in this study come from National Footprint Accounts (2008) that calculate
ecological footprint and biocapacity of 186 countries, from 1961 to 2005. This study
also uses disaggregated biocpacity data, for the same period of time and number
of countries, on four different types of bioproductive areas–Cropland, Grazing land,
Forest for timber and fuelwood and Fishing grounds. As mentioned in previous
chapter, biocapacity (BC) of a country for any land use type is measured by:
BC = A ∗ YF ∗ EQF (4.1)
where A is the area available for a given land use type and YF and EQF are the
yield factor and equivalence factor, respectively, for the country, year, and land use
type in question.
Normalizing Biocapacity–From Hectares to Global Hectares
Average bioproductivity differs between various land use types, as well as between
countries for any given land use type. For comparability across countries and land
use types, Ecological Footprint and biocapacity are usually expressed in units of
world-average bioproductive area. Expressing Footprints in worldaverage hectares
also facilitates tracking the embodied bioproductivity in international trade flows, as
gha measure the ecological productivity required to maintain a given flow. Global
65
hectares provide more information than simply weight - which does not capture the
extent of land and sea area used - or physical area - which does not capture how much
ecological production is associated with that land. Yield factors and equivalence
factors are the two coefficients needed to express results in terms of global hectares
(Monfreda et al., 2004; Galli et al., 2007), thus providing comparability between
various countriesÕ Ecological Footprint as well as biocapacity values.
Yield Factor
Yield factors account for countries’ differing levels of productivity for particular land
use types. For example, the average hectare of pasture in New Zealand produces more
grass than a world average hectare of pasture land. Thus, in terms of productivity,
one hectare of grassland in New Zealand is equivalent to more than one world average
grazing land hectare; it is potentially capable of supporting more meat production.
Table 4.1 shows the yield factors calculated for several countries in the 2010 Edition of
Global Footprint Network’s National Footprint Accounts. Yield factors are country-
specific and vary by land use type and year. They may reflect natural factors such as
differences in precipitation or soil quality, as well as anthropogenic induced differences
such as management practices. The yield factor is the ratio of national average to
world average yields. It is calculated in terms of the annual availability of usable
products. For any land use type L, a country’s yield factor Y FL, is given by:
Y FL =
∑
iU
AW,i∑
iU
AN,i
(4.2)
where U is the set of all usable primary products that a given land use type
yields, and AW,i and AN,i are the areas necessary to furnish that country’s annually
available amount of product i at world and national yields, respectively. These areas
are calculated as:
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AN,i =
Pi
YN
and AW,i =
Pi
YW
(4.3)
where Pi is the total national annual growth of product i and YN and YW are
national and world yields, respectively. Thus AN,i is always the area that produces
i within a given country, while AW,i gives the equivalent area of world-average land
yielding i. With the exception of cropland, all other land use types included in the
National Footprint Accounts provide only a single primary product, such as wood
from forest land or grass from grazing land. For these land use types, the equation
for the yield factor simplifies to:
Y FL =
YN
YW
(4.4)
Due to the difficulty of assigning a yield to built-up land, the yield factor for this
land use type is assumed to be the same as that for cropland (in other words urban
areas are assumed to be built on or near productive agricultural lands). For lack of
detailed global datasets, areas inundated by hydroelectric reservoirs are presumed to
have previously had world average productivity. The yield factor for carbon uptake
land is assumed to be the same as that for forest land, due to limited data availability
regarding the carbon uptake of other land use types. All inland waters are assigned
yield factors of one, due to the lack of a comprehensive global dataset on freshwater
ecosystem productivities.
Equivalence Factor
In order to combine the Ecological Footprints or biocapacities of different land use
types, a second coefficient is necessary. Equivalence factors convert the areas of differ-
ent land use types, at their respective world average productivities, into their equiv-
alent areas at global average bioproductivity across all land use types. Equivalence
factors vary by land use type as well as by year. The rationale behind Equivalence
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Table 4.1: Sample Yield Factors for Selected Countries (2008)
Yield Cropland Forest Grazing Land Fishing Grounds
World Average 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Algeria 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.9
Germany 2.2 4.1 2.2 3.0
Hungary 1.1 2.6 1.9 0.0
Japan 1.3 1.4 2.2 0.8
Jordan 1.1 1.5 0.4 0.7
New Zealand 0.7 2.0 2.5 1.0
Zambia 0.2 0.2 1.5 0.0
Source: National Footprints Accounts (2008)
factors’ calculation is to weight different land areas in terms of their capacity to pro-
duce resources useful for humans. The weighting criterion is therefore not just the
quantity of biomass produced, but also the quality of such biomass, meaning how
valuable this biomass is for humans. Net Primary Production (NPP) values have
been suggested for use in scaling land type productivity (Venetoulis and Talberth,
2008); however this would not allow incorporating the “quality” criterion in the scal-
ing procedure. Usable NPP data could theoretically be used as weighting factors as
they would allow to track both the quantity and quality of biomass produced by land
use types (Kitzes et al., 2009); however usable-NPP data availability and their use
in calculating equivalence factors has not been tested yet by Global Footprint Net-
work. As such, equivalence factors are currently calculated using suitability indexes
from the Global Agro-Ecological Zones model combined with data on the actual ar-
eas of cropland, forest land, and grazing land area from FAOSTAT (FAO and IIASA
Global Agro- Ecological Zones 2000 FAO ResourceSTAT Statistical Database 2007).
The GAEZ model divides all land globally into five categories, based on calculated
potential crop productivity. All land is assigned a quantitative suitability index from
among the following:
• Very Suitable (VS) – 0.9
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• Suitable (S) – 0.7
• Moderately Suitable (MS) – 0.5
• Marginally Suitable (mS) – 0.3
• Not Suitable (NS) – 0.1
The calculation of the equivalence factors assumes that within each country the
most suitable land available will be planted to cropland, after which the most suitable
remaining land will be under forest land, and the least suitable land will be devoted to
grazing land. The equivalence factors are calculated as the ratio of the world average
suitability index for a given land use type to the average suitability index for all land
use types. Figure 4.1 shows a schematic representation of this calculation.
For the same reasons detailed above, the equivalence factor for built-up land is
set equal to that for cropland, while that of carbon uptake land is set equal to that
of forest land. The equivalence factor for hydroelectric reservoir area is set equal
to one, reflecting the assumption that hydroelectric reservoirs flood world average
land. The equivalence factor for marine area is calculated such that a single global
hectare of pasture will produce an amount of calories of beef equal to the amount of
calories of salmon that can be produced by a single global hectare of marine area. The
equivalence factor for inland water is set equal to the equivalence factor for marine
area. Table 4.2 shows the equivalence factors for the land use types in the 2010
National Footprint Accounts, data year 2007. According to the table, croplandÕs
equivalence factor of 2.51 indicates that world-average cropland productivity was
more than double the average productivity for all land combined. This same year,
grazing land had an equivalence factor of 0.46, showing that grazing land was, on
average, 46 percent as productive as the world-average bioproductive hectare.
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Figure 4.1: Schematic Representation of Equivalence Factor Calculations
Note: The total number of bioproductive land hectares is shown by the length of
the horizontal axis. Vertical dashed lines divide this total land area into the three
terrestrial land use types for which equivalence factors are calculated (cropland, forest,
and grazing land). The length of each horizontal bar in the graph shows the total
amount of land available with each suitability index. The vertical location of each bar
reflects the suitability score for that suitability index, between 10 and 90.
4.2 Measuring Conflict
To measure conflict, this study uses “Major Episodes of Political Violence” (MEVP)
Data, 1946-2008 created by Center for Systemic Peace (CSP). CSP defines major
episodes of political violence as systematic and sustained use of lethal violence by
organized groups that result in at least 500 directly-related deaths over the course
of the episode. Episodes are coded for time span and magnitude and assigned to
one of seven categories of armed conflict: international violence (IV), international
war (IW), international independence war (IN), civil violence (CV), civil war (CW),
ethnic violence (EV), and ethnic war (EW). Each episode is designated to span a
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Table 4.2: Equivalence Factors (2007)
Area Type Equivalence Factor (Global Hectares per Hectare)
Cropland 2.51
Forest 1.26
Grazing Land 0.46
Marine and Inland Water 0.37
Build-Up Land 2.51
Source: National Footrprints Accounts (2008)
certain number of years (“inclusive years”) and judged to have been of a certain, gen-
eral “magnitude of societal-systemic impact” (an eleven-point scale, 0-10; magnitude
scores are considered consistent and comparable across categories and cases, that is,
approximating a ratio scale). The episode’s “magnitude of impact” score is entered
for each year of the designated time span and for each country considered to have
been directly affected by the warfare experience. Countries that engage in military
intervention in an episode taking place solely in another country are generally not
considered to be “directly affected” by the violence. When more than one episode of
a particular MEPV category occurs in a single country in a single year, the episode
scores are summed and the sum is entered for that category variable in the data set.
For analyzing the impact of international and domestic violence on the environmen-
tal biocapacity, I have combined all the intrastate episodes (IV and IW) in “INTOT”
variable and all the interstate episodes (CV and CW) are in “CIVTOT” variable.
I also analyze the impact of ethnic conflicts on the environment by combining all
the episodes of ethnic conflicts (EV and EW), which are a subcategory on intrastate
conflicts.
4.3 Analysis and Results
The fact that these data comprise repeated observations on a large number of cross-
sectional units raises the specter of both temporal correlation and non-constant error
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variance. To address these issues, I adopt the method of generalized estimating equa-
tions (GEE) (Liang and Zeger 1986, Zorn 2001). This approach has been shown to
provide consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates of the parameters of inter-
est. In particular, I estimate a GEE model with a first-order autoregressive temporal
covariance structure. All independent variables have been lagged to take into account
the delayed effect of the levels of covariates on biocapacity and its disaggregated in-
dicators. As levels of factors such as GDP and democracy increase or decrease for a
given country, their effects on the overall biocapacity and its components is assumed
to take some time to materialize. Lagged independent variables capture temporal
effects and, therefore, more adequately reflect the relationship between the covariates
and the dependent variable.
Another design issue concerns the possibility of endogeneity for the right hand
side variables. My empirical framework treats conflict, democracy, GDP per capita,
trade and population density as exogenous variables. One might argue that environ-
mental degradation can affect these variables. As mentioned earlier in this paper,
scholars have argued that environmental degradation can lead to conflict or that loss
of cropland may affect the agricultural exports of a country. Therefore, lagging the
right hand side variables also mitigates the potential risk of simultaneity in this study.
I have also addressed the issue of multicollinearity among the exogenous variables by
running a variance inflation factor (VIF) diagnostic on the data. All the dependent
variables and the exogenous variables–GDP per capita, trade, refugee population and
population density have been logged due to diminishing marginal returns.
Two data related issues that often persist in conflict data sets are of missing
data and too many null data points (because conflicts after all are rarer than no
conflicts). Since this is a monadic data on conflict, too many null data points is not
an issue. However, it is important to consider any systematically missing data on the
environment due to conflict. This is especially important because conflict can prevent
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international or domestic institutions from gathering data. International or domestic
agencies are unable to send employees or volunteers into conflict zone to gather data
or collect samples and so on due to lack of safety and infrastructure. The National
Footprint Accounts methodology uses extensive measures to deal with missing data
and other data related inconsistencies. The data cleaning algorithm used by NFA
excludes data points that are beyond a fixed distance from the median value of the
reference time series data. The fixed distance is a user-defined multiple of the median
value of the time series in question. To replace the removed outliers and/or to fill in
data gaps for non-endpoints, the algorithm interpolates the average value of the two
neighboring points. To replace endpoints (outliers or missing data), the algorithm
extrapolates values based on the Akaike Information Criterion. [Akaike (1978)] The
data clean-ing algorithm was implemented on the following trade datasets used in the
NFA 2011 Edition: the COMTRADE dataset, the FishSTAT Commodity dataset,
and the TRADESTAT dataset from FAOSTAT.
I estimate two models to test my hypotheses. The first model measures the effect of
the independent variables on the overall level of environmental capacity as expressed
by national biocapacity for a given year (Yit = Xitβ+µit). The second model employs
the change in environmental capacity, taking the difference between the national
biocapacity for the current year and the previous year (∆Yit = ∆Xitβ + it). This
model assess the immediate short-term effect of conflict on environmental capacity.
The effect on biocapacity in the first model is a better indicator of how the state
would maintain its environment and environment related infrastructure in the long
run after the conflict; the change in environmental capacity due to conflict indicates
the direct effect of conflict in the year following the violence. For each model, I present
separate results for different type of conflicts-intrastate, interstate and ethnic.
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Long-Term Effects
Table 4.3 presents the summary statistics for the model estimating the long-term
impact. Table 4.4 presents the long-term effects of conflict and other covariates on
environmental capacity. In the first model I find that the overall environmental ca-
pacity of a country declines as the magnitude of conflict it is involved in increases.
This finding, illustrated in Figure 4.2, reveals that each unit of increase in the mag-
nitude of conflict in a country, leads to a loss of biocapacity for that country on an
average. This is consistent with our earlier discussion about the impact of violence
on environmental capacity of a country through direct impact and other factors like
destruction of infrastructure, generation of refugee flows, and diversion of resources
away from environment related spending. These factors hinder the ability of a state
to protect and conserve its environmental capacity and also skew its priorities in the
aftermath of war towards economic development, providing health care facilities and
so on away from long-term environmental concerns.
Table 4.3: Summary statistics: Long-term Effects
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent Variable
log(Total Biocapacity) 7.06 0.992 2.904 9.273
Independent Variables
Lagged POLITY score -0.09 7.517 -10 10
Lagged log(Per Capita GDP) 3.266 0.683 1.794 4.8
Lagged log(Trade Openness) 1.768 0.312 0.036 2.794
Lagged log(Population Density) 1.606 0.709 -1.006 3.814
Lagged log(Refugee Population) 3.79 1.322 0 6.644
Lagged log(Per Capita GDP squared) 11.135 4.547 3.219 23.041
Lagged POLITY score squared 56.506 31.624 0 100
Lagged Total Conflict 0.576 1.66 0 14
Lagged International Wars 0.084 0.588 0 11
Lagged Civil Wars 0.491 1.455 0 11
Lagged Ethnic Wars 0.213 0.945 0 10
Note: N=8800
The level of democracy has a significantly negative impact on the long-term en-
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vironmental capacity of a country which seems to indicate that as countries become
more democratic their environmental capacity declines. But considering the coeffi-
cient of the squared POLITY score, which is negative and significant, we can deduce
a curvilinear relationship between levels of democracy and biocapacity. Which means
that countries with low democracy scores and countries with high democracy scores
both have higher environmental capacity. For countries with high levels of democracy,
one could contend that an active civil society and a responsive government ensure
protection and conservation of biocapacity of that country.
One could also argue that countries with high levels of democracy often tend to be
advanced, industrialized economies that can afford to spend on environment friendly
technology. On the other hand countries with very low democracy scores perhaps
experience a very strict and controlled use of their environmental resources. Alter-
natively countries with low democratic scores are also likely to be “underdeveloped”
economies where their environmental capacity has not been tapped yet.
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Figure 4.2: The Effect of Conflict on the Overall National
Biocapacity
Levels of democracy in a country also becomes crucial in the wake of conflict
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and its environmental impact. My findings suggest that as the magnitude of conflict
increases, the role of democracy and democratic institutions increase in rebuilding
biocapacity. Figure 4.3 presents the effect of conflicts on environmental capacity by
democracy scores. The dashed line represents the effect of conflict in countries with
high democracy scores (7 or higher) and solid line represents the impact of conflict
on biocapacity in countries with low democracy scores.
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Figure 4.3: The Effect of Conflict on the Overall Biocapacity by Democracy
Scores
The results indicate that countries with low levels of democracy lose biocapacity
as the magnitude of wars increases as opposed to highly democratic countries that
seem to be doing fine in terms of environmental capacity in the long run. Weak
democracies or autocracies supposedly have weak institutions and infrastructure to
look after the environment, moreover a non-democratic regime is not likely to be very
responsive towards the general population who become the victims of environmental
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degradation. Therefore, weak democracies/non-democracies have neither the will nor
the resources to rebuild and conserve the environment after conflict. On the other
hand strong democracies tend to be better at responding to the needs of the electorate
which includes looking after the environment after war time. Strong democracies
also have better institutional infrastructure and civil society organization to deal
with post-conflict environmental reconstruction. Therefore in the long-run, stronger
democracies tend to do better at rebuilding and conserving environment that non-
democracies. Having said that, such argument may not hold true for international
conflicts where strong democracies have “outsourced” most of their wars in the last
fifty years. Which means that strong democracies do not experience the impact of
conflict on their own territory to have any direct or indirect long-term effect on their
environmental capacity. This argument brings forth the idea of ecological justice or
injustice where the same conflict has an uneven impact on different countries involved
depending on their economic and political status in the international system.
Economic growth has a significantly positive impact on long-term environmental
capacity of a country. Moreover, there is an evidence of a curvilinear relationship
between GDP and biocapacity. This implies that as a country’s GDP increases
its biocapacity increases, presumably by employing more environmentally efficient
technology and investing more money to environment related research and develop-
ment. But this increasing effect decreases as the GDP continues to grow because
even though we can slow down the degree of environmental degradation due to en-
vironmental growth by employing more efficient technology, it does take its toll on a
country’s biocapacity.
Trade openness has a significant negative impact on environmental capacity, hint-
ing towards the environmentally exploitative nature of globalization. My model sug-
gests that population density has a positive impact on environmental capacity, which
seems a little counter intuitive since population pressure is often linked to environmen-
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tal degradation. However, scholars have also suggested that high population density
could also hint at urbanization and perhaps more efficient use of environmental re-
sources. Presence of refugee population also has a negative impact on a country’s
biocapacity in the long run which is in line with our earlier discussion about “living
off the land” consequences of displaced populations.
When comparing different types of conflicts–international, civil and ethnic–my
findings suggest that on an average, international and ethnic conflicts are more dev-
astating for the environment than civil conflicts. However all three type of conflicts
do perpetrate a significant amount of damage to the environment in the long run.
Level of democracy becomes critical for countries facing all the three types of con-
flict in managing environmental capacity in the long run. Refugee population has a
negative impact on environment in countries facing civil wars and ethnic wars.
Short-Term Effects
The second model assesses the short-term relationship between the explanatory fac-
tors and environmental degradation by looking at changes in national biocapacity
and independent variables. The changes in biocapacity is calculated by taking the
difference in the values of national biocapacity for the current and the previous year
(∆Biocapacity = Biocapacityit − Biocapacity(it−1)). Similar calculations are made
on covariates to measure yearly changes. As in the previous model, which assesses
the overall levels of biocapacity, The conflict variable is disaggregated along type–
International, Civil and Ethnic. Summary statistics for this model are presented in
Table 4.5. The results for this model are shown in Table 4.6 and reveal a significant
decline in biocapacity in the short-term, when countries are experiencing interna-
tional wars. There is no statistically significant decline in environmental capacity if
a country is involved in civil or ethnic wars at least within a span of one year.
Trade openness seems to have a positive impact on national biocapacity in the
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short-term but wealth does not have a statistically significant effect on national bio-
capacity in this model. Varying levels of wealth does not have any significant impact
on environmental biocapacity in this model.
Democracy does not have any significant impact on environmental capacity of a
country in a short span of time. Different levels of democracy also does not seem
to matter for the environment in the aftermath of a war. Population density has a
positive impact on the environmental biocapacity in the sort-run, which again hints
at a positive correlation between urbanization and environmental biocapacity.
The impact of refugee population on the environment is negatively significant in
the short-run if a country is involved in a civil conflict. This is perhaps explained
by the nature of civil conflicts and porousness of borders among neighboring states,
whose populations might be involved in those civil conflicts. However refugee popu-
lations don’t seem to have a statistically significant impact on the environment in the
case of international or ethnic wars. The variable of refugee or displaced population is
very crucial to post-conflict environmental degradation and needs further unpacking.
Unfortunately due to the limitation of the data and scope of this research I can’t in-
clude it in this analysis. In this research I’m only accounting for international refugees
and not internally displaced populations, because of data constraints. Including data
in internally displaced populations could shed more light on subnational trends of
environmental degradation due to population displacements within a country.
4.4 Discussion
The findings of this analyses in this chapter indicate that conflicts have a very destruc-
tive impact on the environment which may not become very apparent in the short-run
but can lead to a significant loss of biocapacity for a country in the long-run. My
analysis also suggests that different type of conflicts can have different impact on a
country’s environment, for instance, international and ethnic conflicts have a more
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detrimental impact on a country’s environment in the long-run but in the short-run
only international conflicts seem to impact the environment, which could be explained
by the large scale of the international conflict and the nature of weapons used for
interstate wars.
The results also validate earlier claims made in the thesis that governments and
international political institutions often ignore the environmental impact of conflict
because it is not immediate. Environmental impact of a conflict can take years to
manifest through several direct and indirect means and political institutions need to
be be cognizant of this temporal aspect of environmental degradation after a conflict.
My analysis also finds a significant relationship between democracies and environ-
mental management after conflicts in the long-run. The results, therefore add to the
already vast literature on democracy and conflict, focussing on the benefits of de-
mocratization vis a vis environmental protection post-conflict. However these results
need further investigation because democratic countries often don’t fight international
wars on their own turf, thereby endangering and destroying environmental capacity of
other countries in the process. Environmental consequences of war, therefore, bring
forth the issue of justice and equity not only for the populations (directly dependent
on the environment for their day to day living, hence more vulnerable, verses eco-
nomically better off population groups), but also for countries who initiate conflict
knowing that they will experience negligible environmental loss as a consequence of
their actions.
Apart from political factors, economic factors also have a significant impact on
environmental capacity of a country in both short-term and long-term. Work on
consequences of conflict has mainly focussed on effects on states and institutions,
including political, economic and health related impact of violence. The real costs of
violent conflict can not be understood completely without a clearer comprehension of
the mechanisms through which war affects individuals and their environment. This
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study furthers the goal of understanding the environmental cost of war by examining
the effect of conflict on environmental resources that humans so closely depend on.
It is crucial to study the impact of conflict on environmental capacity of a state
because environmental capacity or natural resources often affect economic growth
and political outcomes in states. Also, environmental degradation in states due to
conflict can engender further conflicts. In this chapter, I looked at the impact of
conflict on the overall biocapacity of a country, in the next chapter I will examine
the impact of conflict on disaggregated indicators of biocapacity. These indicators
are crucial for social sustenance, which, if destroyed, can lead to further conflict.
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Table 4.4: Determinants of Environmental Impact: Long Term Effects, 1961-2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total International Civil Ethnic
Lagged Total Conflict -0.0014∗∗
(0.0004)
Lagged POLITY score -0.0003∗ -0.0001 -0.0003∗ -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Lagged log(Per Capita GDP) 0.2523∗∗∗ 0.2675∗∗∗ 0.2572∗∗∗ 0.2551∗∗∗
(0.0201) (0.0199) (0.0201) (0.0200)
Lagged log(Trade Openness) -0.0258∗∗∗ -0.0230∗∗∗ -0.0256∗∗∗ -0.0258∗∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047)
Lagged log(Pop Density) 0.0897∗∗∗ 0.0870∗∗∗ 0.0899∗∗∗ 0.0888∗∗∗
(0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0052)
Lagged log(Refugee Pop) -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0042∗∗∗ -0.0020∗∗∗
(0.0328) (0.0049) (0.0012) (0.0008)
Lagged log(Per Capita GDP)
sq
-0.0310∗∗∗ -0.0332∗∗∗ -0.0317∗∗∗ -0.0313∗∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031)
Lagged POLITY score sq -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Total ConflictXPOLITY 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001)
Lagged International Wars -0.0030∗
(0.0012)
International WarsXPOLITY 0.0005∗∗
(0.0002)
Lagged Civil Wars -0.0013∗∗
(0.0005)
Civil WarsXPOLITY 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0001)
Lagged Ethnic Wars -0.0030∗∗∗
(0.0008)
Ethnic WarsXPOLITY 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0001)
(constant) 6.8272∗∗∗ 6.8015∗∗∗ 6.8178∗∗∗ 6.8225∗∗∗
(0.0337) (0.0333) (0.0337) (0.0336)
N 4912 4912 4912 4912
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.5: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent Variable
∆ (Total Biocapacity) 0 0.026 -0.352 0.274
Independent Variables
∆ POLITY score 0.085 1.785 -18 16
∆ log(Per Capita GDP) 0.007 0.027 -0.301 0.28
∆ log(Population Density) 0.009 0.008 -0.193 0.136
∆ log(Trade Openness) 0.006 0.057 -0.608 1.165
∆ Lagged log(Refugee Population) -0.002 0.407 -3.575 3.539
∆ log(Per Capita GDP squared) 0.052 0.165 -1.707 1.665
∆ POLITY score squared 0.048 10.083 -100 100
Lagged Total Conflict 0.576 1.66 0 14
Lagged International Wars 0.084 0.588 0 11
Lagged Civil Wars 0.491 1.455 0 11
Lagged Ethnic Wars 0.213 0.945 0 10
Note: N=8380
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Table 4.6: Determinants of Environmental Impact: Short-Term Effects, 1961-2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total International Civil Ethnic
Lagged Total Conflict -0.0003
(0.0003)
∆ POLITY score 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
∆ log(Per Capita GDP) -0.1325 -0.1315 -0.1308 -0.1288
(0.0776) (0.0775) (0.0776) (0.0776)
∆ log(Pop Density) 0.2649∗ 0.2759∗ 0.2678∗ 0.2730∗
(0.1088) (0.1085) (0.1090) (0.1089)
∆ log(Trade Openness) 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.0306∗∗∗ 0.0307∗∗∗
(0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0075)
∆ Lagged log(Refugee Pop) - 0.1957∗ -0.3340 -0.5678∗∗∗ -0.2580
(0.1088) (0.1085) (0.0976) (0.1289)
∆ log(Per Capita GDP sq) 0.0055 0.0055 0.0054 0.0052
(0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0131)
∆ POLITY score sq 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
∆ Total ConflictXPOLITY -0.0001
(0.0001)
Lagged International Wars -0.0053∗∗∗
(0.0009)
∆ International WarsX-
POLITY
-0.0013
(0.0009)
Lagged Civil Wars -0.0002
(0.0004)
∆ Civil WarsXPOLITY -0.0001
(0.0001)
Lagged Ethnic Wars 0.0000
(0.0006)
∆ Ethnic WarsXPOLITY -0.0001
(0.0002)
Constant -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0016
(0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0015)
N 4760 4760 4760 4760
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Chapter 5
Impact of Different Conflict Types on
Disaggregated Measures of the Environment
In the previous chapter I examined the relationship between conflicts (and their dif-
ferent types) and the overall environment of countries in the context of other relevant
social and political factors. The measure of environment that I have used in my
analysis is the national biocapacity calculated by the National Footprint Accounts
(NFA). Biocapacity is the ability of ecosystems to produce biological materials useful
to humans beings and to absorb all the waste generated by human activities. All of
this, of course, is dependent on the prevailing management schemes and extraction
technologies where “useful” materials are defined as those demanded by the human
economy. As I have argued before, biocapacity is a better measure of the environment
to understand the relationship between conflict and environmental resources because
it provides us with a uniform measure of the environmental capacity across different
ecosystems. This enables us to compare a country like Mongolia which primarily lies
in the cold Gobi desert located in the trans-Himalayan region, to Gabon, 85 percent
of whose land is covered with tropical rain forests. Calculations of biocapacity also
normalize disaggregated measures of the environment like–forest land, cropland, graz-
ing land and fisheries, using Equivalence Factors (EF), so that they can be compared
to each other. This gives us a critical advantage in looking at the impact of conflict
on the environment in a deeper way. By understanding how conflicts affect different
aspects of environmental biocapacity or ecosystem “services” we can get a sense of
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what other future crisis will ensue in the light of a specific environmental degradation
during and after violent conflicts.
In this chapter I deepen the analysis presented in the previous chapter and focus
on four disaggregated measures of biocapacity. I examine the effect of the intensity
of conflicts (measured in terms of duration and number of fatalities) on cropland,
grazing land, forest land and fishing grounds. These four environmental assets or
“services” are crucial to human sustenance in terms of sustaining life-stock, providing
raw materials for industries like timber, providing food, fish and water. Degradation
of these resources during or after conflict not only affects the overall quality of the
environment but also engenders further scarcity, access or distribution based conflicts
among contentious groups.
In this specific study I, once again, use data from the National Footprints Accounts
(2010) from 1961 to 2008 for 186 countries to measure biocapacity of cropland, grazing
land, forest land and inland fishing grounds. The NFA uses raw data on agricultural
land, forested land and fishing grounds from the Coordination of Information on the
Environment (CORINE) and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAOSTAT)
to calculate disaggregated biocapacity. Raw data for marine fishing grounds comes
from World Resource Institute (WRI).
Just as in the previous chapter, this analysis uses “Major Episodes of Political Vi-
olence” (MEVP) Data, 1946-2008, created by the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP).
CSP defines major episodes of political violence as systematic and sustained use of
lethal violence by organized groups that result in at least 500 directly-related deaths
over the course of the episode. Episodes are coded for time span and magnitude and
assigned different categories of armed conflict. The three categories that I use for this
analysis are international war, civil war and ethnic war. Each episode is designated
to span a certain number of years and judged to have been of a certain, general “mag-
nitude of societal-systemic impact” (an eleven-point scale, 0-10; magnitude scores are
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considered consistent and comparable across categories and cases, that is, approxi-
mating a ratio scale). When more than one episode of a particular MEPV category
occurs in a single country in a single year, the episode scores are summed and the
sum is entered for that category variable in the data set.
I also include critical political, economic and demographic variables in this anal-
ysis. I use POLITY IV dataset to measure the level of democracy within a state. I
use data from World Development Indicators (2008) to measure national per capita
GDP and I measure trade openness using data from Penn World Table (6.1). I
measure population density and refugee population using World Development Indi-
cators (2008) data. The summary statistics for all these variables, including all the
dependent variables are presented in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent Variables
ln Cropland Biocapacity 14.704 1.896 6.918 18.204
ln Grazing Land Biocapacity 15.442 2.059 8.915 18.648
ln Forest Land Biocapacity 14.286 2.212 7.142 18.496
ln Fishing Grounds Biocapacity 13.704 1.824 8.757 16.291
Independent Variables
Lagged POLITY score -0.09 7.517 -10 10
Lagged ln(Per Capita GDP) 3.266 0.683 1.794 10.8
Lagged ln(Trade Openness) 1.768 0.312 0.036 4.794
Lagged ln(Population Density) 1.606 0.709 1.006 3.814
Lagged ln(Refugee Population) 3.79 1.322 0 6.644
Lagged ln(Per Capita GDP
squared)
11.135 4.547 3.219 23.041
Lagged POLITY score squared 56.506 31.624 0 100
Lagged Total Conflict 0.576 1.66 0 14
Lagged International Wars 0.084 0.588 0 11
Lagged Civil Wars 0.491 1.455 0 11
Lagged Ethnic Wars 0.213 0.945 0 10
Note: Number of observations
varies across models.
The following sections discuss each disaggregated measure of biocapacity–cropland,
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grazing land, forest land and fishing grounds. I also propose and analyze possible
hypotheses regarding their relationship with different conflict types.
5.1 Impact on Agricultural Land
When agricultural land and crop related systems are disrupted by war they take a
long time to recover. Apart from directly destroying fertile land, violent conflicts
also disrupt the food demand and supply chains. As basic as it may sound, war
destroys agricultural equipment like tractors or combined harvesters affecting crop
yield. Conflicts can also destroy irrigation systems and hydrological management
plants that otherwise ensure maintaining suitable soil for plantation. Afghanistan, for
example, after decades of civil and international conflict has lost more than 70 percent
of its irrigational network. This loss is critical for an arid country like Afghanistan
that lacks natural water supply and rainfall. Similarly, the recent NATO bombing in
Libya destroyed irrigation pipelines from the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System–the
primary source of freshwater in an otherwise desert country. Livestock may be killed
as a strategy of war–especially during civil and ethnic conflicts, or incidentally, as
a result of disease during wartime. Transportation infrastructure, that often suffers
heavy damage during war, renders it difficult for farmers to buy seeds or sell and
transport their crop and for buyers to buy any produce. Production goes down when
it becomes unsafe for farmers to leave their homes for their fields. Fewer acres are
planted resulting in lower quantities of crop and food production, resulting in massive
inflation of food prices in what could be an already fragile economy.
Another by-product of conflict—land mines are a major problem in many countries
such as Afghanistan, Croatia, Cambodia and Vietnam. In such developing countries
where agriculture is a major source of livelihood and export revenue, the presence
of mine-contaminated agricultural land represents a major obstacle in social and
economic reconstruction efforts. A significant proportion of the available agricultural
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land in these countries cannot be used because it is contaminated by land mines
and other unexploded ordnance (UXO). De-mining with current methods is slow and
expensive. Aid agencies and governments need to support large refugee populations
for several years because the threat of land mines has forced them off their land. Also,
long delays in de-mining cause loss of fertility and degradation that could be avoided
if the land was used. In Afghanistan, for example, one of the World Bank policy
reports on food price inflation suggest that it may take up to 10 more years before all
designated high-priority areas can begin to be cultivated.[D’Souza and Jolliffe [2010]]
This long clearance period presents problems in terms of depreciation in the economic
value of the land, particularly as fruit trees are an important component of agriculture
in Afghanistan, and it will take years to re-establish productive orchards. Similarly,
in Bosnia-Herzegovina where about 200,000 ha of agricultural land is still mined,
the Bosnia-Herzogevina Mine Action Center estimates that it will take another 40
years to de-mine the land. Apart from the loss or decline in productivity of land for
farmers, markets and contracts lost during the war are often filled by competitors from
other countries, presenting a further obstacle to agricultural recovery.[Bolton [2010]]
In some countries like Cambodia, land holders are either farming mined land, or are
clearing the land for themselves with significant risks to themselves and others. This
is because they cannot afford to wait (possibly for a decade or more) for organized
de-mining teams to arrive.[Bottomley [2001]]
While land-mines and other sources of insecurity drive people away from agri-
cultural land leaving it susceptible to erosion and degradation, inflow of population
groups due to conflict leads to other kinds of land degradation issues. Land, in par-
ticular, its utilization for farming and other uses, becomes an important feature in
displaced persons’ survival strategies. As the general tendency is to locate refugee
camps in semi-arid or ecologically fragile regions, most camps are overpopulated,
resulting in rapid land degradation. [Black [2001]] observes that the resulting soil
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degradation triggers overuse of resources, including cultivated fields that have to suf-
fer shorter than usual fallow period and overgrazing by refugees’ livestock. Where
land is a source of contestation between refugees or IDPs and the local population, it
generates heightened tension, often resulting in skirmishes or even precipitating civil
war.
Figure 5.1: Relative Area of Land Use Type in Hectares and
Global Hectares
Source: National Footprint Accounts (2008)
In this section, I will look at the impact of conflicts on agricultural land or cropland
and grazing land though direct (bombing, chemical warfare) and indirect (popula-
tion displacements, destruction of hydrological infrastructure, long term suspension
of market supply and demand chains) means. Cropland biocapacity consists of the
area required to grow all crop products, including livestock feeds, fish meals, oil crops
and rubber. It is the most bioproductive of the land use types included in the Na-
tional Footprint Accounts. In other words the number of global hectares of cropland
is large compared to the number of physical hectares of cropland in the world, as
shown in Figure 1. Worldwide in 2007 there were 1.55 billion hectares designated as
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cropland.[FAO ResourceSTAT Statistical Database (2007)] The National Footprint
Accounts calculate the footprint of cropland according to the production quantities
of 164 different crop categories. The footprint of each crop type is calculated as
the area of cropland that would be required to produce the harvested quantity at
world-average yields.
Cropland biocapacity represents the combined productivity of all land devoted to
growing crops, which the cropland footprint cannot exceed. As an actively managed
land use type, cropland has yields of harvest equal to yields of growth by defini-
tion and thus it is not possible for the footprint of production of this land use type
to exceed biocapacity within any given area.[Kitzes et al., (2009b)] Unfortunately,
this problem in cropland biocapacity makes it difficult to establish over exploitation
of cropland. Hopefully, eventual availability of more accurate data on historically
sustainable crop yields will help in improving cropland biocapacity calculations and
tracking overexploitation of agricultural land.
The grazing land biocapacity measures the area of grassland used in addition
to crop feeds to support livestock. Grazing land comprises all grasslands used to
provide feed for animals, including cultivated pastures as well as wild grasslands
and prairies. According to Figure 5.1, in 2007, there were 3.38 billion hectares of
land worldwide classified as grazing land.[FAO ResourceSTAT Statistical Database
(2007)] Since the yield of grazing land represents the amount of above-ground primary
production available in a year, and there are no significant prior stocks to draw
down, overshoot is not physically possible over extended periods of time for this
land use type. For this reason, a country’s grazing land footprint of production is
prevented from exceeding its biocapacity in the National Footprint Accounts. Similar
to cropland biocapacity calculations, grazing land biocapacity calculations are also not
very accurate at accounting for overgrazing.
From the above discussion and the nature of cropland biocapacity data and grazing
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land biocapacity data I will test for some of the following key hypotheses to examine
the impact of violent conflicts on cropland and grazing land.
H1: Higher intensity of total conflicts will lower the cropland biocapacity of a country.
H2: Higher intensity of international wars will lower the cropland biocapacity of a
country.
H3: Higher intensity of civil wars will lower the cropland biocapacity of a country.
H4: Higher intensity of ethnic wars will lower the cropland biocapacity of a country.
H5: Increase in the refugee population in a country will increase the cropland bioca-
pacity of a country.
H6: Increase in levels of democracy, per capita GDP and trade should have a positive
impact on cropland biocapacity of a country.
H7: Higher intensity of total conflicts will lower the grazing land biocapacity of a
country.
H8: Higher intensity of international wars will lower the grazing land biocapacity of
a country.
H9: Higher intensity of civil wars will lower the grazing land biocapacity of a country.
H10: Higher intensity of ethnic wars will lower the grazing land biocapacity of a
country.
H11: Increase in the refugee population in a country will decrease the grazing land
biocapacity of a country.
I have analyzed the impact of violent conflicts on the biocapacity of cropland and
grazing land using a Fixed-Effects model. For each of the disaggregated measures
of biocapacity–cropland and grazing land, I estimate four different models–(1) Total
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conflicts, (2) International Wars, (3) Civil Wars, and (4) Ethnic wars. All the inde-
pendent variables are lagged by a year to account for endogeneity. The estimates are
presented in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 respectively.
The results presented in Table 5.2 here suggest that the cumulative intensity of
all the conflicts that a country is involved in decreases the cropland biocapacity of
that country. More specifically, with every one unit increase in the intensity of con-
flict in a country, the cropland’s biocapacity decreases by 1.17 percent. This decrease
can be quite substantial in terms of overall biocapacity. For example, Afghanistan’s
cropland biocapacity in 1999 is 1,07,95,400 GHa (Global Hectares) then with a sin-
gle unit increase in the intensity of conflict in the country, its cropland’s biocapacity
will decline by about 1,26,307 GHa. The estimates also indicate that international
wars, civil wars and ethnic wars, all have a statistically significant negative impact
on a country’s cropland biocapacity. Specifically, international conflicts decrease a
country’s biocapacity by .67 percent with every unit increase in the intensity of inter-
national conflict. With every unit increase in the intensity of civil wars a country’s
cropland biocapacity decreases by about 1.34 percent. Ethnic wars seem to have the
worst impact on cropland biocapacity by decreasing it almost by 2 percent with ev-
ery unit increase in their intensity. This is clearly in line with our earlier discussion
and hypothesis stating that conflicts in general are detrimental to a country’s crop-
land biocapacity through various direct and indirect ways. Ethnic wars seem to have
the worst impact of agricultural land because they often lead to large scale internal
displacements or even worse, death of people who are involved in farming (which is
captured in the conflict intensity data). Such conflicts also tend to be more local-
ized and protracted in nature, preventing farmers from working on their fields and
disrupting food demand and supply chains.
Increase in democracy also has a positive impact on the cropland biocapacity of
a country. According to the above estimates, a unit increase in democracy score
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increases the cropland biocapacity of a country by .31 percent. As discussed in the
previous chapters, this increase can be attributed to two factors—first, often high
levels of democracy also correlate with high levels of GDP, therefore given the nature
of the biocapacity data, increase in crop production will lead to higher agricultural
biocapacity numbers and high economic growth rate can be generally indicative of
higher levels of crop production and food self sufficiency. The second factor is that
democracies are generally responsive to public attitude towards conservation and sus-
tainable agricultural practices, therefore, increase in biocapacity of agricultural land
with increase in levels of democracy perhaps underscores the normative importance
to democracy in agricultural land conservation efforts.
Improvement in economic growth increases the agricultural biocapacity of a region.
One percent increase in per capita GDP of a country increases its cropland biocapacity
about .93 percent which is quite substantial. This increase can be attributed to the
reason explained above, that high levels of economic growth in a country go hand
in hand with increase in crop production and achieving food security for its people.
Since the cropland biocapacity data equates crop production with the biocapacity
of agricultural land, increase in crop yield in high income countries will result in
high estimates of cropland biocapacity. These estimates perhaps don’t account very
well for use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides to increase crop yield, that lead to
deterioration of the agricultural land in the long run. However, it is interesting to note
that an increase in the per capita GDP does not increase the agricultural biocapacity
of a country at the same rate. Which means that the increase in economic growth has
diminishing return on its positive impact on agricultural biocapacity as evident from
the estimates of the squared GDP per capita data. This happens when a country’s
population growth is stabilized and it reaches an optimum level of food production.
As that point the money in the economy is diverted into other sectors. International
trade does not seem to have a statistically significant impact on cropland biocapacity
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of a country.
Population density has a positive impact of cropland biocapacity. More specif-
ically, one percent increase in population density of a country leads to about .37
percent increase in its agricultural capacity. This is fairly intuitive given the nature
of cropland biocapacity data and in line with our hypothesis. Increasing population
leads to not only creating more agricultural land but also puts pressure on the exist-
ing land to increase food production. However, as mentioned earlier, the calculation
of cropland biocapacity data does not inform at what stage does the increase in the
biocapacity of the agricultural land becomes unsustainable and exploitative for the
land.
Refugee population does not seem to have any impact of the bioproductivity of
the land. This could be due to the fact that the refugee data weighs more on refugees
of cross border conflicts who are better cared for by international organizations and
human rights groups. This translates into better aid in terms of food and less depen-
dency on cultivating their own crops. However, increase in the refugees in countries
that are already experiencing ethnic conflicts tends to have a negative impact on the
agricultural biocapacity by perhaps exacerbating existing conflicts and underutiliza-
tion of agricultural land.
The results presented in Table 5.3 here suggest that one unit increase in the inten-
sity of total conflicts decreases the biocapacity of grazing land by about .04 percent.
International wars have the biggest impact on grazing land with one unit increase in
their intensity decreasing the grazing land biocapacity by almost .07 percent. This
can be explained by the loss of grazing land due to aerial bombing and other kinds
of direct impact on soil quality due to warfare. A unit increase in the intensity of
civil war decreases the biocapacity of grazing land by about .4 percent. Increase in
the levels of democracy increases the grazing land biocapacity in a statistically sig-
nificant way. Increase in one unit level of democracy scores raises the capacity of
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grazing land by .03 percent. This can again be attributed to high income levels of
democracies and practice of large scale animal rearing activities in developed coun-
tries for food production. This is also evident by the statistically positive impact of
per capita GDP on grazing land biocapacity. According to the estimates, one pre-
cent increase in per capita GDP leads to about .2 percent increase in the capacity of
grazing land. This trend again exhibits a diminishing effect because in high income
countries as population stabilizes, and animal husbandry practices reach an optimal
level, national income is diverted to other sectors. Increase of one percent in popu-
lation density increases biocapacity of grazing land by .13 percent. Also increase in
the refugee population of a country puts pressure on the pastures of the host country
and increases in biocapacity by .13 percent.
5.2 Impact on Forest Cover
Forest cover is affected by conflict through many direct and indirect mechanisms.
Firstly, forests can be destroyed during warfare through aerial bombing, or use of
chemicals. This destruction by combatants is either on purpose–to clear out hiding
cover for ‘guerilla’ forces or a collateral during bombardment. Incendiary bombing of
forests made its debut in the early 1920s in the context of French efforts to defeat an
anti-colonial struggle for independence in northern Morocco, the Rif War (1921-26).
The aerial use of napalm began in the final stages of the Greek Civil War (1944-49),
in which a communist insurgency used the forests of the northern mountains as its
redoubt. Both sides burned forests for tactical advantage, but the Greek nationalists,
with napalm and American help, did it more widely, trying to minimize the forest
cover that afforded refuge to their enemies. Perhaps the most outstanding example
of this kind is Vietnam, where the US forces cleared 325,000 ha of land and sprayed
72,400 m3 of herbicides in the name of security.[Westing (1982)] The impact on bio-
diversity was severe; spreading herbicides on 10 percent of the country (including 50
96
percent of the mangroves) led to growth of low-diversity grasslands replacing high-
diversity forests, mudflats instead of highly productive mangroves. Apart from this,
forests have often been cleared to ease troop movements in wartime or in preparation
for war.
Secondly, forests have been a source of war material and funding. For millennia the
world’s armies and navies had depended on the world’s forests, and a reliable supply
of good timber; be it for the construction of wooden fortresses in ancient China,
Japan or Rome or for the construction of naval ships by great sea powers like Britain,
France, Spain or Netherlands. Even after bronze, iron ore or other metals became
important for active warfare, wood was still used for smelting to make weapons and
canons. By the end of the 19th century, warships increasingly came to be made of
metal, and the metals were now smelted with coal. Wood had lost some of its strategic
significance as a source of war materiel, but it was still important. In a protracted war
of attrition, such as the WWI, timber supplies became significant. In Great Britain,
for example, which had come to rely almost completely upon North American and
Baltic forests for wood in the late 19th century, U-boat warfare interrupted supplies
in 1915. Britain’s own woodlands were scant and not managed for timber production.
But the military needed timber for trenches, barracks, telegraph poles at the front,
and the munitions industry and coal mines needed plenty more. From 1916 to 1918
Britain felled half of its productive forests to meet the needs of the war. Similar
urgency inspired similar assaults on forests in other combatant countries. Roughly
the same thing happened during the WWII. Japan, for example, felled 15 percent of
its forests from1941 to 1945, and clear-cut 50 square miles a week by 1945.
However, technological developments have almost eliminated the use of timber
in warfare and the relationship of forests to warfare has experienced a drastic shift.
Now, timber works as a crucial resource for rebel forces or the state to be sold for
money to buy arms and ammunition. Timber’s characteristics–its bulk, low value for
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weight (compared to other, more lootable, commodities, such as precious metals or
rough diamonds), and relatively high extractions costs, both technical and financial–
does make it difficult to smuggle. However, if the warring factions are able to control
territory rich in forests and the transportation routes necessary to export the timber,
then the exploitation of timber can, and indeed does, fuel conflict as it has been done
in Liberia, Cambodia, DRC, Ivory Coast and other heavily forested countries.
Thirdly, forest conservation efforts experience a major set-back during and after
war. During the time of war, most international workers involved in forest and
wildlife conservation projects leave because of threat to their survival. Times of
violent conflict also mean changes in priorities, which means that whatever domestic
and international funds are allocated towards post-war recovery are primarily targeted
on humanitarian relief efforts. Given the constant threat of war in many politically
unstable states, few incentives encourage long-term conservation or management of
resources.
Lastly, refugees and displaced persons exert impact on forestry and other vege-
tation which in turn can also impact local communities. Their engagement in de-
forestation is due to two main reasons–to meet their own survival needs for lumber
to build shelter or for firewood, and to earn money through selling wood and char-
coal in the local markets, also known as relief economy.[Languy (1995), quoted in
Kalpers (2001)] This problem is related to the scale of the camps and to the standard
of aid provision for displaced populations. Indeed, the level of assistance that dis-
placed people receive in temporary settlements varies greatly. International refugees
automatically qualify for assistance from UNHCR, while many IDPs do not. The
assistance provided can include food aid, a water supply, basic sanitation facilities,
tented accommodation or simply cover sheets and some basic household items. What
is virtually never provided is a source of energy for cooking food, boiling water or
heating. In addition, when no formal accommodation is supplied, timber is needed to
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construct temporary dwellings. As a result, people living in camps and settlements
are forced to find timber and fuelwood in the surrounding area.
In Sudan, for example, deforestation is clearly visible around all major camp
locations and can easily be detected by satellite in regions with otherwise good forest
cover. In Nimule county on the border with Uganda, for instance, the illicit felling
of trees for firewood and to clear land for slash-and-burn agriculture on the outskirts
of a local IDP camp has resulted in the deforestation of a large area surrounding
the camp. In drier regions, the effects are more difficult to detect but even more
damaging. Much of northern and central Sudan is relatively dry, with low woodland
density and slow growth rates. Tree cover is particularly sparse in Northern Darfur
and northern parts of Kassala, two regions that host large displaced populations.
Besides, the majority of settlements have been established in locations that were
already occupied, and where the existing burden on forest resources may or may
not have been sustainable. In eastern Sudan, camp-related deforestation has been
occurring for at least twenty years. Corrective measures (prohibitions) were put into
place by UNHCR and the Forests National Corporation (FNC) to prevent refugees
from cutting down trees for fuel, but as their ongoing energy needs were not addressed,
these were not effective. In Darfur, fuelwood collection is effectively uncontrolled.
Camp residents reported journeying up to 15 km to find timber, and UNEP fieldwork
inspections revealed extensive deforestation extending as far as 10 kms from the
camps. This has contributed to a major security issue, as displaced women and girls
are often at risk of rape, harassment and other forms of violence when they leave the
camps to collect wood. This risk, however, is one they often have no choice but to
take, since there are few other sources of cooking fuel or income available to them.
A similar situation obtained in the Gambela region of Ethiopia which witnessed
massive deforestation at the hands of 200,000 settlers and refugees form Sudan.[Kurimoto
(2005)] A UNEP rapid assessment of the impacts of refugees on the environment in
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Guinea, through interviews, field visits and available reviewed materials reported
over-exploitation and consequent degradation of natural resources and the disruption
of traditional practices in refugee-hosting areas, with the depleted vegetation cover
used for the housing construction, firewood and charcoal, both for domestic use and
cash generation.[UNEP (2000)] A study of the Senegal River Valley found changes in
vegetation and land cover, which depicted declining stands of vegetation in all eco-
logical zones along the river.[Black and Sessay (1996: 61-64)] Fuel wood for energy
and heating, which is a consequence of deforestation and degradation of land cover,
is one area in which refugees and IDPs exert a negative impact. In western Tanzania,
unhealthy competition between refugees and local hosts impacted adversely on the
firewood usage: refugees used more firewood than their local hosts, they rarely put
out fires between meals for lack of matches and their food was cooked for a much
longer time because dried food rations took longer to cook than fresh crops.[Whitaker
(1999)]
Worldwide in 2007 there were 3.94 billion hectares of forest land area in the
world.[FAO ResourceSTAT Statistical Database (2007)] The forest land biocapacity
measures the capacity of this forest land area to supply fuelwood, timber and other
forest products. The current Ecological Footprint data methodology also counts forest
land as carbon uptake land and a measure of biodiversity reserve. Although, many
different ecosystem types have the capacity for long-term storage of CO2, including
the land use types considered in the National Footprint Accounts such as cropland or
grassland, most terrestrial carbon uptake in the biosphere occurs in forests. For this
reason it is considered to be a subcategory of forest land. The National Footprint
Accounts calculate the yield of forest land according to the production quantities of
13 primary timber products and three wood fuel products. Timber productivity data
from the UNEC and FAO Forest Resource Assessment and the FAO Global Fiber
Supply are utilized to calculate the world average yield of 1.81 m3 of harvestable
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wood per hectare per year.[UNEP (2000), FAO (2000b), FAO (1998)]
In the light of the above discussion here are some of the key hypotheses we will
test to examine the relationship between forests and violent conflicts:
H13: Higher intensity of total conflicts will lower the forest land biocapacity of a
country.
H14: Higher intensity of international wars will lower the forest land biocapacity of
a country.
H15: Higher intensity of civil wars will lower the forest land biocapacity of a country.
H16: Higher intensity of ethnic wars will lower the forest land biocapacity of a coun-
try.
H17: Increase in the refugee population in a country will decrease the forest land
biocapacity of a country.
I have analyzed the impact of violent conflicts on the biocapacity of forests using
a Fixed-Effects model. Again, I have estimated four different models–(1) Total con-
flicts, (2) International Wars, (3) Civil Wars, and (4) Ethnic wars, to analyze their
individual impact on the forest cover of a country. All the independent variables are
lagged by a year to account for endogeneity. The estimates are presented in Table
5.4 below.
The results confirm some of the above hypothesis about the relationship between
forest cover and conflicts. The increase in intensity of the overall conflict has a very
significantly negative impact on the forest cover of a country. To be more specific,
according to the model estimates, an increase of one unit in the overall intensity
of conflict decreases the forest biocapacity of a country by about 4.26 percent. An
increase in the intensity of international wars by one unit decreases a country’s forest
biocapacity by about 5.44 percent. This is in line with our hypothesis and points
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to the fact that modern day warfare over all is more detrimental to forest cover as
opposed to some older claims that have argued that conflicts lead to development
of “no man’s land,” such as the Green Corridor between East and West Europe or
the DMZ in along 38th parallel in the Korean peninsula, creating protected forested
and wildlife areas. According to the above estimates, international wars have a more
detrimental impact on forest biocapacity than civil wars because while a unit increase
in the intensity of international wars decreases the forest biocapacity by 5.44 percent,
a one unit increase in the intensity of civil wars in a country decreases the capacity
of its forests by 2.63 percent. This indicates that aerial warfare, that has become
a staple in international intervention and international warfare, has an extremely
damaging effect on forest resources. This is much worse than exploitation of forest
resources like timber to fund intra-state conflicts. Ethnic wars do not seem to have a
statistically significant impact on forest biocapacity according to this analysis.
Democracy has a negative impact on the forest biocapacity with every unit increase
in democracy scores leading to a .47 percent decline in forest biocapacity. Again, this
could be explained by democracies generally being more industrialized and extractive
in nature which negatively affects biocapacity. However, this relationship begs more
exploration in the future, because strong democracies also tend to be more organized
towards environmental protection and conservation.
GDP does not have a statistically significant impact on forest biocapacity here.
However, increase in one percent of trade decreases the forest biocapacity of a country
by about .06 percent. This is a significant decline and attests towards the exploitative
impact of international trade on natural resources, especially forests.
Population density has a statistically significant negative impact on forest bioca-
pacity with one percent increase in population density decreasing the forest biocapacity
by about .2 percent. This direction of the relationship is fairly intuitive since growing
population puts more pressure on forest resources. As the population grows, forests
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are often cleared to develop agricultural land and for other commercial purposes like
housing, timber, and so on. Presence of refugees does not have a statistically signif-
icant impact on forest bicapacity. However, the estimates here suggest that refugees
do have a detrimental impact on forest biocapacity if the country is already experi-
encing with ethnic conflicts. This could certainly lead to exacerbation of the existing
ethnic conflicts.
5.3 Impact on Water
Armed conflict and related activities can degrade water resources in a number of ways.
Direct action against facilities supporting military activities can release harmful con-
taminants into the environment. During the Kosovo War, for example, NATO forces
targeted a major industrial complex in Pancevo, which included a petrochemical
plant, a fertilizer plant, and a major oil refinery. Hazardous substances were released
into the environment as a result of the strike and the ensuing fires. Smoke from the
fires produced “black rain,” threatening air, food, and water safety in Pancevo, as
well as in downstream and downwind countries, particularly Bulgaria and Romania
(UNEP and UNCHS 1999). Bombs, missiles, and other explosives can create craters,
compact soil, and contribute to erosion, all of which can degrade water quality.[Linden
et al. (2004)] The disposal of human causalities can also threaten water quality. Dur-
ing the Rwandan genocide, for example, bodies washed or were thrown into water
systems, affecting the water quality of the entire Great Lakes region.[Tesi (2000)]
Damage to utilities’ infrastructure can have indirect impacts on the water system.
Physical infrastructure to maintain clean water supply is especially vulnerable to in-
tentional or unintentional impacts from armed conflict and related activities. For
example, in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Israeli defense forces in Jenin inten-
tionally destroyed or damaged booster pumps, water lines, and valves. Other system
components were damaged unintentionally by tank traffic and the construction of
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a trench designed to restrict Palestinian movement.[Zeitoun (2005)] In general, cen-
tralized water systems are more vulnerable to conflict than decentralized systems, as
relatively less damage can disrupt supply to a greater number of people. Systems that
rely on a single source of water are also especially vulnerable.[Zeitoun (2005)] During
times of conflict, delicate water sharing systems between countries and groups also
come to a stand-still. For example, the recent upheaval in the Libya has halted the
incredibly important process of managing and conserving the Nubian Aquifer System
(a fossil water aquifer), which is the largest source of freshwater in the region, also
providing water to Sudan, Chad and Egypt.
Displaced persons also have a major impact on surface and ground water bod-
ies, water being a necessity in human life. As relief camps are constructed under
emergency conditions where haste rather than careful planning matters, wells are
dug before the capacity of the aquifer feeding them is assessed, resulting in rapid
depletion rates and/or decline in water quality.[Hoerz (1995a), quoted in Jacobsen
(1997, p. 25)]. There have been instances where refugees competed for scarce water
resources, depleting the water sources and forcing the diversion of river courses to
the camps, away from the villages.[Whitaker (1999, p. 6)]
In this study, in order to measure the quality of marine and freshwater eco-systems,
we use the National Footprint Accounts data on fishing grounds. This is because any
detrimental impact on the aquatic systems due to war would affect its biocapacity
(measured in terms of fish yield). Oil spills and leakage or massive localized air
and soil pollution which occur as a result of warfare affect the aquatic systems in
terms of their high biological productivity; provision of nutrients, feeding, breeding
or nesting areas for marine and other animals; areas particularly rich in species; and
areas important for sustaining populations of species at some or all phases of their life
cycle. This is especially true in the case of international conflicts, where the scale of
weapon systems, tactics and ariel bombardment can wreak an indiscriminate damage
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to delicate aquatic ecosystems. In civil conflicts, the impact on marine and freshwater
ecosystems is more likely to come from a breakdown of conservation infrastructure
and water-sharing arrangements. Biocpacity of fishing grounds also indicates towards
the ability of certain population groups that are primarily dependent upon fishing,
to sustain their lives. Destruction of fishing grounds due to conflict can lead to loss
of income for such fishing communities and breed further discontentment.
The National Footprints Accounts estimate the marine yields using data on an-
nually available primary production of the sustainable annual harvests of 19 different
aquatic species groups.[Gulland (1971)] The fishing grounds calculation is one of the
most complex in the National Footprint Accounts and significant improvements have
taken place over the past seven years; including revision of many fish extraction rates,
inclusion of aquaculture production, and inclusion of crops used in aquafeeds.[Ewing
et. al (2010)] The FAO FishSTAT database does not report trade in fish commodities
prior to 1976. In the NFA 2008, trade in fish commodities prior to 1976 was simply
omitted. In both the 2009 and 2010 Editions of the NFA, COMTRADE data were
used to extrapolate these trade flows back to the start of their time series (1961).
In the 2010 Edition of the NFA the list of fish species considered in the biocapacity
of production calculation has been expanded, as the number of reported species has
grown, and estimates of average trophic level have been collected for more species.
The exports yield for each fish commodity is now calculated as the weighted average
of domestic catch and imports. The catch intensity for each commodity is now based
on the effective trophic level across a countryÕs catch of several species, rather than
global constants based on the trophic levels of individual species. Moreover, fishmeal
and fish oil production and trade, and of aquaculture, were included in the 2010 Edi-
tion and the fish commodity extraction rates were revised to include species-specific
extraction rates for all species.
Some of the main hypotheses based on the above discussion on the impact of
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violent conflicts on water (measured in terms of fishing biocapacity) are presented
below:
H18: Higher intensity of total conflicts will lower the fishing grounds biocapacity of
a country.
H19: Higher intensity of international wars will lower the fishing grounds biocapacity
of a country.
H20: Higher intensity of civil wars will lower the fishing grounds biocapacity of a
country.
H21: Higher intensity of ethnic wars will lower the fishing grounds biocapacity of a
country.
I have analyzed the impact of violent conflicts on the biocapacity of fishing-grounds
using a Fixed-Effects model. Again, I have estimated four different models–(1) Total
conflicts, (2) International Wars, (3) Civil Wars, and (4) Ethnic wars, to analyze their
individual impact on the fishing grounds in a country. All the independent variables
are lagged by a year to account for endogeneity. The estimates are presented in Table
5.5 below.
The estimates in the table above suggest that violent conflicts have a statisti-
cally significant negative impact of the fishing grounds biocapacity. A single unit
increase in the overall intensity of conflicts decreases fishing ground biocapacity by
.15 percent. International wars have a larger negative impact on the fishing ground
biocapacity with every one unit increase in the intensity of international wars signifi-
cantly decreasing the fishing ground biocapacity by .45 percent, whereas a single unit
increase in the intensity of civil wars decreases the biocapacity of fishing grounds by
.11 percent.
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Every single unit increase in democracy increases the fishing biocapacity by .13
percent indicating that democracies are indeed more vigilant about sustainable fish-
ing practices, at least around their own country. GDP levels don’t seem to have a
statistically significant impact on fishing biocapacity, however every percent increase
in international trade decreases biocapacity of fishing grounds by .01 percent. With
one percent increase in population density, the fishing grounds biocpacity declines by
.05 percent indicating that population increase does put pressure of fishing grounds
and compromises sustainable fishing practices.
Refugee population does not seem to affect the biocapacity of fishing grounds in
any statistically significant manner.
5.4 Discussion
The analysis in chapter provides a more detailed account of how different types of
conflicts affect different aspects of the environment. While the impact of different
types of wars on disaggregated measures of biocapacity is mostly in the expected
directions, the magnitude varies. However, the estimated results for other political,
economic and demographic variables tell a mixed story about their impact on different
aspects of the environment. Based on the estimated coefficients presented in the above
models, Table 5.6 below summarizes the percentage change in disaggregated measures
of biocapacity—cropland, grazing land, forest land and fishing grounds, as a result of
one unit increase in the intensity of different conflict types. The percentage change
in disaggregated biocapacity measures is the percentage change in the total global
hectare biocapacity of the four environmental resource categories.
The percentage change numbers presented above indicate that different types of
conflicts affect a country’s environmental sources differently. On an average, interna-
tional wars tend to be most devastating for the three out of the four environmental
resources analyzed here. This clearly indicates that with use the of chemical weapons,
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carpet bombing and strategic aerial attacks on essential infrastructure, as part of the
modern international warfare strategy, wreak havoc with a country’s environment.
This devastating impact on the environment also highlights the environmental injus-
tice of many international wars that are being increasingly undertaken for the sake
of “humanitarian intervention.” This is because the intervening parties’ mode of con-
ducting warfare is often not only impersonal but also physically distant, absolving
themselves of any environmental damages.
While internal wars are extremely devastating for the forest resource of a country,
ethnic wars and civil wars are more destructive for crop production. This is because
civil wars and ethnically motivated wars, especially as part of protracted conflict be-
tween social groups, completely disrupt the domestic supply and demand chain for
agricultural produce. Violence at a localized level prevents farmers from working on
their fields, and stalls transportation and sale of agricultural goods. Cropland bioca-
pacity is an extremely critical environmental service that lends a source of sustained
livelihood to people. Therefore, a decline in cropland biocapacity means possible large
scale unemployment and social disruption. While laying out my plan for this project
in the earlier chapters, I had stresed on the importance of studying the relation-
ship between conflict and environmental degradation as a reinforcing feedback loop.
When thinking about such vicious cycles of conflict and environmental degradation,
a decline in cropland biocapacity during the time of intra-state warfare is asignificant
factor in predicting further continuation and escalation of conflict.
Unfortunately, at this time the National Footprint Accounts data does not distin-
guish between high yield and unsustainable agricultural practices to calculate crop-
land and grazing land biocapacity. This means that an increase in the biocapacity
of cropland and grazing land could also be indicating better and more sustainable
agricultural practices that can be potentially associated with democracies due to a
high levels of political participation by environmental organizations and an increased
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awareness in the population about environmental issues. Also advanced democracies
tend to be richer and can afford “green” technology to a greater degree. However, an
increase in the biocapacity of cropland and grazing land can simply mean more yield
which can be obtained through overuse of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and genet-
ically modified crop variety which are harmful to the environment in the long-run.
Therefore, it is hard to untangle the positive impact of GDP and trade on cropland
and grazing land biocapacity from their exploitative impact on the environment with
in the scope of this study.
However, the impact of conflicts on the environment is clear. Conflicts are bad for
the environment and some type of conflicts are worse than others with their impact
on certain environmental services. Also, high levels of decline in cropland biocapacity
due to internal conflicts forebode an environment and conflict degradation spiral.
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Table 5.2: Estimates Measuring the Impact of Different Types of Conflicts on Crop-
land Biocapacity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total International Civil Ethnic
Lagged Total Conflicts -0.0117∗∗∗
(0.0026)
Lagged POLITY Score 0.0031∗∗∗ 0.0046∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0011)
Lagged ln(Per Capita GDP) 0.9322∗∗∗ 0.9493∗∗∗ 0.9325∗∗∗ 0.9594∗∗∗
(0.0514) (0.0508) (0.0513) (0.0512)
Lagged ln(Per Capita GDP
Sq)
-0.0678∗∗∗ -0.0688∗∗∗ -0.0678∗∗∗ -0.0693∗∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Lagged ln(Trade Openness) 0.0536 0.0578 0.0534 0.0559
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119)
Lagged ln(Pop Density) 0.3767∗∗∗ 0.3682∗∗∗ 0.3790∗∗∗ 0.3750∗∗∗
(0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0133) (0.0132)
Lagged ln(Refugee Pop) 0.4027 0.4326 0.3786 0.3791
(0.2932) (0.3089) (0.2679) (0.2526)
Total Conflicts X RefugeePop -0.0003
(0.0004)
Lagged International Wars -0.0066∗∗
(0.0028)
International Wars X Refugee
Pop
0.0007
(0.0010)
Lagged Civil Wars -0.0134∗∗∗
(0.0029)
Civil WarsXRefugee Pop -0.0004
(0.0004)
Lagged Ethnic Wars -0.0198∗∗∗
(0.0047)
Ethnic WarsXRefugee Pop -0.0013∗
(0.0006)
N 4912 3678 3867 3906
r2 0.5370 0.5341 0.5372 0.5371
F 210.9850 207.5536 211.1906 211.0939
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5.3: Estimates Measuring the Impact of Diffrent Types of Conflicts on Grazing
Land Biocapacity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total International Civil Ethnic
Lagged Total Conflicts -0.0042∗∗∗
(0.0013)
Lagged POLITY Score 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Lagged ln(Per Capita GDP) 0.2694∗∗∗ 0.2732∗∗∗ 0.2741∗∗∗ 0.2751∗∗∗
(0.0258) (0.0254) (0.0257) (0.0257)
Lagged ln(Per Capita GDP
Sq)
-0.0149∗∗∗ -0.0152∗∗∗ -0.0152∗∗∗ -0.0152∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0017)
Lagged ln(Trade Openness) 0.0304∗∗∗ 0.0321∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗ 0.0318∗∗∗
(0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0059)
Lagged ln(Pop Density) 0.1352∗∗∗ 0.1317∗∗∗ 0.1354∗∗∗ 0.1318∗∗∗
(0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0065)
Lagged ln(Refugee Pop) 0.1352∗∗∗ 0.1317∗∗∗ 0.1354∗∗∗ 0.1318∗∗∗
(0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0065)
Total ConflictsXRefugee Pop -0.0003
(0.0002)
Lagged International Wars -0.0077∗
(0.0034)
International WarsXRefugee
Pop
0.0010∗
(0.0005)
Lagged Civil Wars -0.0038∗∗
(0.0014)
Civil WarsXRefugee Pop -0.0002
(0.0002)
Lagged Ethnic Wars 0.0010
(0.0023)
Ethnic WarsXRefugeePop 0.0004
(0.0003)
N 4870 4268 4356 3261
r2 0.2223 0.2226 0.2217 0.2207
F 192.4530 192.7369 191.7903 190.6483
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5.4: Estimates Measuring the Impact of Diffrent Types of Conflicts on Forest
Land Biocapacity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total International Civil Ethnic
Lagged Total Conflicts -0.0426∗∗∗
(0.0091)
Lagged POLITY Score -0.0047∗∗∗ -0.0045∗∗∗ -0.0046∗∗∗ -0.0032∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0009)
Lagged ln(Per Capita GDP) 0.0036 0.0073 0.0073 -0.0015
(0.0227) (0.0224) (0.0226) (0.0226)
Lagged ln(Per Capita GDP
Sq)
0.0026 0.0023 0.0024 0.0029
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Lagged ln(Trade Openness) -0.0583∗∗∗ -0.0576∗∗∗ -0.0579∗∗∗ -0.0588∗∗∗
(0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053)
Lagged ln(Pop Density) -0.2151∗∗∗ -0.2155∗∗∗ -0.2156∗∗∗ -0.2158∗∗∗
(0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0060)
Lagged ln(Refugee Pop) 0.0563 0.0562 0.0498 0.0562
(0.0265) (0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0265)
Total ConflictsXRefugee Pop 0.0003
(0.0002)
Lagged International Wars -0.0544∗∗∗
(0.0097)
International WarsXRefugee
Pop
0.0007
(0.0004)
Lagged Civil Wars 0.0263∗∗∗
(0.0082)
Civil WarsXRefugee Pop 0.0002
(0.0002)
Lagged Ethnic Wars -0.0010
(0.0020)
Ethnic WarsXRefugee Pop 0.0009∗∗∗
(0.0002)
N 4688 4367 4120 3990
r2 0.3640 0.3643 0.3637 0.3651
F 370.9754 371.4857 370.5403 372.7658
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5.5: Estimates Measuring the Impact of Diffrent Types of Conflicts on Fishing
Ground Biocapacity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total International Civil Ethnic
Lagged Total Conflicts -0.0015∗∗∗
(0.0002)
Lagged POLITY Score 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Lagged ln(Per Capita GDP) -0.0536 -0.0512 -0.0520 -0.0490
(0.0646) (0.0645) (0.0546) (0.0543)
Lagged ln(Per Capita GDP
Sq)
0.0039 0.0037 0.0038 0.0036
(0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0099) (0.0098)
Lagged ln(Trade Openness) -0.0108∗∗∗ -0.0114∗∗∗ -0.0110∗∗∗ -0.0115∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Lagged ln(Pop Density) -0.0513∗∗∗ -0.0499∗∗∗ -0.0511∗∗∗ -0.0502∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Lagged ln(Refugee Pop) 0.0089 0.0091 0.0087 0.0092
(0.0074) (0.0076) (0.0078) (0.0075)
Total ConflictsXRefugee Pop 0.0000
(0.0000)
Lagged International Wars -0.0045∗∗∗
(0.0006)
International WarsXRefugee
Pop
0.0001
(0.0001)
Lagged Civil Wars -0.0011∗∗∗
(0.0003)
Civil WarsXRefugee Pop -0.0000
(0.0000)
Lagged Ethnic Wars 0.0003
(0.0004)
Ethnic WarsXRefugee Pop -0.0000
(0.0001)
N 4781 4567 4672 3980
r2 0.5174 0.5189 0.5144 0.5124
F 708.6192 712.8844 700.3386 694.7196
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5.6: Percentage Change in Disaggregated Biocapacity Measures (in GHa)
due to One Unit Increase in Conflict Intensity
Conflict Type Cropland Grazing Land Forest Land Fishing Ground
Total Conflicts -1.17 -.04 -4.26 -.15
International Wars -.67 -.08 -5.44 -.45
Civil Wars -1.34 -.04 - 2.63 -.11
Ethnic Wars -1.98 Inconclusive Inconclusive Inconclusive
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Chapter 6
Protecting the Environment from Conflict
In Chapters 4 and 5, I examined the extent of damage to a country’s environmental
capacity due to violent conflict. I also assessed how different types of conflicts affect
different aspects of a country’s environmental capacity like agricultural land, forests,
and water, potentially leaving it more susceptible to further conflict. The results in
the previous chapters highlight yet another cost of conflict–the environment. Even
though conflicts often produce very stark and obvious images of environmental de-
struction, like the nuclear attack on Japan or the burning oil wells during the Gulf
War, it is often difficult to translate those dramatic images into actual long-term
impact. Therefore, environmental degradation is difficult to measure, often occurs
over long-term, and is unfortunately politically not as compelling as other casualties
of war such as the economy or health. This study is attempting to measure the envi-
ronmental cost of conflict and that realization should make the decision to go to war
more prohibitive for leaders and policy-makers. However, if wars do occur, then the
international society and domestic institutions have a responsibility to protect the
environment during and after wartime, just like it is the international community’s
moral obligation to prevent human rights abuses, or to provide monetary assistance
towards health, education and economic development after wars.
After presenting the long term impact of conflicts on countries’ environmental
biocapacity in the previous chapters, I now assess the international provisions avail-
able so far to protect the environment during wartime. Since displaced populations
and refugees are an important part of the natural resources and conflict dynamic, I
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will also analyze the international regime pertaining to displaced population groups
and its affect on environmental extraction. In this chapter, I argue that the interna-
tional regimes designed to protect the environment during wartime need to undergo
a norm-shift. Most of such international regimes, especially the ones that are de-
signed as part of international humanitarian law are normatively constructed under
the doctrine of ‘military necessity’ and not ‘environmental preservation’. This means
that even though there are international provisions to protect the environment dur-
ing war-time, any military compulsion allows those environmental concerns to be
compromised.
6.1 International Regime to Protect the Environment during War-
time
After much debate on their definition, Steven Krasner characterized International
Regimes as: “Implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making pro-
cedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international
relations.”[?] Oran Young claimed that regimes are “more specialized arrangements
that pertain to well-defined activities, resources, or geographical areas and often in-
volve only some subset of the members of international society.” IR scholars have
also been debating about the role of regimes from being mere tools in the hands of
powerful actors to all pervasive standards of behavior that all states try to comply
with.Milner [1992], Young [1982], Puchala and Hopkins [1982] 1
The international regime for protecting the environment during and after war-
time is an amalgamation of international organizations and agencies like the World
Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). The
1The literature on international and multilateral regimes is extremely vast and unfortunately it
is beyond the scope of this project to discuss it in detail. For additional information refer to some
of these seminal works on international and multilateral regimes like Snidal [1985], Keeley [1990],
Haas [1980], Keohane [1982], Haggard and Simmons [1987], Ruggie [1982], Krasner [1983a,b].
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regime also includes the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the International
Environmental Law (IEL) that make specific provisions to protect the environment
during wartime and form the basis of punishing the violators. Given the results
of this research presented in the previous two chapters about environmental impact
of wars due to a hold on land use, and, the indirect role of Internally Displaced
Populations (IDPs) and Refugees, I believe that the various treaties on land-mines
and the international law regarding IDPs and Refugees, should also be considered
an important part of the international regime to protect the environment from the
effects of war.
International Humanitarian Law
In the early 1970s, when the international community began addressing environmental
protection generally, it also started making a serious attempt to remedy the deficien-
cies of legal protection for victims of armed conflict. Environmental disasters like oil
spills and scientific assessments about ozone depletion had already galvanized public
opinion towards environmental protection and conservation. However, the Vietnam
War, the protection of human rights in occupied territories (specifically in Palestine),
and the armed conflicts that occurred during decolonization brought forth the issue
of environmental and public health effects of wars. However, lawmaking in the in-
ternational environmental field left the issue of protecting the environment during
wartime at the margins. Therefore, the issue was directly addressed by the interna-
tional conferences dealing with armed conflict and humanitarian law–perhaps to the
great dismay of those defending military interests. These conferences included the
United Nations Committee of the Conference on Disarmament (CCD) and the Diplo-
matic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitar-
ian Law (CDDH, Geneva, 1974-1977). While these conventions made giant strides in
introducing some legal recourse to protecting the environment during wartime, sev-
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eral gaping holes in these provisions continued to exist which were, arguably, never
meant to be fixed.
The “Threshold” Issue
In 1976, the CCD adopted the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Hos-
tile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD). This treaty regulates
the use of environmental modification techniques as a means to cause harm to the
enemy. ENMOD specifically prohibits “environmental modification techniques hav-
ing widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction.”2 Around
the same time CCDH adopted two important provisions in what became Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.3 First, Article 35, paragraph 3, states that
“[i]t is prohibited to employ methods and means of warfare which are intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment.” Second, Article 55 of Additional Protocol I states that “[c]are shall be
taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term
and severe damage.” It further specifies that this protection “includes a prohibition of
the use of methods and means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to
cause such damage to the environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival
of the population.”
Right from the outset, it is clear that the ENMOD and the provisions in the
Additional Protocols have adopted different standards of prohibition of environmental
damage during war-time. The three adjectives–“widespread”, “long-lasting”, and
“severe”,–limiting the scope of prohibited damage are alternatives (joined by “or”)
in ENMOD and cumulative (joined by “and”) in the Additional Protocol. Legal
2Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modifi-
cation Techniques (ENMOD), 10 December 1976, 1108 UNTS 151, Art. 1.
3Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) of 8 June 1977, Arts 35(3) and 55(1).
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scholars have called it a threshold problem. Additionally, the CCD defined “long-
lasting” as “lasting for a period of months or approximately a season.”4 On the other
hand discussion on the Additional Protocols established the time-frame to establish
damage to the environment to be twenty or thirty years.
Clearly ENMOD tried to set up a fairly stringent limit to establish environmental
damage during war-time whereas the Additional Protocol I negated that limit by
setting up a more permissible scope and time-frame of environmental damage and
thereby creating a threshold problem in this legal framework. This was done to
make sure that the battlefield damage incidental to conventional warfare would not
normally be proscribed by international legal provisions. This also leaves room for
application to biological and chemical warfare. As to nuclear warfare, however, most
NATO countries claim that Additional Protocol I does not apply thereto, and at
least the United States and the United Kingdom contest that these two provisions
constitute customary law.5 Therefore the legal situation pertaining to the protection
of the environment during war-time is highly unsatisfactory. First, the cumulative
conditions of environmental damage attached to the prohibition of Articles 35 and 55
of Additional Protocol I are excessively restrictive, making the prohibition much too
narrow from an environmental point of view. Second, the exact scope and time-span
of this prohibition remains uncertain, and thus difficult to implement or enforce.
4See Understanding annexed to the text of ENMOD, contained in the report of the UN Com-
mittee of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly, Official Records of the General
Assembly, 31st Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/31/27).
5United States, declaration made on signature: “It is the understanding of the United States
of America that the rules established by this protocol were not intended to have any effect on and
do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.” United Kingdom, declaration made on
ratification: “It continues to be the understanding of the United Kingdom that the rules introduced
by the Protocol apply exclusively to conventional weapons without prejudice to any other rules of
international law applicable to other types of weapons. In particular, the rules so introduced do not
have any effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.”
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Environment as a “Civilian Subject” or “Military Target”?
Another environmentally critical provision of the Additional Protocol I, Article 51(5)(b),
prohibits attacks that cause “excessive” collateral damage to civilians or civilian ob-
jects. Similar to Article 51(5)(b), the Rome Statute, while establishing the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, contained a provision to protect the environment in times of
international armed conflict:
“Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will
cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian
objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural envi-
ronment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct overall military advantage anticipated.”6
Legal scholars argue that in order to by-pass the restrictive conditions of Article
35 and 55 of the Additional Protocol I, one could use Article 51 and the Rome Statute
(Article 8) to safeguard environment as a civilian subject during war-time. After all,
elements of the environment are most often civilian objects. However, this argument
becomes shaky when environmental elements become military objectives. Once armed
forces are located in a protected area, the area may contribute effectively to military
action and its neutralization may offer a definite military advantage. Thus, it becomes
a military objective. In the case of herbicide use in Vietnam, the trees provided cover
for the enemy. Their defoliation constituted a definite military advantage, and the
trees–more precisely their leaves–became a military objective. There are some weak
legal recourses available (Articles 59 and 60 of the Additional Protocol I) to protect
environmentally sensitive regions from becoming military targets by establishing them
as de-militarized zones or non-defended localities. But that would require a prior
agreement between the warring parties (possibly mediated by a third party like the
UN or the Red Cross) to recognize certain regions as demilitarized zones and out of
6Art. 8(2)(b)(iv), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) of 17 July 1998.
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bounds for combat. This is certainly a tall order to achieve between two countries
internationally, let alone between two factions in a domestic civil war.
The “Proportionality Issue” and the“Precautionary Principle”
In 2005, the International Committee for Red Cross (ICRC) published a crucial study
on the Customary International Humanitarian Law, that tried to simplify the “thresh-
old” issue discussed above.7 The study declares a simplified version of the provisions
of Additional Protocol I and of ENMOD to constitute customary law, stating that the
“use of methods and means of warfare that are intended, or may be expected, to cause
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment is prohibited.
Destruction of the natural environment may not be used as a weapon.”8
A real step forward was accomplished via another rule articulated in the study.
Rule 44 states that:
....[m]ethods and means of warfare must be employed with due regard
to the protection and preservation of the natural environment. In the
conduct of military operations, all feasible precautions must be taken to
avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental damage to the environ-
ment...........[l]ack of scientific certainty as to the effects on the environ-
ment of certain military operations does not absolve a party to the conflict
from taking such precautions.9
The above rules of customary international humanitarian law, by using the words
“due regard” and “precaution” argue that recognition of the precautionary principle,
as exists in customary international environmental law, must be reflected in the law of
armed conflict. The study, however, quotes limited state practice to support this rule.
7For references, see Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International
Humanitarian Law, International Committee of the Red Cross and Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2005, Vol. I, pp. 153ff.
8Ibid., Rule 45.
9Ibid., Rule 44.
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The majority of the support cited is the reading of two decisions of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), namely the 1995 Nuclear Tests case order and the 1996 Nuclear
Weapons advisory opinion.10 Additionally, two private, yet semi-official, restatements
of the relevant rules also give credence to the precautionary principle. First, the San
Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflict at Sea (1994)
states that “[m]ethods and means of warfare should be employed with due regard
for the natural environment....”11 and second, the HPCR Manual on International
Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (2009) states that the “destruction of the
natural environment carried out wantonly is prohibited.” It also urges that “[w]hen
planning and conducting air and missile operations, due regard ought to be given to
the natural environment.”12
These rules of customary international humanitarian law provide a more favorable
and flexible approach to protecting the environment during war-time that the provi-
sions of the Additional Protocol I by stressing upon the notion of proportionality (by
using the words ‘wanton’ and ‘due regard’) and precaution when it comes to treating
the environment during conflict. However, as mentioned before, the state practice to
establish strong customary laws in this regard are very limited.
International Environmental Law
Another body of international law that can be evoked to protect the environment dur-
ing conflict is the International Environmental Law (IEL). Multilateral environmental
10ICJ, Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the
CourtÕs Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, Order
of 22 September 1995, ICJ Reports, 1995; ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports, 1996.
11San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflict at Sea, reproduced in
Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman (eds), The Laws of Armed Conflict, 4th edition, Leiden and
Boston, 2004, p. 1153, Rule 44.
12Harvard University, Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR), Manual
on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, Bern, 2009, Rule 88.
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agreements like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) or
Convention for the Protection of Biological Diversity (CBD) or the World Heritage
Convention, are all examples of multilateral agreements that have been designed to
protect the environment by the member states. The catch, however, is that these
conventions are not explicitly made to work during wartime. For example, if while
targeting a particular infrastructure facility during war, an oil pipeline is destroyed,
what should the international response be? During the Israel-Lebanon conflict in
2006, the Israeli Air Force bombed the Jiyeh thermal power-station in Lebanon. The
air strikes also destroyed the heavy fuel storage reservoir that lead to about 30,000
tons of oil being leaked into the Mediterranean. The UN estimated the cost of clean
up and the cost of the spill for the Lebanese economy to be more than 203 million
dollars, however, Israel claimed immunity from damage payments stating that it was
a collateral of strategic warfare and that Hezbollah, based in Lebanon, started the
war. The UN did set up a fund (based on volunteered donations) to pay for the
damages, but the money has been insufficient and it might take more that 10 years
for the affected region to recover environmentally. On the other hand, in the event of
a similar occurrence during peacetime, such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill or the BP
oil spill, the oil companies or the states controlling the oil companies can be made
liable according to the international and domestic environmental laws.
International Environmental Law is still developing and the international com-
munity and legal scholars have only recently started looking into the application of
IEL during an armed conflict. Since the 1990s, there has been a noticeable shift in
the historic belief that laws applicable during war and peace were mutually exclu-
sive. Contemporary perspectives are increasingly trying to bridge the two bodies of
law, applying peacetime international law during armed conflict to varying degrees.
Where both bodies of law apply concurrently, however, the question of their relation-
ship also has to be answered. This development is clearly documented in the work of
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the International Law Commission (ILC). In 2004, the General Assembly approved
the ILC’s proposal to include work on the ‘effects of armed conflict on treaties’ in its
long-term program. In 2008, that work resulted in a set of draft articles that attempt
to regulate the applicability of treaties during armed conflicts.13 The draft articles
state that the onset of armed conflict ‘does not necessarily terminate or suspend
the operation of treaties’ between belligerents or belligerents and neutral parties.14
Rather, this is determined by a complex body of different considerations: express
provisions and subject matter of the treaty, treaty interpretation according to Arti-
cles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 23 May
1969, the nature and extent of the armed conflict, and the effect of the armed conflict
on the treaty.15 This means in practice has to be ascertained on a case-by-case basis.
Multilateral Environmental Agreements During Armed Conflict
With regard to the question of whether and to what extent multilateral environmental
agreements (MEAs) continue to protect the environment in times of armed conflict,
a basic distinction has to be made, which is also a basic problem. As a rule, the law
applicable in times of peace applies between belligerents and neutral states (more
generally, states not parties to an armed conflict). This means that, at least as
a matter of principle, an MEA must continue to apply during an armed conflict
at least in the relation between the parties to the conflict and the states that are
not parties. From this perspective, the continued application of an MEA during an
13International Law Commission (ILC), Report of the International Law Commission, 59th Ses-
sion, 7 MayÐ5 June and 9 JulyÐ10 August 2007, paras. 266Ð324, UNGA Supp. A/62/10; ILC,
Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.727/Rev.1, 6 June 2008; ILC, Effects
of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, Addendum, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.727/Rev.1/Add.1, 11 July 2008.
The draft articles were provisionally adopted and circulated to states for comment and observation,
to be submitted by January 2010: ILC, Report of the International Law Commission, 60th Session,
5 MayÐ6 June and 7 JulyÐ8 August 2008, para. 14, UNGA Supp. A/63/10.
14ILC, Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, 6 June 2008, Art. 3.
15Ibid., Art. 4
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armed conflict only constitutes a problem in the relationship between belligerents.
In addition, and in line with this logic, the existence of a non-international armed
conflict arising on the territory of a party to an MEA does not affect the application
of the treaty. Herein lies the conundrum of the intra-state conflicts, just as in the case
of International Humanitarian Law, where the international environmental regime is
least effective in protecting the environment.
While the basic distinction between the relationship between belligerents and the
one between belligerents and non-belligerents has to be maintained, a closer look
at the scope of that distinction is necessary, taking into account the basic content
of relevant MEAs. How instruments of IEL address their applicability during times
of armed conflict varies substantially and can be broadly classified under three cat-
egories. The first kind are the MEAs that directly or indirectly provide for their
continued application during hostilities, the second kind state that they are auto-
matically suspended, terminated, or inapplicable once armed conflict has begun, the
third kind are the ones that remain silent on the issue. Unfortunately, most MEAs
fall into the third category, and there is substantial amount of uncertainty regarding
their applicability during war-time.
For example, under the World Heritage Convention, the World Heritage Commit-
tee establishes and updates a World Heritage List of cultural heritage and natural
heritage properties with “outstanding universal value.”16 Inclusion on the list requires
the concerned state’s consent. In addition, the Committee maintains a list of “World
Heritage in Danger” that includes sites that require ‘major operations’ to conserve,
for which assistance has been requested, and that are “threatened by serious and
specific dangers.” These serious and specific dangers may include “the outbreak or
the threat of an armed conflict.”17 Another example of MEAs that directly or indi-
16World Heritage Convention, Art. 11(2).
17Ibid., Art. 11(4).
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rectly provide protection for the environment during an armed conflict is the Ramsar
Convention, which establishes a list of wetlands of international importance.18 The
Convention does not expressly state whether it applies to belligerents; however, intent
may be inferred from the Convention’s language that a party to the agreement has
the right, “because of its urgent national interests, to delete or restrict the boundaries
of wetlands already included by it on the List.”19 Although a little vague, scholars
argue that ‘urgent national interests’ may include armed conflict.?Austin and Bruch
[2000]20 Similarly, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) requires
states party “to protect and preserve the marine environment’, as well as to take
measures to prevent, reduce, and control marine pollution.”21 Although the stan-
dards applied to military as opposed to non-military vessels and aircraft vary,22 legal
experts argue that since UNCLOS creates an “objective regime” and intends to serve
the interests of the state community as a whole, regardless of any political context, it
may continue to apply during armed conflict.?Vöneky [2000] As discussed previously,
more specific requirements for protecting the marine environment during wartime are
are formulated in the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed
Conflicts at Sea. Article 44 of the Manual states that when hostile actions are under-
taken within the exclusive economic zone of a neutral state, belligerents shall “have
due regard for the rights and duties of the coastal State, inter alia, for Éthe protection
18The Ramsar Convention or The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Art. 2.
19Ibid., Art. 3. Article 4 of the Ramsar Convention then requires that, when urgent national
interests cause a party to make such a deletion or restriction, they should attempt to compensate
for that loss of wetlands.
20It is notable that urgent national interests do not allow a party to restrict the protective
measures of a listed wetland, only to amend its boundaries. The question then arises whether
a military use of the area constitutes a violation of the duties of protection established by the
Convention.
21United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS
3. Arts. 192 and 194; also see Arts. 207Ð208 and 212.
22Ibid., Art. 236.
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and preservation of the marine environment.”23
In contrast, the second type of MEAs explicitly suspend, derogate, or terminate
the agreement between belligerents during armed conflict. For example, the Conven-
tion on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (1960) exempts opera-
tors for damage directly resulting from armed conflict or similar activities.24 This is
equivalent to the established principle of insurance law that insurance against losses
does not cover war damages. Seen in this light, the rule would apply not only to
the relationship between belligerents but also to that between belligerents and non-
belligerents. However, Austria and Germany objected to this provision and explicitly
declared their right to hold operators liable for such damage.
Most of the MEAs contain no reference to their applicability during armed conflict.
A few examples of such kind are the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), the
UN Convention to Combat Desertification (1994), and the Convention on the Con-
servation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (1979). The effect of their silence,
and whether it varies by type of convention, is uncertain. For example, commentary
has posited that the Convention on Biological Diversity applies to belligerent par-
ties, as it is analogous to human rights treaties that do not automatically terminate
upon hostilities.25 This uncertainty raises questions about how parties should pro-
ceed, such as whether belligerents should agree on sites to be placed off limits, or if
military entities should be instructed on the principles of the MEAs and charged to
abide by them to the extent possible. Table 6.1 provides a categorical list of some of
the most important international environmental conventions and treaties according
23Art. 34. of the San Remo Manual. Additionally, Art. 35 states that if mines are laid within a
neutral state’s exclusive economic zone, the belligerent must notify the neutral state and give “[d]ue
regard É to the protection and preservation of the marine environment.”
24Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Art. 9, 29 July 1960,
amended 28 January 1964, 956 UNTS 264.
25Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79; United Nations Convention to
Combat Desertification, 17 June 1994, 1954 UNTS 3; Convention on the Conservation of Migratory
Species of Wild Animals, 23 June 1979, 1651 UNTS 333.
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to their applicability during war-time.
Customary International Environmental Law and Soft Law
Going back to our discussion on the relationship between the belligerent states and
belligerent and non-belligerent states during an armed conflict, Customary Interna-
tional Environmental Law provides clearer guidelines for establishing liability between
belligerent and neutral parties. For example, the Trail Smelter principle may afford
protection to non-belligerent, neutral territories by establishing state responsibility
for environmental damage caused outside the state where the acts or events entailing
such damage occur.26 Even though, several legal experts suggest that such allocation
might not apply if belligerent interests outweigh the victim state’s harm.? When
damage is caused in neutral territory, this thesis is in contradiction with the general
principle of the law of neutrality that the neutral territory is inviolable and that the
neutral state, as a matter of principle, may not be affected by the armed conflict.
There is no basis in state practice for the suggested exception to this customary
rule of international law. The frequent reiteration of the Trail Smelter principle in-
deed indicates the rapid emergence of a state’s right to environmental protection as
customary IEL even during an armed conflict.
That still leaves the environmental protection of parties to the conflict an open
question. Certain soft-law instruments of IEL explicitly refer to armed conflict. Other
IEL principles and soft-law instruments may apply, although they do not address
armed conflict directly. Soft-law instruments are not binding and can only inform
26Trail Smelter Case (United States v. Canada), 16 April 1938 and 11 March 1941, Reports
of International Arbitral Awards (R.I.A.A.), Vol. III, p. 1905. The Trail Smelter principle arose
from an arbitral decision resolving a dispute between the United States and Canada regarding
trans-boundary air pollution in which a Canadian smelter harmed US crops and forests downwind
of it. The Trail Smelter arbitral panel held that Canada had a responsibility to prevent harmful
trans-boundary air emissions from the smelter, and was liable for the damages that such emissions
incurred. The decision was based on a fundamental responsibility to use one’s territory so as not to
cause harm to that of another. It must nowadays be considered as a rule of customary international
law.
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Table 6.1: Applicability of MEAs During Armed Conflict
EXPLICIT PROVISIONS
1) UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982)
2) International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil
(OILPOL) (1954)
3) International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)
(1973/1978)
4) Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region
of the Mediterranean and its Protocols (Barcelona Convention) (1976/1995)
5) Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl
Habitat (Ramsar Convention) (1971)
6) Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Her-
itage (World Heritage Convention) (1972)
7) Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) (1979)
8) African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Re-
vised) (2003)
9) Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter (London Convention) (1972)
10) UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Wa-
tercourses (1997)
SUSPENDED OR TERMINATED
1) Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous
to the Environment (1993)
2) Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (1960)
3) Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (1963)
4) International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1971)
NO PROVISION
1) Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (1986)
2) Convention on Biological Diversity (1992)
3) Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal
(Basel Convention) (1989)
4) UN Convention to Combat Desertification (1994)
5) Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES) (1973)
6) Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (1985)
7) Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987)
8) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992)
9) Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001)
10) Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS)
(1979)
11) Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (1998)
Source: UNEP
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the interpretation and application of international law unless they rise to the level
of customary IEL. For example legal scholars are still arguing whether the ‘precau-
tionary principle’ and the right to a healthy environment constitute–or are emerging–
customary IEL. A few examples of these soft laws are the Declaration of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment or the Stockholm Declaration of
1972 that articulated an overarching principle that may bear on IEL applicability
during armed conflict.27 Principle 21 of the Declaration provides that “States have
É the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do
not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.” Two decades later, adopting the language in the Program of
Action or Sustainable Development (Agenda 21),28 The Declaration on Environment
and Development (Rio Declaration) of 1992 stated in Principle 24 that “Warfare is
inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore respect in-
ternational law providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict
and cooperate in its further development, as necessary.” 29. In 1993, the UN General
Assembly adopted resolution 47/37, urging states to take measures for complying
with international law protecting the environment during armed conflict. In all of
the above soft law measures, the intent to protect the environment is clear, the pro-
vision’s precise meaning is less so; it may mean that IEL applies during conflict, or
it may simply reiterate required state adherence to relevant IHL provisions.
27Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Decla-
ration), 16 June 1972, UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (1973).
28See Art. 39(6) of Agenda 21: Program of Action for Sustainable Development, UN GAOR,
46th Session, Agenda Item 21, UN Doc. A/Conf.151/26, 14 June 1992.
29Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 13 June 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26,
Vol. I
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6.2 Commentary
The above discussion on the International Humanitarian Law and the International
Environmental law, embodying several conventions and treaties that make up the
environmental protection regimes during war-time, highlights the fact that the doc-
trine of military necessity overshadows environmental concerns during wartime. The
“threshold problem” in the IHL signifies the lack of will in the international com-
munity to protect the environment during conflicts. As the findings in the previous
chapters suggest, conflicts do inflict a long term damage on the environment in many
indirect ways even though we might assume that the environmental damage was
contained. The IHL stipulations clearly have a very narrow view of environmental
damage in-terms of its time and scope which has led to a very myopic regime, giving
a significant advantage to military operations over environmental concerns. Similarly,
treating environment as a military target trumps environmental concerns for the sake
of military strategy. Even though customary international humanitarian law tries to
rectify some of these problems, there aren’t enough international case law precedents
to strengthen customary law in this sphere.
Similarly, International Environmental Law, which includes conventions and treaties
to primarily protect and conserve the environment is often silent when it comes to
warfare. Except for a few treaties that explicitly offer guidelines during conflicts,
most environmental laws are either silent on the issue of warfare or are suspended
during conflict. This underscores the need to explicitly include regulations for states
not only at the times of peace but also during the times of conflict. Also, these reg-
ulations should not only apply towards parties and non parties to conflict but also
between parties to conflict.
Another critical issue that faces environmental regime during war-time is intra-
state wars. Both IHL and IEL are extremely weak when it comes to dealing with
environmental degradation during civil wars. As made clear in the previous chapters,
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civil wars are as destructive for the environment as international wars, therefore, to
not have significants regulations about the treatment of the environment during wars
with in state borders is a serious gap in this international regime. One could poten-
tially apply International Criminal Law or International Human Rights Law to deal
with environmental abuses during civil war. For example, the case against Sudan’s
President, Omar Al-Bashir, in the International Criminal Court (ICC) has explored
using environmental damages as an underlying act of an international crime. The
prosecutors argued that the Militia/Janjaweed and the Armed Forces repeatedly de-
stroyed, polluted or poisoned these wells so as to deprive the villagers of water needed
for survival and thus invited the judges to recognize that environmental degradation
in Darfur constituted an underlying act of genocide. However, such case precedents
are far and few and have not been prosecuted successfully. Also, prosecution in such
cases is based upon endangering human lives and not on damaging the environment,
which limits the regime to human security and not comprehensive environmental
security.
6.3 Land-mines and the International Law
As discussed in the previous chapters, both international and civil wars have an
extremely detrimental impact on agricultural capacity. A large part of this loss can
be attributed to direct and indirect effects of both anti-personnel and anti-tank land-
mines. Land-mines not only release toxic chemicals into the soil, they also render
large parts of the land useless by preventing people from utilizing the land. Given
the extent of their usage even till today and the enormous harm that they perpetrate
on the environment, it is important to look at the international mechanisms designed
to deal with land-mines as part of international regime protecting the environment
during war-time.
Land-mines were traditionally used by state-militaries for the purposes of defensive
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warfare–to protect strategic locations or to channel enemy troops into specific combat
areas. Due to this restricted manner of use, casualties of land-mines were limited to
military personnel during combat or related activity. However, since the Vietnam
war, land-mines have come to be increasingly used by weaker military or semi-trained
militia to carry out more offensive warfare. This certainly does not mean that larger
and more organized military did not use land-mines for combat, but the strategic
use of land-mines moved from defense to offense. Most of the wars in the last few
decades have been long-drawn, low-intensity, internal, and have been carried out by
cash strapped parties. This changed nature of warfare has made land-mines, that
are cheap and extremely destructive, an attractive weapon of choice. In wars today,
mines are frequently placed in areas of high civilian concentration rather than being
confined to limited battlefields of discreet size. This has resulted in increased level of
destructiveness and fatalities in civilian communities. For example, internal wars in
Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Uganda saw all the parties involved using land-mines to
perpetrate economic and social destabilization or to prevent the return of refugees.
Similarly, in Bosnia during 1993-94, Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian forces used mines
to discourage the return of refugees by other ethnic groups.
Even though the US has been resistant to signing any treaty banning the use of
land-mines, the U.S. State Department estimates that about 59 to 69 million land-
mines were deployed worldwide in the early 1990s, making them one of the most
toxic and widespread pollution facing mankind.30 The State Department report also
states that apart from inflicting heavy civilian casualties, (killing over twenty-four
thousand people each year), land-mines exacerbate regional conflicts, hinder post-
conflict reconstruction, seriously undermine infrastructure, and deny land-to-civilian
use, thereby leading to overuse of existing land.
30U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, Pub. no. 10225,
December 1994,1.
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Over the last four decades two treaties have emerged as part of the International
Humanitarian Law to restrict or ban the use of land-mines by both state and non-
state actors. The first one is the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
(CCW or CCWC), concluded at Geneva on October 10, 1980 and entered into force
in December 1983, legislates on the use of excessively injurious and indiscriminate
conventional weapons. The Additional Protocol II (AP-II) of CCW “prohibits or
restricts the use of mines, booby traps and other devices.” The AP-II aims to restrict
the use of not only anti-personnel mines but also anti-vehicle mines and over the
years the AP-II has been amended to expand its scope. Designed on the lines of
arms control treaties, this protocol has been heavily criticized for prioritizing military
necessity over humanitarian concerns. This is because the Protocol restricts the use
of land-mines in stead of completely eliminating them. It also does not take into
account the temporal aspect of land-mine use, which means that land-mines often
have an impact on unsuspecting civilian population long after they are deployed.
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Trans-
fer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, also known as the Mine Ban
Treaty, which came into effect in March 1999 sought to rectify the loopholes of the
AP-II. The Treaty is designed to completely eliminate Anti-Personnel land-mines
around the world. The treaty also heavily emphasizes on the process of de-mining
in all the signatory parties. Even though the Mine Ban Treaty does not enjoy the
membership of some of the most militarized countries like the United States, China,
India, Israel, Iran and so on, it does embody a different normative principle of regime
building from AP-II which is the primacy of humanitarian and environmental concern
over military necessity. This shift in international norms of regime construction which
accords importance to humanitarian and environmental concerns over the doctrine
of military necessity is the key to building stronger and more effective international
regimes to protect the environment.
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6.4 International Laws regarding IDPs and Refugees
Previous chapters show the impact of forced migration on environmental resources.
Both outflow and inflow of population can lead to environmental degradation. Exit of
large groups of people, especially from agrarian communities, leads to degradation of
agricultural and grazing land. On the other hand, arrival of large population groups
in an area leads to greater pressure on the local environmental resources like fresh
water, land, forests and wildlife. Forced migrants settling on a new area can be
primarily categorized as Refugees and Internally Displaced Populations (IDPs).31
When IDP data were first gathered in 1982, the ratio of refugees to IDPs was
10:1 (Cohen and Deng 1998a, 3); however, by 1990, the ratio was reversed to 1:1.45,
with 14.7 million refugees and 21.3 million IDPs. More recently, the reversed ratio
has increased to 1:3.08 in 2009 (UNHCR 2010c). The reasons for this reversal are
both demographic and political. While internal wars, developmental projects and
environmental disasters in the last few decades, have led to much more displacement
of population groups within state borders, the limited definition of “refugees” as
per the the international law precludes these groups from being counted as refugees.
Refugees are recognized by the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
and IDPs are not. Defining or labeling categories of forced migration changes the
lives of a potentially very large number of people. People who fall into the refugee
category are more likely to have the opportunities to be safe; otherwise, they are
often ignored and their lives become more endangered they are similarly in desperate
need of help ??.
Most internal displacements in the last decade were caused by internal armed con-
31In the contemporary research on forced migration, the most frequently cited definition of forced
migration, which has been adopted and promoted by the International Association for the Study of
Forced Migration and Forced Migration Online, is: “a general term that refers to the movements
of refugees and internally displaced people (those displaced by conflicts) as well as people dis-
placed by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development
projects.”(Refugee Study Center N.d.)
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flicts rather than international or internationalized conflicts [?]. Sudan, DRC, and
Iraq are major countries that consistently produced refugees and IDPs. In these coun-
tries, although the non-displaced population maybe exposed to the same abuses and
barriers, the fact that IDPs have been displaced within their countries tends to fur-
ther keep IDPs from access to physical security, the basic necessities of life, and other
rights. In the worst case, these people are often not acknowledged by national author-
ities. Governments often deny situations of internal displacement caused by conflict,
generalized violence, or human rights violations. According to IDMC [?], the govern-
ments of Ethiopia, Indonesia, Israel, Myanmar, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
and Zimbabwe did not acknowledge the existence of internal displacement during
2008. Thus, it is difficult to profile a forcibly displaced but hidden population along
with their suspected outstanding needs. In these cases, the influence of international
humanitarian actions on IDPs becomes marginal, especially when those governments
reject international humanitarian assistance. Notably, no international institution
has been given the mandate to protect or assist conflict-induced IDPs.
As an outcome of wars, these groups can be further divided as–1) Refugees of
International Wars, 2) Refugees of Civil Wars, 3) Internally Displaced Population
(IDPs) of International War, and 4) IDPs of Civil Wars. Given the nature of the
international refugee regime, Pathak and Song (2012) find that the level of environ-
mental extraction varies by different migrant groups depending on the financial and
humanitarian assistance by the international community for those groups. This is
primarily due to the design of international regimes pertaining to refugees and IDPs.
Institutional Definition of Refugees
Traditionally, academic and policy concerns with forced migration have concentrated
on refugees. The 1951 Convention codifies the rights of refugees and lays down basic
minimum standards for the treatment of refugees. It defines a refugee as a person
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who:
“. . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, . . . is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, . . . is unwilling to return
to it . . . ” (Article 1.A.(2)). 32
Most importantly, refugees have to be outside their countries of origin. The well
founded fear has to result from persecution, and refugees have to be unwilling or
unable to seek the protection of their country. The definition in the 1951 Convention is
often applied to cover people displaced by natural disasters or economic development
projects; however, those groups are not recognized by the international refugee law.33
Developing countries host 8.3 million refugees, which is 80 percent of the global
refugee population. Statistics from UNHCR show that most refugees remain in their
region of origin and flee to bordered countries. The major refugee generating regions
host on average between 76 percent and 91percent of the refugees within their regions.
At the end of 2009, only 17 percent of the total 10.4 million refugees lived outside their
region of origin (UNHCR 2010c). This pattern remains consistent over the period
between 2001 and 2009. During these years, the minimum percentage of refugees who
stayed in their region of origin was recorded at 71 percent in Europe in 2004, and
the maximum percentage was 94 percent in Latin America in 2004. This obviously
puts a tremendous amount of pressure on the neighboring countries’ environmental
resources sometimes leading to further violence between local and refugee populations.
32The 1967 Protocol Relating to Refugee Status and the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa also recognize this individual as a refugee.
33The term “Refugees” should not be confused with “economic migrants,” who can leave their
countries of origin by voluntary and conscious choice and may return to their countries of origin
without any problems. The UNHCR statistics also do not include 4.2 million Palestinian refugees
from 2000 to 2009. They fall under the responsibility of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
of Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
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The situation is complicated by the fact that most of the countries facing an influx
of refugees are themselves strapped in terms of money and infrastructure to provide
adequate support for the incoming population groups. However, the international
law and agencies pertaining to refugees are relatively organized and well funded to
offer help.
Institutional Definition of IDPs
During the past three decades there has been a growing recognition that a great
number of people are in refugee-like situations within their own countries with the
same level of special needs that refugees have. Since IDPs relocate themselves to
a different part of their own country, international assistance to and the protection
of IDPs are politically controversial issues in international relations. Nevertheless,
the international community has developed an international IDP regime since the
mid-1990s.
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in 1997 (UN OCHA N.d.) de-
fines IDPs as follows:
“. . . persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee
or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a
result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of
generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or man-made
disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state
border (para.2).”
Three core elements of this definition are the coercive and involuntary character of
movement, movement within national borders, and citizens or foreigners with habit-
ual residence. Unlike refugees, IDPs do not have a specific legal status; yet, they are
in as much desperate need as refugees are. In contemporary forced migration crises,
governments reluctantly but increasingly allow humanitarian agencies to launch hu-
manitarian operations within their territories. Thus, it is necessary to restate more
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detailed legal provisions responding to the specific needs of IDPs induced by conflict
as well as other causes. At the end of 2009, the number of conflict-generated IDPs
was estimated at 27.1 million (IDMC 2010a). UNHCR does not have a mandate to
assist or protect these people, but it increasingly engages in field operations for IDPs.
In 2009, for instance, 5.6 million IDPs benefited from UNHCR-involved operations.
However, the majority of IDPs worldwide live in protracted displacement in which the
processes of finding durable solutions have stalled and/or IDPs are marginalized as a
consequence of violations or a lack of protection of human rights, including economic,
social, and cultural rights (IDMC 2009, 14). In this situation, it is difficult to assess
their number, particularly in countries with both protracted and new displacements.
For example, in the August 2008 conflict between Russian and Georgian forces, the
situation of people displaced since the 1990s was overlooked in favor of the people
affected by the new displacement crisis.
Different categories of forced migrants vary in their power of choice and the acces-
sibility to international assistance and protection. In general, refugees are considered
to exercise more power of choice and get more assistance and protection than IDPs.
In international conflict, neighboring countries and the international community often
become promptly involved in assisting and protecting those who have already crossed
international borders. Due to the binding demand of the international refugee regime,
refugees enjoy a higher level of accessibility to international support than IDPs. The
range of their freedom of choice in international conflict becomes wider than that of
refugees motivated by domestic violence.
IDPs in an international conflict can also have a wider range of power of choice
than IDPs in a domestic conflict, but by staying inside the country of origin in which
a conflict occurs, they often have little access to international assistance and protec-
tion. On the other hand, in the case of an internal conflict, the probability that both
refugees and IDPs will be assisted and protected by the international community is
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lower than in the case of an international conflict. Since the international refugee
regime was established to address humanitarian consequences of interstate wars, it
does not bind governments and humanitarian agencies together to assist displaced
people in internal conflicts. Therefore, forced migrants in civil wars and other in-
ternal conflicts are likely to remain within their countries of origin and face harsher
circumstances. Without binding rules for the international community to be involved
in domestic affairs, the number of refugees is expected to be smaller than that created
by international conflict. IDPs are assisted or protected by the international commu-
nity in varying degrees. Depending on the willingness and capability of governments
and the international community, some IDPs have better opportunities for safety
than others. In general, being entitled to refugee status increases the probability
that displaced people can be safe and can get assistance.
To sum it up the above argument, in terms for humanitarian and financial assis-
tance, refugees of international wars benefit the most from the international refugee
regime followed by refugees of civil wars followed by the IDPs of international war
and the groups that benefits the least are IDPs of civil wars as follows: refugees
in international wars >refugees of civil wars >IDPs of international wars >IDPs of
civil wars. This order of benefits perhaps indicates the group that would engage in
most environmental extraction to compensate for any the lack of assistance from the
international community. Therefore, the need of the hour is to strengthen the IDP
regime so that internally displaced groups rely less on environmental extraction from
their surrounding areas.
6.5 Discussion
A regime’s norm forms its core that determines its objectives and effectiveness. The
above discussion indicates that the international regime to protect the environment
during wartime accords primacy to military necessity over environmental security.
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Even when International Human Rights Law, International Criminal Law or the In-
ternational Humanitarian Law prescribe measures for environmental protection dur-
ing wartime, that concern often stems with in the context of human security and
not necessarily environmental security (which should mean securing the environment
for the sake of environment itself and not necessarily for the sake of human beings).
For a more comprehensive and effective regime to wards environmental protection
during wartime, the norm of the international community needs to experience a shift
towards environmental protection.
One example of how norm-shifting can help the effectiveness of a regime is the
international whaling regime. The International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling which regulates and monitors whaling activities around the world has seen
significant changes in its norms since 1940s. The regime was initially designed for
sustainable whaling and embodied a “consumptionist” norm. This meant that the
aim of the member states was to establish fixed quotas for the catch be able to carry
on whaling for commercial purposes in a sustainable manner. Due to an upsurge of
environmental movements in the 1960s and new research by the scientific community,
the “consumptionist” norm of the whaling regime shifted to “conservation.” This
shift in the regime norm led the International Whaling Commission (IWC) to estab-
lish zero catch limits for commercial whaling in 1986. This provision is still in place
today, although the Commission continues to set catch limits for aboriginal subsis-
tence whaling and research related whaling. Various environmental groups have been
fighting for complete “preservation,” which means an absolute ban on whaling. So
far, the IWC has resisted a shift to the “preservation” norm but the earlier shift from
a “consumptionist” norm to a “conservationist” norm in the whaling regime made
significant improvements in the whale population and the effectiveness of the whaling
regime.
A similar shift in the international norm–from that of “military necessity” to
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“environmental preservation”–has to occur so that the international regime towards
protecting the environment during wartime can be strengthened.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
The traditional notion of security focuses on the security of states and their ability to
guard their territorial sovereignty against any external threat. At the international
level this implies that the world is secure if individual states can protect their borders
and national interests. However, with the end of Cold War, the notion of security
underwent a paradigm shift. With the great power politics suspended, scholars and
policy practitioners of security began to shift their gaze from the security of states
on to the security of human beings. This new paradigm of human security demanded
absence of wars, population health, human rights, social developments, and protec-
tion from environmental hazards. The expansion of the notion of state security to
human security was a result of changing dimension of the international context such
as the emergence of an arguably multipolar world, growth of non governmental or-
ganizations, international terrorism, and globalization. Now, once again we are at a
critical juncture in international politics where the world has to think about security
in terms of environmental challenges and this calls for another reorientation of our
perspective of security.
Earlier, the idea of environmental security was subsumed under the paradigm of
human security. This involved and reflected the ability of an entity, whether a nation
or a society, to withstand environmental asset scarcity, environmental risks or adverse
changes, or environment related tensions or conflicts. Such a conception of environ-
mental security has been very prevalent in the field of international relations and in-
ternational development. In international politics, scholars and policy-practitioners,
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concerned about conflict, have looked at how altered resource availability such as food
shortage or loss of land, leads to political disputes and civil unrest. Such resource
scarcity could lead to creation of new power blocs and much bigger international con-
flicts. Scholars of international development worry about environmental security in
terms of access to drinking water, food, and environmental sustainability to ensure
continuous economic development. However, as more and more scientific evidence of
anthropogenic impact on the environment is coming forward, we must question our
objective of environmental security.
As mentioned repeatedly in this research, an anthropocentric vision of environ-
mental security is not only presumptuous, it also weakens the construction and effec-
tiveness of environmental regimes. Also, given how human civilization has exploited
Earth’s “resources,” for centuries now, it is the environment that needs to be secured
from us and not vice-versa. Both states, (as emphasized by the Neo-realist security
paradigm) and individuals, (as epitomized by the Human Security paradigm) have
contributed towards compromising the environment for developmental gains. As the
landscape of international politics is shifting again, it is important to not subsume en-
vironmental security under other security paradigms but reframe it as an independent
paradigm that prioritizes the security of the environment.
The Millennium Project, an independent think tank initiated by the United States
EPA, UNDP, and UNESCO, did a global assessment of the definitions of environmen-
tal security and created a synthesis definition: Environmental Security is environ-
mental viability for life support, with three sub-elements–1) preventing or repairing
military damage to the environment, 2) preventing or responding to environmentally
caused conflicts, and 3) protecting the environment due to its inherent moral value.
This definition, although anthropocentric, does underscore the importance of secur-
ing the environment due to moral imperatives above all else. This understanding of
environmental security also recognizes that environment is greatly susceptible to wars
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and needs to be protected from military activities.
In line with the above understanding of environmental security, this study has
examined some important aspects of the relationship between armed conflict and the
environment. Whereas most studies of conflict focus on determinants of war, I exam-
ine the consequences of war for the environment. Environmental security should not
mean securing the environment for us, rather it should be about securing the environ-
ment from us. This includes protecting the environment from militarized and violent
conflicts notwithstanding any doctrine of military necessity. In this concluding chap-
ter, I revisit the question of why the relationship between conflict and environment
matters to students of international security. In the next section, I briefly discuss the
importance of securing the environment in a global context, followed by some signif-
icant aspects of conflict-environment relationship that might be useful directions for
future research.
7.1 Environment and Environmental Security as a Global Issue
Although the Earth’s climate has gone through natural changes through its inception
due to natural climatic cycles, variations in the Earth’s orbit and inclination to the
Sun, changes in sea currents, and other natural phenomena such as volcanoes and
sunspots, the scientific community concurs that the changes in Earth’s climate since
the 20th century have outpaced all other natural changes of the past recorded by
humans. Scientists have attributed this unusual pace of change in Earth’s climate,
which includes an overall rise in global temperatures, to anthropogenic activities.
Since the industrial revolution, human activity has increased the amount of green-
house gases such as carbon-dioxide, methane, nitrous-dioxide, and chlorofluorocar-
bons, in the atmosphere. The increased amount of gases which absorb heat, has
directly lead to more heat being retained in the atmosphere and thus an increase in
global average surface temperatures. The increase in temperature also leads to change
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in rainfall patters, hurricanes, glacial melting, and other effects on the climate system.
Land-use changes, such as cutting down forests to create farmland, have led to
changes in the amount of sunlight reflected from the ground back into space, a phe-
nomenon known as the surface albedo. The World Meteorological Organization es-
timates that this phenomenon is responsible for at least one-fifth of the changes in
the global climate due to changes in emissions of greenhouse gases. About half of
the land use changes are estimated to have occurred during the industrial era, much
of it due to replacement of forests by agricultural cropping and grazing lands over
Eurasia and North America. Other significant changes in the land surface resulting
from human activities include tropical deforestation which changes evapotranspira-
tion rates (the amount of water vapor put into the atmosphere through evaporation
and transpiration from trees), desertification, which increases surface albedo, and the
general effects of agriculture on soil moisture characteristics.
Given the state of affairs and the inability of the Kyoto Protocol to achieve a
global mandate, the international community is now aiming to come up with a bind-
ing universal agreement to cut greenhouse gas emissions by the year 2015. Fervent
international negotiations are underway as part of the Bali Action Plan to come up
with a viable and effective agreement to protect the environment from anthropogenic
activities. Two primary reasons why the Kyoto Protocol failed to achieve a universal
mandate were a strong reluctance from developed countries like the United States and
Australia to accept a “differentiated responsibility” for cutting down emissions, and a
refusal from developing countries like India and China to accept any binding cuts on
their emissions and compromise their economic growth. The reservations from both
sides are predicated upon prioritizing economic security and development of states
and individuals over environment. However, the inability to reduce the anthropogenic
emissions into the Earth’s atmosphere, coupled with massive deforestation and other
pollution, will lead to catastrophic effects for the planet. Therefore, we have come
146
to a precipice of environmental degradation where we need to change our priorities
and secure our environment above all. This is also true in the realm of violent con-
flict where no military necessity or national security should justify environmental
degradation.
7.2 Violent Conflict and Environmental Security
In this study, I have evaluated certain aspects of the relationship between conflict
and the environment within an altered environmental security framework. I have
presented the environment at the center of my analysis and have argued that envi-
ronment must be protected during war-time as a moral imperative. Wars affect the
environment through a myriad of complex mechanisms, and a number or direct or
indirect consequences of violent conflict can lead to deterioration of the environment.
My analyses demonstrate some important linkages among conflict, socio-political fac-
tors, and environmental indicators.
I find that conflicts have a very detrimental impact on the environment which may
not become apparent in the short-run but can lead to a significant loss of biocapacity
of a country in the long-run. My analysis also suggests that different type of conflicts
can have different impact on a country’s environment, for instance, international and
ethnic conflicts have a more detrimental impact on a country’s environment in a the
long-run but in the short-run only international conflicts seem to impact the envi-
ronment. My analysis also finds a significant relationship between democracies and
the long-run environmental management after conflicts. Apart from political factors,
economic factors also have a significant impact on the environmental capacity of a
country in both short-term and long-term. By using a standardized measure of envi-
ronmental quality such as national biocapacity, I can compare the impact of different
types of wars on different types of environmental services or indicators. For example,
I find that while internal wars are extremely devastating for the forest resource of a
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country, ethnic wars and civil wars are more destructive for crop production. On an
average, international wars tend to be more devastating for most of the environmental
indicators analyzed in this study.
These are important conclusions regarding a significant consequence of war, and
are relevant to policy decisions regarding conflict initiation, intervention, and inter-
national regime building. As mentioned earlier in the dissertation, this study only
claims to be the “first-cut” in assessing the impact of conflicts on the environment in
a large-scale and systematic manner. I expect this type of research to become more
nuanced and accurate as we develop better data for measuring the environment in a
more comprehensive manner and not just the productive capacity of the environment
(which is a completely anthropocentric measure of the environment). A more nuanced
analysis of this relationship (between violent conflict and the environment) would also
involve looking at feedback loops where environment and conflict could impact each
other in temporally sequential manner. This means that violent conflicts can lead to
environmental degradation, which in turn can lead to further conflict, which could
lead to further environmental degradation and so on.
Another path for this analysis would be to look at the spatial diffusion of envi-
ronmental degradation due to conflict. Since, both environment and conflict spread
across territorial boundaries, this relationship often diffuses across national borders.
Therefore, the next natural step for this research would be to undertake a spatial
analysis to understand how environmental impact of conflict spreads into neighbor-
ing countries.
There are some additional aspects to the impact of violent conflicts on the en-
vironment that have not been empirically tested in this study but warrant a brief
discussion here as appropriate directions for continued exploration of the conflict-
environment relationship. Internal displacement of population, international aid and
domestic budget allocation, environmental justice, and conflict cycles are some of the
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factors that need to be looked into when we look at the relationship between conflict
and environment.
Allocation of Resources Between Environment and Military
Expenditure
Wars cost money, and for states and warring factions, the expenditure on war often
comes at the expense of social welfare. Societies all over the world have had to
divert divert resources from other use, including environmental provisions, to fund
war efforts. Both developing and developed countries make critical decisions about
defense spending, particularly in times of conflict. Between 1960 and 1990, military
expenditure increased about four times in developing countries, but began to decline
after 1990. Even though there has been an overall decline of military expenditures by
developing countries since the 90s, their per-capita expenditure on defense spending
has doubled in recent years. This means that developing states cultivate a higher
defense spending burden as a proportion of their GDPs as compared to developed
countries that obviously outspend the developing countries in absolute amounts.
This is a classic guns verses butter debate where due to states’ limited economic
capacity there is budgetary tradeoff between military expenditure and welfare spend-
ing. In this research I have talked about the indirect impact of wars on the environ-
ment, this kind of monetary trade-off that takes away resources from spending on
environmental protection is a very important economic consequence of conflicts for
the environment.
There are three important ways in which conflict affect the environment through
economic channels. Firstly, wars lead to diversion of resources away from environ-
mental protection. This trade-off has a much more harmful impact on developing
countries that developed countries. Wars put tremendous strain on a country’s in-
frastructure and social services, this includes environmental infrastructure such as
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irrigation structures, conservation personnel, refineries, mines and so on. Developing
countries, where such infrastructure might be underdeveloped and under-protected
to begin with, often pay a much heavier price if whatever infrastructure that exists, is
destroyed. Also, during and after wars, economically disadvantaged countries might
not be able afford reconstruction of critical environmental services and the impact of
destruction is then prolonged. This is because, given a limited supply of economic
aid and resources, other human services like food, shelter, and health take priority
over environmental conservation efforts in times of crisis. Having said that, such
budgetary trade-offs are also experienced in societies of developed and industrialized
states. For example, the Cold War witnessed a significant resource allocation of re-
sources from welfare to war preparation both in the United States and the Soviet
Union. Military spending by developed states also affects financial aid allotted to
developing countries. [Levy and Sidel (2002)]
Secondly, in addition to diversion of resources from welfare to warfare, states that
are involved in conflict–particularly longer conflicts–experience a decrease in their
overall income level. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
estimates, by 1986 Mozambique’s GDP per capita was 50 percent less than what it
would have been without the war. Mozambique’s GDP per capita fell from 185 USD
in 1980 to 87 USD in 1992, and Mozambique became the poorest state in the world.
This loss of income not only affects human services, it also affects a Mozambique’s
ability to spend on conservation efforts and protect its precious Mangrove forests and
coral reefs. Other countries in Africa, such as Niger, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, have
also been expanding their defense spending at the expense of other economic sectors.
[Rahim and Akinroye (2002)]
The third way in which conflicts indirectly affect the environment through eco-
nomic mechanisms is in trade involving environmental resources to generate the in-
come needed to buy arms. Extraction of minerals and diamonds, and illegal logging
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have funded brutal wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Democratic Republic of
Congo and CŹte dÕIvoire that have resulted in the death and displacement of millions
of people. According to recent reports, revenues from diamond mining companies op-
erating in the Marange area in Zimbabwe have funded abusive security forces loyal
to the ruling Zanu-PF. Revenue from the diamond sector could fund further violence
in the 2013 elections. In Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), fighting that has
continued over 15 years, has been driven by the trade in valuable minerals like cassi-
terite (the ore for tin), coltan (the ore for a rare metal called tantalum), wolframite
(tungsten ore), and gold. Interestingly, the electronics industry based in developed
countries is one of the main destinations for these metals, which end up in mobile
phones, laptops, and other consumer products.
Untangling these complex economic connections between conflicts and environ-
ment is a crucial task which will not only highlight the inadequacy of funding to-
wards environmental conservation but also underscore the need for financial aid and
international concern towards combating environmental impact of conflicts.
Subnational Environmental Impact of Conflicts
This study has looked at the impact of warfare on a country’s environmental capacity.
Due to the nature of national biocapacity data, this research has been confined to
a country level analysis of environmental degradation. However, “environment” is
not confined by political boundaries, and states often experience different levels of
environmental degradation within their territories as a consequence of conflict. This
is because the ecological vulnerability of the environment varies within countries.
Also environmental infrastructure such as dams varies in different parts of a country
which can determine what areas are targeted during wartime.
For example, according to UNEP reports, the southern part of Sudan and the
northern part of South Sudan were the worst affect regions environmentally during
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the civil war in Sudan. This region falls in the Sahel belt and is environmentally
one of the most vulnerable regions of the world. Also, this region was the epicenter
of the Darfur conflict hence it experienced the maximum amount of population dis-
placement in the country. Similarly, in larger countries like India, intra-state wars in
specific regions such as Kashmir or Assam or Punjab lead to environmental deterio-
ration within a localized area that is not effectively captured by national biocapacity
data. Also, due to data limitations, this research only focuses on the impact on a
country’s environmental biocapacity due to hosting international refugees. However,
as mentioned before, given the increase in the number of intra-state wars in the last
thirty years the number of internally displaced population is much higher that in-
ternational refugees. These groups of IDPs that locate themselves in different parts
within the same country also put pressure on environmental resources that needs to
be accounted for.
Refugee camps and IDP camps put an immense amount of pressure on local
environmental resources. It is often hard to find large swaths of land to establish
refugee camps and IDP camps, hence, national parks and wildlife reserves often be-
come the de facto choice for setting up these camps. As mentioned before in this
research, this leads to logging, poaching and hunting of wild animals, pollution of
water resources. Such environmental degradation is often limited around the area
of rehabilitation camps and might be difficult to capture in a national level environ-
mental data. Therefore, it is important to develop similar studies that look at the
environmental impact of conflicts at a more subnational level. This will not only
increase the accuracy of the analysis, it will also help in making more specific policy
prescriptions designed for localized regions.
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Environmental Justice
This study highlights the devastating impact of international warfare and how over-
all, international wars are more detrimental to the environment that civil wars. This
is because, modern international wars use advanced weaponry, carpet bombing and
strategic aerial attacks that wreak havoc with a country’s environment. This devas-
tating impact on the environment also highlights the environmental injustice of many
international wars that are increasingly being undertaken for the sake of “humani-
tarian intervention.” Because the intervening parties’ mode of conducting warfare is
often not only impersonal but also physically distant, absolving them of any environ-
mental damages.
The notion of environmental justice emerged in the United States in the 1980s
a part of a larger environmental movement. The concept of environmental justice
focuses on a fair distribution of environmental benefits and burdens. Environmental
justice advocates are concerned with what is termed “social ecology” or “human
welfare ecology.” Their primary concern is the impact of institutional systemic flaws
which are the natural result of a progression of historical events resulting in decisions
which establish unjust living conditions upon one group of people due to a lack of
organization, power and prominence. Environmental justice advocates contend that
instances of environmental injustice are not simply arbitrary realities which occur in
varying contexts. Rather, instances of environmental injustice are the outcome of an
institutional oppression and isolation which have set up an inevitable framework of
the powerful oppressing the powerless. The victims, through a significant occurrence
of historical and social realities, have been cut off from the power required even to
challenge the causes of environmental injustice.
Even-though the environmental justice movement primarily emerged in the United
States within the context of racial and class politics, its scope has now been expanded
to international circumstances. The idea of “differential responsibility” in the politics
153
of climate change and the financial and technological aid demanded by the global
South, stems from the idea of environmental justice. The environmental exploitation
of the global south is symptomatic of systemic injustice that has been perpetrated
from the times of mercantilism to colonialism to the present era of globalization.
Since the development of aerial warfare, the notion of environmental injustice has
become relevant for militarized conflicts also where the environmental burden of war
is born unequally. From the atomic bombing of Japan during the Second World War
by the United States to the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011, developed countries
have been able to successfully distance themselves from the environmental catastro-
phes of war. Every time, the United States has undertaken military operations in
Iraq, or when Britain launched an attack over Falkland Islands with Argentina, or
when NATO bombed Yugoslavia, it was the country at the receiving end that experi-
enced environmental devastation. Such inequality in experiencing the environmental
impact of war can make the powerful and more developed countries oblivious of the
environmental cost of war. However, such thinking can be misguided because in the
long-run, if not sooner, the environmental impact of wars if felt by other countries
due to the interconnectedness of environmental systems and a global dependence of
environmental resources.
7.3 Directions for Future Research
Environmental security if treated as means for human security will dilute our focus on
protecting and conserving the environment. As mentioned previously, this research
only claims to be the beginning of looking at the relationship between environment
and conflict from an altered perspective of environmental security. Most research
exploring this issue has looked at the environmental factors as exogenous determinants
of violent conflicts. These studies argue that scarcity or abundance of resources or
environmental disasters lead to conflict. I, on the other hand, have argued here that
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the relationship between environment and conflict is not unidirectional. In stead
environment and social conflicts affects each other in complex feedback loops and
looking at the environmental impact of conflict is only examining one part of this
complex relationship. My research also shows how conflicts degrade some of socially
critical environmental resources such as cropland, fisheries, and forests, that could
lead to more social conflict. The difficulty in clearly explicating this feedback type of
relationship between conflict and environment arises from the complexities of relevant
linkages, the challenge of identifying influential intervening factors, lack of data, and
the sheer number of actors involved. It is therefore necessary to continue examining
the environmental consequences of conflict and their larger relationship.
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